Organisational Culture Analysis - Example

ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE ANALYSIS By Name Course Instructor Institution City/State Date Organisational Culture Analysis Introduction Inadequate organisational concentration on safety remains to be a crucial factor in a number of accidents in the aviation industry. Even though accidents in aviation industry could have distinct physical causes, Lofquist (2010, p.6) posits that score of these accidents are often associated with organizational factors. In this regard, safety climate offers a snapshot of worker opinions of the safety focus in the organization, and may be an important safety culture predictor (Lofquist, 2010, p.3). Endeavouring for a safety culture is an incessant expedition that involves a number of milestones along the way. As argued previously, the effect of policies in aviation (either national or international) results in changes, which ultimately change the framework of the organisation. The organizations role in human factors has recently turn out to be imperative as it is at the present obvious that in case of any accident, it is not just about the humans, but also the system which is accountable. Safety management systems for organisations design in aviation considering that threats to safety will always be there: a vital element of making certain safety is about acknowledging and handling threats prior to the happening of the accidents. Evidently, the success of a safety management system relies heavily on how best it infuses in the organisation’s fabric; that is based on how things are done in the organisation, in order that a supportive safety culture is created and maintained continuously (Jones, 2004, p.17). The report seeks to conduct an analysis of organisation’s culture with regard to the challenges as well as implications for safety culture and organisational learning. Strengths Basically, changes in national and international aviation policy as well as practice resulted in changes in Australia’s aviation policy. A number of noticeable changes included quality management, enterprise bargaining, award restructuring, deregulation of economic markets, and so forth. Deregulation of economic markets as per Jones (2004, p.26) was measured as valuable to customers, since it reduced monopoly in aviation industry and as a result lessened the prices (ILO, 2013, p.20). Basically, improving effectiveness with the organisation by means of increasingly changing the, practices, attitudes and in a number of instances the organisational structure can result in an improved end result.  In the similar way that Safety Management Systems (SMS) has taken scores of organization, broad approach to practices and attitudes, an effectual Quality Management program in an organization assists in making certain long-standing profitability. Undoubtedly, the key objective of any organization in the aviation industry is to improve (organizationally, physically and financially) at the least cost possible.  The likely savings from any upgrading (like decreasing the aircraft’s on-board weight hence resulting in fuel expense saving) have to be below the cost of the performed upgrading.  In case an airline gets rid of blankets and pillows from a short haul journey, the possible loss of reimbursing travellers thanks to the termination of such services must be below the savings per flight. In this case, the Total Quality Management (TQM) concept for airlines as well as airports must take place as a direct outcome of the systems Approach to the management of the organisation.  The Systems Approach to management, carried over from triumphant industrialized businesses, sees the organization as an existing mortal; that is a collection of interrelated and independent elements making up the whole. Therefore, how aviation firms deal with these interrelated and interdependent parts is directly reflected in the customer experience quality.  Every day, aviation firms have to interact with a host of government agencies, stakeholders, as well as other business organizations so as to convey their relevant services. These days, scores of airport authorities together with airline managers are turning to Six Sigma methodology so as to put into operation wide Quality Management in the organisation.  The philosophies of Six Sigma are based on two main assumptions: first, individuals comprehend the capability of numbers as well as the math language so as to exemplify a process, and second, reducing discrepancy in an organizational process is at all times advisable. Although deregulation is yet to bring about persistent competition by new market entrants, there subsists proof that competition between the existing aviation firms and new entrants is to a great extent more spirited as compared prior to deregulation. The aviation market structure for interstate air voyage has as well evidently changed with the enormous rise in the discount fare market. The existing passenger as well as fare data point out that more than 70% of the interstate market for air passenger can at the moment be grouped as price sensitive. The more broadly accessible and deeper discount fares subsequent to deregulation have led to an enormous demand increase and a change past economy fares. According to ILO (2013), in the first-class fare market both demand and fares have increased, and this is accredited to economic conditions that has been improving since economic deregulation was introduced. The economy fare market is currently showing a low level of price elasticity, and the tendency increase to travel through air in addition to the advancement of the discount fare market have resulted in an elemental change in the ways of key carriers. Evidently, discounting was widely utilised by the airlines prior