Hyatt Regency Hotel Kansas Collapse - Literature review Example

Name: Course: Professor: Institution: City and State: Date: Literature Review: Hyatt Regency Hotel Kansas Collapse Introduction Dubbed one of the most devastating structural failures in the United States of America in regards to lives lost and injuries sustained, the 1981 hotel disaster claimed 114 lives while leaving 200 injured persons. In addition, the financial losses amounting to millions of dollars were suffered; a factor that resulted to thousands of lives being adversely affected. This was either directly or indirectly, mainly due to job losses and business losses to suppliers and business partners and their families. Some of these effects are still felt to date. At the time of the collapse, the hotel had been in operation for just over one year, having opened is doors on July 1 1980, while the disaster occurred on July 17 1981 (Youtube.com). This literature review, therefore, focuses on the Hyatt disaster where quality project management was lacking or was overlooked. First, the literature review identifies why the disaster occurred, and how quality project management should have been implemented/executed in the first place and why. Why did the Disaster Occur - What was done wrong and why? According to the Department of Philosophy and Department of Mechanical Engineering Texas A&M University, the hotel held a tea dance party on July 17 1981. The party took place on the atrium lobby of the five star hotel with close to 2000 guests gathered, some watching while others took part in the dance competition. The atrium was the main attraction in the lobby of the sleek hotel, spanned by three walkways based on the second, third and fourth floors of the hotel. The walkways had been suspended from the roof, articulately displaying fine architectural and construction prowess. The bridge positioned on the fourth floor hung above the one on the second floor, while that on the third floor appeared offset. Each of these bridges, also known as pedestrian walkways, weighed 64, 000 pounds measuring approximately 12 feet long. They hung suspended by three pairs of hangars at each end, all set at uniform intervals. They offered spectacular location from where guests and patrons could watch, a factor that prompted a total of twenty persons to gather on the second floor, while the forth floor held approximately forty persons. Unfortunately, the weight from the people could no longer be supported by the walkways, leading to the collapse of the forth floor which then landed on the second floor. This subsequently exerted additional pressure on the second floor causing both walkways to collapse on the lobby floor. They fell on the patrons dancing on the lobby floor leading to massive deaths and injuries. The collapse came as a shock to all. The building was anything but old and run-down, a fact that might cause one to think twice regarding the structural integrity of where they work. The hotel was new, built using the most modern technology and designs, not to mention the clearly expensive aura the hotel presented to the world. As a result of this, it did not in any way present any signs of danger to anybody visiting it. The walkways, visually imposing and modern were not particularly revolutionary or innovative in design. There was nothing about them that would have been a cause for panic or alarm (Deutsch, 1985).The fact of the matter is that the walkways looked solid, whereas they were not. In most cases, it is considered normal to expect some degree of failure due to unavoidable circumstances. The implementation of new designs and perfecting of new technologies all face setbacks as the ultimate price for progress. For the Kansas City Hyatt-Regency Hotel though, this was not the case. The structural collapse occurred as a result of project management errors which collectively resulted to the installation of a fatal construction problem into the support system of the bridge. Unfortunately, this was only discovered after the destruction that caused massive loss of life, injuries and immense financial losses (Moncarz and Taylor, 2000, 7). According to Luth (2000, 35), the most crucial cause of the collapse has been established to be the design of the walkways. From the onset, there was a proposed walkways design agreed upon by the parties concerned. To start with, broad flange beams hanging from a box beam were to be used on both sides of the walkways. A clip angle to be welded to the topmost section of the box beam and connecting the flange beam using bolts was also part of the design. In addition, one ending of the walkway was to be connected to a fixed plate, while the other end was to be held by a descending bearing. Finally, each one of the three walkways was designed in such a way that a washer and nut threaded on the supporting bar supported each of them. Fig. 1. Obtained from: http://antoine.frostburg.edu/phys/invention/case_studies/disasters/kansas_city_walkway.html However, due to disputes occurring between Havens and G.C.E., the initial design was altered. The new design introduced the use of a double hanger bar as opposed to the initial single hanger rod. The main reason behind this was the simple fact that Havens avoided threading the entire rod for the installation of the nut and washer. On the ground, one of the ends of each of the support rods were appended to the cross beams on the roof of the atrium. The rod’s bottom end passed through the beam box on which a nut and washer were threaded, with the second rod appended to the box seam approximately