Domestic Fires in Multi-Occupancy Building - Harrow Court - Case Study Example

Community Safety Table of Contents ITEM PAGE # Title Page 1 Standard Operating Procedure 3 Incident Command System 3 Domestic Fires in Multi-Occupancy Building (Harrow Court) 4 Integrated Risk Management Plan 6 Migrant Workers Housing 10 Communication and Public Safety 13 Works Cited 15 Standard Operating Procedures The manner in which various Fire and Rescue Services have devised to capitalize on their resources which have been modified and improved over a number of years to enhance successful conclusions for the types of fires and assorted emergencies can be classified as the Standard Operating Procedure. It has the goal of making sure that the requirements, which have been formulated through time and incident trials, are in fact carried out at the incident, and that there is zero tolerance for deviation, which might compromise the established minimum for health and safety standards. Incident Command System The fact that the ICS is capable of being applicable on any level of incident, and it has adopted a common structure and jargon, it can respond and be effectively implemented in national or international incidents. The management protocol of the ICS was originally designed for emergency management agencies, it has a built in flexible, scaled response; and it can adapt to very small emergencies or tuned up to accommodate large emergencies. In theory, the most positive aspect of the system is, the responders can be brought in from all types of agencies and immediately adhere to the specific type of command which is to serve as the operating mode for an emergency. The system is so standardized until there is a minimum chance for miscommunication among the responders, who normally do not work together. The hierarchical order of the command structure has resulted in the ICS being termed as a first on scene structure. This usually enables the first responder who arrives on the scene, to normally be in charge of the scene, until the situation is resolved, or the first responder to arrive will relinquish the command of the scene to a commander who later arrives, and has more qualifications.Some of the studies which were commissioned to investigate the weaknesses in the system, pointed to the following, in stressing the need for a standardized system. At the scene of the incident it was not always clear to everyone, who was the person in charge; there were not any specific chains of command, or supervision. The lines of communication were blurred; because with multiple agencies on the scene, there was a constant conflict of jargon. Additionally, the methodology to incorporate inter-agency stipulations into the management system was convoluted. It was a determination of the emergency managers that the previous management structure, which was different with each agency of responders, was not adaptable to addressing the mass mutual emergency responses, in that the responding agencies did not normally work together, there was more turmoil than coordination.That most of the agencies were unfamiliar with the structure and the terminology, and responders were not able to adequately adjust to situations. Domestic fires in multi-occupancy building ( Harrow Court) Fires which occur at ground level present varying levels of risk for firefighters. Consequently, when firefighters are faced with a fire which is situated in multi-story dwellings, the physiological demands are amplified, the pending difficulties are much greater and the inherent risks are much greater. There are a series of Murphy laws which can intervene. For example, the time consumption which takes place between the articulation of a strategy and the actual application of the tactical operation on the fire floors can consume lots of valuable time. During the delay which occurs between the articulation of the proposed strategy from the fire commander, the circumstances of the incident could drastically change. Which may dictate an alteration in the strategy on the fire floor(s).The need for ICS grew out of a need to shore up response problems in the light of an emergency, and that most of the problems encountered by response teams not being both efficient and effective, were not borne out of a need for resources, but to a mounting communication and management defect. Effectiveness in a high rise fire fighting situation dictates that there be a pre-plan, which is based on the past experiences of those who have been engaged in these types of fires in the past. It is imperative that the pre-plan be understood by everyone involved with the incident. Understanding is achieved through extensive training in buildings of similar type. There is a commonly accepted premise that the communication process will inevitably breakdown.Therefore,the pre-plan will serve as an invaluable tool during this communication lapse, and it will dictate that other critical tasks be performed, such as searching elevators, stair shafts and the roof. The Incident Command system was one of the subjects in the review of the Harrow Court incident.The Fire Brigade Union has been extremely critical of the delineated process. As previously mentioned, the ICS was designed to facilitate communication between all actors.The system is formulated on a hierarchical order. (See flow chart and verbal explanation in Appendix “A”) While the concept for ICS is incident appropriate, given the fact that it possesses the built in flexibility to adjust to small or large emergencies, and it is standardized to provide a common jargon which will accommodate the functionality of agencies which do not normally work as a team, the problem at the Harrow Court incident, was a lack of incident command training, and crew command training. However, where does one place the blame, and more importantly, what is the solution. I would be inclined to take the position that the problem is exactly where the FBU pin pointed it in the Harrow Court fire. Particularly if we were to place credence in the assessment of UK Fire Officer Paul Grimwood In his "Operational Aspects of High-Rise Firefighting:, wherein he asserts, many incident command systems and standard operating procedures for tall structures are based on out of date policies.