Systems Methodology in Deconstruction of Disasters - Case Study Example

Name : xxxxxxxxxxx Institution : xxxxxxxxxxx Course : xxxxxxxxxxx Title : Systems methodology in deconstruction of disasters Tutor : xxxxxxxxxxx @2010 Systems methodology in deconstruction of disasters Soft systems methodology Soft systems methodology is described as a planned, flexible process of handling situations such as disasters which other people view as problematical and requires specific actions to correct them by making them acceptable. It is an organized process of working out issues by undertaking reasonable actions aimed at improving a situation based on particular body of ideas and namely system ideas. It is normally implemented in groups aided by specialists or facilitators who guide the other participants in understanding the techniques involved. It is also possible to include researchers in the process. Their role is to act as intermediaries and to interview the participants to ensure that everyone understands the opinions and perspectives of each participant (Abeer & Khaled, 2008). The main idea behind this method is to incorporate judgments by handling purposeful action as a system and an adaptive whole. Altering any part of the system implies that the change will apply to all the parts of the system. The practitioners of this approach argue that the process is not a mechanical linear process. The main characteristics and implementation phases of soft systems methodology include: workshop participants express their opinions concerning the problematic situation or the disaster in an unstructured form and then develop a visual representation of the disaster in question. This is followed by a careful definition of the human activity systems that are relevant to the disaster in order to establish a uniform understanding and agreement among the players in terms of the system. This step explicitly names a number of features of the relevant systems and transformation processes. The conceptual models that have been mentioned in the definitions are then created in a manner that they take the practical design capable of deconstructing the disaster. An analysis of the constructed models is done by comparing them with the opinions of the real world. The action plan is finally developed and implemented (Abeer & Khaled, 2008). Application of the method in deconstruction of disasters This method is applicable in unraveling real life disasters. Some of the disasters where the method is applicable include: Buncefield oil storage and transfer depot The explosion at the Oil Depot that took place in 2005 was the largest in Europe and caused considerable damage to goods neighboring the site. 43 people were hurt and the total destruction as a result of the disaster was estimated to be £1 billion. There was considerable distraction of businesses on the Maylands estate while some had to be relocated and others going into administration. Irrespective of the initial concerns that the disaster would result to extensive economic impacts on Hemel Hempstead this does seem to have materialized. Discussions of the future of Buncefield and the possible planning restrictions developed through the soft system methodology lead the establishment of three key guiding principles: the vital significance of community safety, the significance of Maylands to the local and regional economy and the significance of Buncefield to the local and regional economy (Jackson, 2001). Causes of the explosion Early on Sunday 11 December 2005, a succession of explosions and ensuing fire destroyed big parts of the Buncefield Oil storage and transfer depot, resulting to damage of a significant amount of property both at the deport and the surrounding areas. The explosion resulted due to an overfilling of a petro storage reservoir on the North West of the depot and the consequence creation of a combustible vapor cloud. Investigations suggested that the safety systems that had been put in place to detect and control overfilling failed to function on that material day. I order to respond to the disaster, Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board (BMIIB) was created by the Health and safety Executive to find out the cause of the disaster and recommend appropriate measures for the future (Jackson, 2001). The Boards recommendations Some of the key recommendations made by the created board include: primarily, the land use planning requirements to be incorporated with the COMAH safety report system to attain uniformity in the procedures for safety and environmental protection near major disaster sites. This will call for a methodological participation from the site operators in suggesting possible risks and control procedures to the local planning authorities. The planning decisions should take into account the communal risks of grave accidents from key disasters. In general, the Board recommended that all appropriate parties join up and take into account the risk posed from risky sites when planning future improvements near the area (Jackson, 2001). Explosions at Festival Fireworks UK Ltd The explosions that occurred at Festival Fireworks UK Ltd lead to the deaths of two fire fighters and the injury of four other people including two firemen and a police officer. Festival Fireworks UK Ltd was allowed to store over 20 tones of imported firework and to produce fuses and build displays. Assessors from HSE’s risky fittings and Field Operations Directorates and scientists based in Health and Safety Laboratory conducted an investigation (Fischer, 2001). Causes of the explosion The explosion resulted from fireworks that had been placed in the laboratory and were capable of causing mass explosions. According to the investigations, the explosions were handled and stored in a careless manner. Dynamic Risk Assessment Dynamic Risk Assessment is the consistent evaluation of risk in the rapidly varying conditions of an operational occurrence, in order to apply the control channels essential to ensure an acceptable level of safety (Jackson, 2001). EVALUATE THE SITUATION, TASKS AND PEOPLE AT RISK Issues to be put into consideration include: evaluation of the operational information that is available. This will include information concerning local risk assessments emergency plans, the tasks and activities that need to be executed and the hazards existing in carrying out the task in this circumstance. Other hazards to be considered include the risks connected in carrying out the activities to team members or the public and the resources are available for use, for instance, experienced personnel, ambulances