to deregulation so as to boost demand in the then price discount market that was so sensitive. Thanks to the deregulation of the economy, the current carriers are more oriented towards the market and are quick to respond to the needs of consumers as evidenced by ongoing quality of service improvement offered to air travellers. For that reason it is worth stating that deregulation of aviation was a crucial step as well as the accelerator for the continuing aviation reforms. In 1990s, enterprise bargaining value in Australia turned out to be one of the sacred cows of industrial relations. In this regard, federal along with state governments of various political influences, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) National employer groups as well as the industrial relations tribunals have in one way or another positively espoused the concept of enterprise bargaining as very important to the Australia economy wellbeing or leastwise acknowledged it as an essential element of reform in industrial relations. For that reason, enterprise bargaining become extremely imperative element of aviation labour laws as well as wage systems. However, this perceptible national accord, masks significant distinctions between the concerned parties with regard to connotation of enterprise bargaining as well as how an system of industrial relations rooted in enterprise bargaining must function. The enterprise bargaining paradigms expressed in the aviation industry are at variance on various issues, which includes the tribunals’ role in monitoring the outcomes as well as procedures of bargaining, the association between enterprise agreements as well as awards, the non-union agreements status, the legality of cross-enterprise bargaining coordination, the timing and types of industrial action as well as the accessibility of permissible sanctions. Basically, conditions of employment in the aviation industry are molded to go with the unique situations of the industry by means of negotiations between management as well as employees. For that reason, external influences like industry-wide awards and tribunals have been eliminated. Most aviation firms, like Qantas hold the view that if workers decide to be represented by trade union, in that case there must be only one trade union and also its organizational structure must preferably be rooted in the company or as a minimum offer strong highlighting to the aviation company as a unit of the organization. In Australia, there have been a number of decentralization of bargaining subsequent to 1987 under the award restructuring and two-tier systems of remuneration; especially, negotiations over awards’ restructuring for aviation staff. However, in general, the industry-wide coordination of bargaining, employers and unions carried on through the 1989 aviation pilots' clash, the 1990 deregulation introduction as well as the recognition of enterprise bargaining in 1991 by the Industrial Relations Commission (IRC). Weaknesses and Potential Blind-Spots In aviation industry, human error has time and again been the main cause of commercial airlines’ accidents. There are highlights two types of accidents: organizational and individual accidents. In this regard, individual accidents take place when a person places an error independent of influences in the organisation. For instance, an individual accident can occur when a worker following the company’s set procedures, slips and fall from the ladder. Therefore, the injury or damage will be limited to only this one individual, and even though the implications could be severe for this individual as well as his/her family, there are probably no pervasive organisational or environmental implications. On the other hand, Organizational accident, have manifold causes connecting scores of persons working at diverse departmental levels, and can have shocking a impact on unconcerned people, the environment, and assets. Organizational accidents as per Wensveen (2010) stem from the chain of numerous causative factors arising from several system levels. For decades, human error has been recognized as a key contributor to over 70% of hull-loss accidents amongst commercial airplane. Whereas characteristically related to flight operations, human error has as well lately turn out to be the main concern in air traffic management as well as maintenance practices. In aviation companies, human factors work with mechanics, pilots, and engineers to use the most recent knowledge concerning the interface between commercial airplanes and human performance in assisting operators enhance efficiency and safety in their day after day operations. In this regard, the phrase human factors have become more and more popular as the aviation industry has come to understand that human error, instead o mechanical failure, triggers the majority of aviation incidents and accidents. If narrowly interpreted, human factors are frequently deemed tantamount with maintenance resource management (MRM) or crew resource management (CRM). Still, it is much wider in both its knowledge scope and base, bearing mind that they involve collecting information concerning human limitations, abilities and other attributes and using it to jobs, systems, tasks, as well as environments to create secure, comfy, and effectual human use. Human factors in aviation industry are committed to improved understanding how people can most efficiently and safely be integrated with ever-changing technology. This understanding as per (Wensveen, 2010, p.12) is afterward changed into organisational design, procedures, or policies to assist people perform well. This could result in organisational changes, and changes are always received with resistance particularly if there is no consultation while making the changes. This is