(Grimwood) Additionally, risk assessment was not handled properly, in the Harrow Court incident The unfortunate consequence of this shortcoming was an inadequate response, both with the number and types of apparatus and the necessary manpower.Again, reliance on systems which do not provide correct data for proper assessment. Integrated Risk Management Plan The system was borne out of the recognized need for more efficient analysis and allocation of resources and management techniques. The process to arrive at what the system would consist of was a well developed methodology which was conducted over a number of years, using 11 United Kingdom fire and rescue services to participate in the alpha testing. The methodology enabled the teams to collect data from a number of different scenarios during the testing period. These scenarios concerned the possibility of the loss of life, property, and injury. These incidents were correlated with the response times of the services in reaching the occurrences. Additionally, the item of costs was also an important entity which was calculated on a costs and benefits assessment measured against existing practices of local emergency practices. One of the hallmarks of the Integrated Risk Management plan was, the model was to be customized to accommodate the needs of local fire and rescue units. These were to be developed in accordance with the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations, wherein the Fire Service Inspectorate formulated a list of Generic Risk Assessments (GRAs) which dealt with the spectrum of risks the Firefighters would customarily experience whenever they responded to an emergency The GRAs were were passed on to LFRS as guidance, and were used by them in developing their specific local risk assessments. In the specific instance at Harrow Court, the Standard Operating Procedure which management had in place, did not function as per the macro model.Actually, the FBU made a firm point on the inadequacy of the Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service’s Standard Operating Procedure at the time of the Harrow Court incident, saying the procedure itself was faulty; it had not been approved, and should not have been used during the incident. The loss of lives at the Harrow Court incident was further amplified by the overall assessment made by Paul Young when he moves to yet another critical issue in his assertion that, throughout the UK, one must give due credence to the critical variable of how the firefighter performs in the workplace. His assertion is that even if the ICS is functional, and even if the IRMP is validated and operative, the competency of those who are charged with carrying out the tasks must be assured, if safety is to prevail. While it is required for fire and rescue personnel to receive training,. this training in most instances, has not been validated.(Young).Inadequate and insufficient training of personnel is a dereliction of managers responsibilities and can be seen as a violation of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, and the Fire Services Act 2004 One major criticism of the model (even when it is managed properly, and implemented to its optimum), it works well until it is called upon to predict the critical matter of risk reduction, when certain risk reduction measures are added. For example, there has been a considerable amount of discussion on the placement and retrofitting of buildings and homes with automatic sprinklers and fire alarms. On a daily basis in the UK, fires take the lives of at least two people and cause injuries to at least 50. The majority of fires occur in private homes, and those most often affected are the old, disabled, young children, and those individuals who are either inebriated or on drugs. Advocacy and fire education places particular emphasis on prevention and mitigation. Albeit security measures might be in place, once a fire is ignited, the chances for the loss of life, injuries and massive property damage, is usually unpreventable. During the years of 2005 and 2006, the UK government completed the compiling and analysis of the data collected from the eleven fire and rescue services, and subsequently issued a comprehensive guidance package to all fire and rescue services in the UK. The results are premised on the concept that all sectors of UK society should be serviced in a fair and equitable manner The government authorities felt that the macro- budgetary approach of the past was not conducive to providing the local breadth which was necessary for maximum coverage. It is on this reasoning that the local approach to risk management gained a considerable amount of steam. The variances and occurrences of incidents from place to place, made it clear that a one size fit all approach was not feasible.(Bain 2002) On the basis of the data which was collected over the two to three year period of testing the model, the authorities believed that Integrated Risk Management Plans when in place can present the following results;. identify existing and potential risks to the community within the authority area, evaluate the effectiveness of current preventative and response arrangements, identify opportunities for improvement and determine policies and standards for prevention and intervention, and determine resource requirements to meet these policies and standards.(Young) Migrant Workers Housing In order to inform and make relevant decisions concerning strategies regarding resource allocation for migrant workers housing needs, one must have access to good intelligence and data. (Byrne and Tankar2007). Unfortunately, available knowledge of the needs of migrant workers housing needs, there does not exist a comprehensive body of reliable knowledge. The absence of information on housing needs of migrant workers presents a crucial void in understanding the changing dynamics in the housing market. (Cole 2007). These voids in information present significant problems in the ability to predict the evolving demand for migrant workers, and it hampers the planning process in how best to prepare the community-at-large of the pending or proposed program. (Phillips 2006: 32). It has been noted that the migrant worker housing market is extremely transient, and this high mobility presents another set of peculiar problems in attempting to plan for change. Those things which we do know and are sure about is that the incidence of cramped housing with high fire risks have become a problem for local councils where there are growing numbers of immigrants. The newness of this occurrence has prompted some landlords to exploit the situation by allowing the new arrivals to live in dwellings which are below code and to further exacerbate the problem, they encourage overcrowding.Additionally, employers and individuals are subletting apartments to other families.This pattern has a number of negative manifestations, with the prospect of fires being one of the most pervasive.