The Buncefield Oil Storage Depot - Explosion and Fire - Essay Example

The Buncefield Oil Storage Depot Explosion and Fire 1. Investigation of the Incident In December 11, 2005, fire and explosion destroyed large part of the Buncefield Oil Storage Depot. The first massive explosion occur at around 6:00 a.m. that was followed by a large fire that engulfed 23 large fuel storage tanks over large parts of the depot. Forty-three people injured and 2,000 others evacuated. 630 businesses affected employing some 16,500 persons (Moore and Lakha 2006, 170). There were no fatalities but the fire burned for five days, destroying most of the site and emitting a large plume of smoke into the environment. The Police and the Fire and Rescue Service were first to respond. The Hertfordshire police made coordination and those who responded includes the Hertfordshire County Council, Dacorum Borough Council, EA and HPA. At the height of the incident, there were twenty-six Hertfordshire pumps, twenty support vehicles and one hundred eighty fire fighters on site. The operation consumed more or less 250,000 litres of foam concentrate, more than 25 million litres of water, and 30,000 metres of high-volume hose (MIIB-08b 2008, 64). Throughout the emergency response, Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service personnel showed tremendous commitment, professionalism and skill (Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service 2006, 3). The approximate quantifiable cost of the Buncefield incident is £1 billion (MIIB-08a 2008, 24). 2. Causes The Major Incident Investigation Board or MIIB that was appointed January 2006 by the Health and Safety Commission reported that the explosion and fire that caused the extensive damage on and off site could be attributed to the ignition of a ‘mist like’ flammable mixture that was reported by eyewitnesses and visible on CCTV records (Moore and Lakha 2006, 170). The safety system that is supposed to shut off the supply of petrol to tank 912 to prevent overfilling failed. Consequently, petrol flows down the side of the tank and the mixture of petrol and air forms a highly flammable vapour clouds (MIIB-08a 2008, 7). The main explosion that occurred that early morning was very strange according to the report since it generated extreme over pressures that usual vapour cloud explosion. Consequently, further investigation was conducted to explain the phenomenon. Petrol alone will not easy explode (MIIB-08a 2008, 7) but when 3000 tonnes of it escaped from the tank and turned to vapour that mixed with the cold air, it can reach a concentration point where it can turn into highly combustible. Although the source of ignition was not precisely determined, there was evidence to support the view that the first ignition occurred at a source in the emergency generator cabin. This conclusion was based on forensic evidence that the building have been subjected to an internal confined explosion. Ignition was followed by a ‘bang-box’ explosion inside the generator cabin, which generated a high over-pressure together with a fast-moving flame in an external cloud (MIIB-07b 2007, 12). 3. Management Failure Although many believes that the Buncefield incident was an unprecedented event, the Investigation Board advised the Competent Authority (CA) concern to check the functionality of some high-level switches on fuel tanks. This is because the investigation board questions the defective leakage protection of a number of the tank yards. Although reports claim that the explosion and resulting fire were accidental, it appears to be a disaster waiting to happen. For instance, the explosion and fire happened without any alarm being raised. Apparently, the site do not have sufficient or defective alarm system to provide early warning of possible pressure increase, smoke or fire or heat. Some the major failures identified were failure of the overfilling level measuring device, malfunction of the overfill safety device, and operational failure caused by insufficient monitoring by the site’s personnel (MIIB-08a 2008, 7). Five companies operating at the site were charged for violating health, safety, and welfare of its employees under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. Moreover, they were charge with violations of Regulation of COMAH 1999 for failure to take necessary actions to limit the consequences of a major disaster (Buncefield Investigation 2008, 1). 