quarter of a foot from the first rod. In addition, supplementary rods were perched down in a bid to support the second level walkway in the same way. Fig. 2 Obtained from: http://antoine.frostburg.edu/phys/invention/case_studies/disasters/kansas_city_walkway.html The addition of another rod increased the load exerted on the nut that connected the forth floor segment. Originally, the load on every single hanger was estimated to be 90kN, a figure which escalated to a whooping 181kN following the alteration. With the box beams welded horizontally, they were not in a position to support the weight of two walkways. At the time of the collapse, the box beam came apart. This coupled with the bottom rod pulling through the box beam led to the collapse as shown below. Fig. 3 Obtained from: http://antoine.frostburg.edu/phys/invention/case_studies/disasters/kansas_city_walkway.html According to the Project Management Institute Standards Committee (1996), effective communication incorporates the aspects of sending and receiving of the message. With this concept in mind, a most appropriate definition of project communication management would be the process that is required to ensure that information related to the project is timely and appropriately generated, compiled, disseminated, stored, and ultimately disposed of (Project management institute standards committee, 1996, 103). One of the most basic aspects of efficacy in communication is the ability to interact. In the life of any project, communication may take any form be it non-verbal, written or oral. To a large extent, the success of a project depends on the effective project communication. The lack of communication was another problem credited with the failure of the project. In this regard, there lacked effective communication between the engineering firm (G.C.E.) and the contractor (Havens Steel Construction Company) to the point that the drawings prepared as preliminary sketches were interpreted by Havens as the finalized drawings. G.C.E. also failed to review the final design which would come handy in catching the error of increasing load onto the connections. As stated earlier, the increase in the load led to the ultimate collapse of the walkways. Information documented in the Kansas City Public Library sheds more light on this. It states that on investigations, grave design flaws were discovered and they were said to have resulted from miscommunication between the two organizations, Jack D. Gillum and Associates, the engineering company and the Havens Steel construction company. The report further claims that the original design had advocated for support rods to suspend both the fourth floor and second floor walkways from the ceiling. However, the designs were later altered in such a way that a separate set of bars suspended the second floor walkway from the fourth floor walkway. This resulted in the fourth floor supporting its own weight as well as that of the second floor walkway. Had the initial plan been followed, all the weight would have been suspended and supported from the ceiling supports which were much stronger. In reinforcement of the above, further investigation into the structural failure that led to the collapse established that the flaw was in the design. The techniques applied in construction work were not flawed at all, therefore were not at fault. In line with the imperfect design, the construction was found to have been soundly done. It was also established that the prints had been altered under the approval of G.C.E., and that they did not meet the requisite safety standards of the Kansas City Building Code. For this reason, G.C.E. took the complete blame for the collapse of the walkways (Antoine.frostburg.edu). In establishing the conclusions above, the investigations first determined the manner in which the walkways collapsed. As stated earlier, the fourth floor walkway gave in first, collapsing on the second floor walkway, causing it to collapse too under its weight. How Quality Project Management Should Have Been Implemented Executed In The First Place At this juncture, it is clear that numerous management errors were responsible for the Hyatt Regency Hotel walkway collapse. These grave mistakes were responsible for the use of flawed construction details in the walkways’ support system. Unclear communication or total lack of effective communication between Havens Steel Construction Company and G.C.E. engineering company gave way for the alteration of the original designs. To the contractor, the initial design detailing the continual nut threading through the two stories seemed impractical, a factor that prompted him to replace the single hanger rod with the two rod system (Luth, 2000, 38-42). According to Banset (1989, 4), the main issue leading to the Hyatt disaster was a breakdown in communication between the two major stakeholders; the contractors and the engineers. The structural engineer failed in his duty to adequately communicate to the fabricator their responsibility in the critical rod to beam connection design. Moreover, the flaw in the aforementioned connection led the investigators to a design that wasn’t effectively communicated either graphically or verbally. The indistinct communication between the steel fabricator, Havens, and the structural engineers, G.C.E., was further discussed by Deutsh (1985, 12) who termed it as a major player in the Hyatt disaster, a sentiment that has been shared by many reviewers. According to Missouri’s Administrative Hearing report, the Commission stated that it was the engineer’s duty