(Sherman 2007).These matters should be addressed in magistrates court. Where suggested compliance of the Health and Safety Rating System under the housing act 2004, part 1, would apply to clear and obvious violations. Under the Housing Act 2004, landlords of HMOs comprising three or more storeys and occupied by five or more people must obtain an HMO Licence from the council. Landlords who continue to operate such properties without a licence, or who exceed the occupancy limit set down in the license, can be prosecuted by the council and fined up to £20,000. These new powers came into force on 6 April 2006, and several councils – the London Borough of Ealing, London Borough of Islington and Arun District Council - have already successfully prosecuted landlords for operating unlicensed HMOs. There are a number of variables which place migrant workers in the vulnerable position to settle for substandard overcrowded housing; the status or employment situation of the newly arrived immigrant is tenuous at best, and accompanied by low wages. The migrant is often compelled to find lodging in close proximity to their place of employment. In most instances due to language barriers, and other cultural nuances, they seek accommodations with or in close proximity to fellow countrymen. It is often due to their vulnerabilities, even though the housing is not suitable, they either view the situation as a temporary arrangement, or they do not complain out of a fear of causing problems, which may result in retribution. Most of the properties do not possess fire precautions, and are absent of the proper accommodations for washing and drying clothes. Drying clothes in front of gas fires, and leaving the laundry unattended to dry have resulted in numerous fires. Most of these properties are unsuitable for multiple occupancy.(Pemberton and Stevens 2007). These units may consist of atticks which have been illegally converted, with migrant workers sleeping as though they were in a dormoitory, where these people are being subjected to safety and health risks.(Audit Commission)Taylor andRogaly (2004) discuss the high number of HMOs in Kings Lynn, citing anecdotal evidence of a police raid that discovered thirty people sharing a single property on the Fairsford Estate. They also describe an incident where overloading of electricity circuits at another HMO had caused a serious fire (2004) The often precarious situation which some immigrant workers are placed in HMO situations, compels them to simply ignore the laws governing electrical wiring and common sense. These amateurs who are attempting to carve out a semblance of privacy for themselves and their families in an overcrowded low-cost situation, often engage in twisting two wires together. Due to their unsophistication on electrical matters, they do not solder nor do they use a wire nut.(Smith 1990). Another method which is of common use and a direct cause of ignition or short circuiting, is when they engage in merely twisting the wires together, and using electrical tape for insulation. When two copper wires were joined by a twist-on connector without adequate tightening, failures commonly occur due to metal loss, but this always occurred “several inches” away from the connector, not at the connector itself.(Beland 1987) Communication and Public Safety The British fore services believe that a substantial number of residents can be reached, of the fire service adopts a programmed, coherent message by using the media in facilitating its national and local public safety efforts.The British Fire and Rescue service has adopted an uncommon approach in its delivery of media pronouncements. The standard operating procedure is one which deals with maximum saturation, as it utilizes prime time television coverage and spots on the radio. It also involves the print media and the internet, which are not public service announcements, which places their messages at the mercy of the media executives, which might relegate their announcements to exclusive late night exposure. The British Fire and rescue service, pays for their outreach to the community-at- large.Their educational adverts are geared to catch people when they are attentive.The practice of promoting public safety through the media is comprehensive, as they also target their messages to be broadcasted on local talk shows. To address the diversity of individual groups; the elderly, migrant workers and the like, fire brigade personnel will also call into live shows, for impromptu interviews. There are also strong strategic ties between the fire service and local government units. This is a well tested paradigm, for getting more information distributed to the public.It is estimated that roughly one third of those in the UK who succumb to fire, have some type of association with a social service agency prior to a fire occurrence. As a consequence, the social service links serve as a viable entity for reaching the otherwise, hard to reach members of the population. Works Cited Audit Commission (2007) “Crossing borders: responding to the local challenges of migrant workers.” London: Audit Commission Bain, George, (2002), The Future of the Fire Service, Reducing risk – saving lives, December 2002, Retrieved on line on December 19, 2008, from www.irfs.org.uk Beland, B.,(1987) Behaviour of Electrical Contacts Under fore conditions, Fire and Arson Investigator 38, 42 Byrne, D. and Tankard, J. (2007) New European Migration: good practice guide for local authorities. London: IDeA Cole, I. (2007) Understanding and responding to housing market change. York:JRF Fire Services Act 2004 Grimwood, P. (2003), Operational Aspects of High rise Firefighting Health and safety at work Act 1974 Pemberton, D. and Stevens, C. (2007) Economic Migration to Housing Market Renewal Areas in North West England –Opportunity or Threat? (MSIO Policy Report(4). Liverpool: Merseyside Social Inclusion Observatory Phillips, D. (2006) ‘Integration of new migrants: housing’ in (ed.) Spencer, S.Refugees and new migrants: a review of the evidence on successful approaches to integration. Oxford: COMPAS Sherman, J.(2007) Cramped housing, higher fire risks and community tensions, The Times, 1st November 2007 Smith, L.E., and McCoskie,D.(1990), What Causes Wiring Fires in Residences, Fire J. 84, 19-24, 69 January/ February 1990 Taylor B., Rogaly, B.,m (2004) Migrant working in west Norfold (Report for Norfolk County Council) Brighton Sussex University (Sussex center for migration research) Young, P., Integrated Risk Management and fire safety in the UK, Fire and rescue Service Read More