4. Failure Health and Safety The Investigation Board in Buncefield incident made a study of the causes and prepared proposals to enhance safety and environmental implementation. These include design and operation of sites, emergency preparedness, land use planning, and the Competent Authority’s policies and procedures. The HSE, apparently ineffective in its functions were asked by the Board to review its approach to giving advice to planning authorities, with a view of taking greater account of risk. The Board also reiterate the necessity for additional investigation into the explosion mechanism. The Board also believes that the incident in Buncefield is not a ‘reasonably credible scenario’ for planning purposes. This is because in their analysis, the circumstances leading to the incident was inevitable although the consequences were not. For this reason, there is need to alter the present principles in controlling a particular incident risks (MIIB-08a 2008, 18). The failure of government agencies to provide assessments of the potential risk from explosion and spread which engulfed the entire site is an obvious failure. The site is COMAH site under the control of the HSE and the Environmental Agency (MIIB-07a 2007, 3). Both should have been fully aware of the potential failures, which have materialised. In addition, operators in this type of industry are answerable to the requirements of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999. The most important question about the Buncefield incident is how it is possible to develop a residential and commercial establishment around the site, considering the requirements of existing legislations and the danger it pose to people (MIIB-07c 2007, 14). Undoubtedly, the implementation of such laws was ineffective and environmental agencies are not doing their job well enough. For instance, the presence of a major hazard site alongside neighbouring commercial and residential development is a clear neglect on the part of planning authorities (MIIB-08b 2008, 141). 5. Effects on the Environment Affected by the Buncefiled explosion and fire were soil and water around the site. They were polluted by escaped fuel and fire fighting foam and water. Although contamination around the site was evident, there was no report of drinking water contamination. However, the threat of pollution remains since a lot of fuel and foam migrated into the ground water. Pollution from the smoke that was spread over a wide area caused minimal damage to soil and vegetation. In general, the impact of the incident to the environment is minimal including air quality at ground level. (MIIB-08a 2008, 11). On further investigation and monitoring, the initial result indicates that there is indeed contamination on the surface layer of lands around the site. A hazardous chemical PFOS or Perfluorooctane sulphonate, use as an additive to fire fighting foams, were also detected in the Ver and Colne river. However, there is no direct impact reported on fish and other aquatic species at the time of the report. According to EA, identification of the environmental consequences of PFOS is only possible through long-term monitoring (MIIB-08b 2008, 133). 6. Conclusion The December 11, 2005 Buncefield incident destroyed 23 large fuel storage tanks, injured 43 people, displaced thousands of people. The cause of the incident according the result of the investigation was a malfunctioning tank overfill safety device. Consequently, petrol escaped and flows down the side of the tank creating a highly flammable vapour cloud of air and petrol. The first ignition occurred at a source in the emergency generator cabin. The explosion, fire, and fire fighting operation contaminated the surrounding area of the site. Although many believe that the incident was a unique event, the effectiveness of site safety management was investigated. Operators were charge of violating health and safety legislation and regulations. Moreover, HSE, EA, CA and others were also asked to reconsider their approach particularly in giving advice to planning authorities. 7. Bibliography Buncefield Investigation. Notice of Prosecution: Explosion and Fire at Buncefield Oil Storage Depot - Five Companies to Face Prosecution. Available online at http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/press/b08002.htm, 2008 Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service. Buncefield: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service's Review of the Fire Response. U.K.: The Stationery Office, 2006 MIIB-07a. Recommendations On the Emergency Preparedness for, Response to and Recovery from Incidents. U.K: The Office of the Public Sector Information, 2007 MIIB-07b. Explosion Mechanism: Advisory Group Report. U.K: The Office of the Public Sector Information, 2007 MIIB-07c. Recommendations on the Design and Operation of Fuel Storage Sites. U.K: The Office of the Public Sector Information, 2007 MIIB-08a. The Buncefield Incident: 11 December 2005, The Final Report of the Major Incident Investigation Board Volume 1. U.K.: The Office of the Public Sector Information, 2008 MIIB-08b. The Buncefield Incident: 11 December 2005, The Final Report of the Major Incident Investigation Board Volume 2. U.K: The Office of the Public Sector Information, 2008 Moore Tony and Lakha Raj Tolley's. Handbook of Disaster and Emergency Management: Principles and Practice. U.K.: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2006 Read More