and doctors (Jackson, 2001). SELECT OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES The appropriate operational procedures should be selected by taking into account the various alternatives and choosing the most suitable for the condition. The first step involves the procedures arrived at in pre-planning and training while ensuring that the staffs are competent to execute the activities in play (Jackson, 2001). ASSESS THE CHOSEN OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE Assess the selected procedure by comparing the benefits versus the risks of the procedure. If the benefits out way the risks, proceed with the task after ensuring that: The objectives and activities both individual and team are comprehended and the duties have been clearly allocated to specific participants for execution. The safety measures and practices are comprehended at this point (Jackson, 2001). If the risks out way the benefits then proceed as follows: ESTABLISH ADDITIONAL CONTROLS Eliminate, or decrease any remaining risks to a satisfactory level, if possible by extra control measures like: The application of PPE such as protective gloves, hard hats, overalls and other protective clothing, application of specialist equipment and seeking assistance from other agencies such as ,Fire Service and Ambulance Trusts or the aid of event marshals and safety officers. RE-ASSESS SYSTEMS OF OPERATION & EXTRA CONTROL MEASURES If any risks exist, does the benefit realized from carrying out the tasks overshadow the probable consequences if the risks are realized? If the benefits outweigh the risks, then the planned activities should be executed. If the risks outweigh the benefits do not execute the plan, but think about other alternatives. Incident Command System Incident Command System is a uniform on-scene disaster management concept devised specifically to facilitate responders of an incident like the explosions at Buncefield oil storage and transfer depot and Explosions at Festival Fireworks UK Ltd to adopt an integrated organizational framework equal to the intensity and demands of every disaster. ICS prevents the meddling of jurisdictional boundaries in response measures. ICS which was developed in the 1970s assist in addressing a variety of problems affecting response patterns. Such challenges include: too many individuals reporting to a single supervisor, diverse emergency response managerial patterns, and lack of trusty incident information, inadequate and irreconcilable communications and unclear lines of authority. It also helps in solving the problem of terminology disparities among agencies and imprecise or undetermined incident objectives. An ICS facilitates incorporated communication and planning by instituting convenient functions essential for disaster response operations: Command, Operations, scheduling, Logistics, and funding and Administration (O'Neill, 2008). The ICS is led by the Incident Commander or the Unified Command who is accountable for all phases of the response, which include the establishment of incident objectives and controlling all incident operations. The Incident Commander is in charge of establishing direct priorities chiefly the safety of responders, emergency workers, onlookers and anyone involved in the disaster and stabilizing the episode by making certain that life safety and resource management measures are carried out effectively. IC also comes up with the objectives of the incident and the means of achieving the objectives (O'Neill, 2008). Development of the Incident Action Plan The Incident Command System stresses logical and systematic planning and the Incident Action Plan is the main tool for planning in the course of a response mission to an incident. The Incident Action Plan is created by the Planning Section Chief with resources from the relevant sections and departments of the Incident Management Team. The plan should be drafted at the beginning of the response and reviewed consistently and regularly in the entire response mission. The plans will differ depending on the intensity of the disaster in consideration. A written plan may not be necessary for a disaster that is readily controllable like the explosions at Festival Fireworks UK Ltd while a comprehensive written plan will be necessary for a large and complex disaster such as the explosions at Buncefield oil storage and transfer depot. The plan should always be complete and accurately transmit the information created in the planning process. The plan should be prepared and availed to all participants before the operations shift briefing. Every operation period requires a different plan (Jackson, 2001). Conclusion The main challenge in inter-organizational analysis as far as responding to fire incidences is concerned is the co-ordination of the participants. Lack of a structured authority can hinder inter-organizational co-ordination in various levels. The development of an Incident Command System as an emergency management practice is essential in every organization since it systematizes the roles of responding participants and consequently establishes a structured authority. Proper communication is also necessary to prevent confusion or issuance of contradicting commands in the course of responding to incidences (O'Neill, 2008). Bibliography Abeer E. & Khaled E., 2008, A multi-agent cooperative model for crisis management system, Proceedings of the 7th WSEAS International Conference on Artificial intelligence, knowledge engineering and data bases. Cambridge: Cambridge UP Culler, J., 2001, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. Buncefield: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service’s review of the fire response Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service 2006 Emergency planning for major accidents: Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (COMAH) Fischer, F., 2000, Risk Assessment and Environmental Crisis: Toward an Integration of Science and Participation, in Campbell, S. and Fainstain, S. (Eds.) Initial Report to the Health and Safety Commission and the Environment Agency of the investigation into the explosions and fires at the Buncefield oil storage and transfer depot, Hemel Hempstead, on 11 December 2005 Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board 2006, < www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk> Jackson, M. C., 2001. Critical Systems Thinking and Practice. European Journal of Operational Research ., 128: 233-244 O'Neill, B., 2008, A Model Assessment Tool for the Incident Command System: A Case Study of the San Antonio Fire Department Read More