to communicate their intention to the contractor subsequently, assuming the risks of non-communication or confusion. In addition, the report clearly stated that the responsibility and burden of clarity in communication also lies with the engineers, as they assume the risk of ambiguity in their deign drawings. In line with this information, the Hyatt disaster would have been avoided had the stakeholders assumed their proper duties of effective communication. According to a report by the departments of Philosophy and Mechanical Engineering at the Texas A & M University, the fabricator stated that his organization (Havens) had made a telephone call to G.C.E. for purposes of approving the alteration of the design from a single road hanger to double rod hanger. However, G.C.E. denied ever having received the alleged call from Havens. This depicts a flaw in professional ethics because it is obvious that one of the parties is keeping the truth from being known. Project management is an area largely driven by decision making; both prominent and small decisions. Some of them require intense thought processes as they involve financial resources, people and time. Often, these factors may be in conflict, and this creates dilemmas as well as some significant amount of risk. Ethics entail the discipline of how to make the best decisions despite conflicting interests amongst the stakeholders (Kliem, 2011, 65). In this case scenario, the two stakeholders (G.C.E. and Havens) should have consulted one another in this grave matter without either of them taking matters into their own hands. Luth (2000, 50-54) stated that more than one year before the collapse of the walkways during construction, a large section of the atrium in excess of 2, 700 square feet had collapsed. The collapse was caused by a failure in the connections of the roof at the northern end of the atrium. During the investigations, G.C.E. cited that they had requested for onsite project presentation in the course of the construction from the owner of the project (Crown Center Redevelopment Corporation). Despite the fact that the requests had been done on three separate occasions, the project owner had not acted on the requests due to the additional costs that would come with onsite inspection (Deutsch, 1985). In this regard, it was crucial for the project owner to provide inspection in spite of any additional costs that might have been incurred. Having inspectors on site would have prevented further damage of losing the entire hotel, not to mention the massive loss of lives as well as injuries suffered. In support, the departments of Philosophy and Mechanical Engineering at the Texas A & M University, the designs of the walkways were barely in a position to hold the expected load in place. This means that the engineers had not met the minimal requirements of the Kansas City Building Code. Professionalism should have been practiced from the beginning during planning of the design to curb this. There was negligence on the part of the engineers such that they clearly overlooked the requirements of the building code. Conclusion Owing to the massive evidence supplied at the hearings, several principals involved in the entire project lost their engineering licenses. Some of the firms had little to keep them from going bankrupt as a majority of the cases had to be settled outside of the courts. G.C.E., Gillum and Duncan were found to be guilty of misconduct, gross negligence and unprofessional conduct in carrying out engineering duties. Consequently they lost their practicing licenses in Missouri (and later the State of Texas). G.C.E., as an organization had its certificate of authority revoked. According to researchers, the Hyatt disaster would have been prevented had there been effective communication. Reference List Banset, E. and Parsons, G. 1989. Communications Failure in Hyatt Regency Disaster,” Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering, 115(3), pp. 324-78 Engineering Ethics. The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse. Department of Philosophy and Department of Mechanical Texas A & M University. NSF Grant Number DIR-9012252 Deutsch, J. 1985. “Report of the Administrative Hearing Commission, State of Missouri.” Case No. AR-84-0239, Missouri Board of Architects, Professional Engineers, and Land Surveyors vs. Daniel M. Duncan, Jack D. Gillum, and G.C.E. Int., Inc., Jefferson City, Mo. Hotel Horror | Kansas City Public Library. 2015. Hotel Horror | Kansas City Public Library. [ONLINE] Available at: http://www.kclibrary.org/blog/week-kansas-city-history/hotel-horror. [Accessed 09 September 2015] Kerzner, H., 2001. Project management: A systems approach to planning, scheduling, and controlling .7th ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Kliem Ralph L, 2011. Ethics and Project management. Florida:Taylor & Francis Group, CRC Press Luth, G. 2000. Chronology and Context of the Hyatt Regency Collapse. Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities, 14(2), pp. 35-69 Moncarz, P. and Taylor, R. 2000. “Engineering Process Failure – Hyatt Walkway Collapse,” Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities, 14 (2). Project Management Institute Standards Committee, (1996). A guide to the project management body of knowledge (1996 ed.). North Carolina: PMI Publishing Division Seconds From Disaster S03E01 Hotel Skywalk Collapse - YouTube. 2015. Seconds From Disaster S03E01 Hotel Skywalk Collapse - YouTube. [ONLINE] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e72My2DrZbs. [Accessed 09 September 2015]. Read More