because, the majority of workers fear about job security, and so they react by expressing disappointment and displeasure in the change process. In spite of rapid technological gains, humans are at last accountable in making certain the safety and success of the aviation industry. They have to continue to be well-informed, efficient, devoted and flexible while practising good judgment. For now, the aviation industry continues making noteworthy investments in equipment, training, as well as systems that have long-standing implications. Since technology continues changing more rapidly as compared to the capability to foresee how humans will interrelate with it, therefore, the aviation industry can no more rely as much on intuition and experience to direct decisions merged with performance. Rather, a sound technological foundation is needed for examining implications of human performance in procedures, training, and design; akin to developing a new wing requires level-headed aerodynamic engineering. Implications for Safety Culture The safety culture is inextricably related to, but may be differentiated from its organisational culture. Safety culture relies on factors like the manner in which the aviation company is managing the often differing goals of profitability as well as safety, as well as the demonstrated level of dedication to safety. It as well relies heavily on insights of the communication styles in the organisation (Flannery, 2001, p.4). For instance, if a worker is worried about the safety of a particular procedure or practice, are communications channels open for that worry to be communicated in the organisation. Wiegmann et al. (2007, p.12) believe that a perfect safety culture is the engine that steers the system towards the objective of supporting the utmost resistance towards the hazards of its operations. This objective must be realised regardless of the leader of the organisation or present commercial uneasiness. In this case, what steers the system is a steady level of admiration for whatever thing that could go around the safety systems of the organisation. That is to say, it is imperative to keep in mind what may go wrong since it is extremely hazardous to believe that an organization is secure for the reason that no information is claiming otherwise (Wiegmann et al., 2007, p.14). During the time of improved safety performance, the finest means to remain precautious is to collect the accurate type of data, which connotes generating a knowledgeable culture. A knowledgeable culture needs safety management to be conscious of the many factors that affect the safety systems (specifically environmental, organizational, technical, and human factors). The safety culture of the organisation is eventually revealed in the manner in which safety is in the place of work is managed. It is imperative to take into account that safety management system of the organization cannot be made of a set of procedures and policies. Rather, the safety management system is rooted on how safety is managed in the place of work as well as how those procedures and policies are placed into service in the workplace. Furthermore, the nature through which safety is handled in the place of work (specifically, supervising, procedures, practices and resources.) will be impacted by the organisational safety culture. For that reason, safety management must be included in the management practice of the organization and organisational system. Without doubt in high-risk sectors such as aviation industry, safety must be come first before anything else. Arguably, an enhanced safety culture can both mirror and be supported by factors such as organisation leadership dedication to safety, collective concern and care for hazards, a concern for their effects on the public, flexible and level-headed rules as well as norms concerning hazards, and incessant expression upon practice through organizational learning. Besides that, leadership impacts a safety culture, especially the transformational leadership. Implications of Organisational Learning Safety culture within an organisation is always driven by organisation learning; however, proper “organisational learning are uncommon even if the concept is broadly acknowledged. Besides that, creating and supporting a learning culture within an organisation appears hard to do, and those that have succeeded have a described learning plan with regard to their recognized gaps in knowledge. Basically, reports are depended on for the reason that reporting systems as well as relationships are healthy. Differing points of view are searched and analysed for successful organisational learning opportunities. Learning organisations, as mentioned by Christenson (2007) steer clear of recurring mistakes since they often consider their experience, filter valuable lessons, and support the execution of advanced processes. What is more, learning organizations shun, misplacing vital knowledge when crucial person leave for the reason that they create time to retain, codify, diffuse as well as develop crucial knowledge into their practices, norms and values (Christenson, 2007, p.4). In aviation industry, knowledge has turned out to be a common property, and more than just a warehouse, they take action on what they understand, capitalising on new insights as well as becoming accustomed to behaviours (Kleiner et al., 2012, p.72). The combination of two authoritative processes, that is organizational learning as well as high reliability organizing, may assist any aviation organization boost reliability as well as performance. Individuals that manage teams in aviation industry use organisational learning to reduce unforeseen events and human errors and recover from them for the reason that they have set up a heedful infrastructure. Conclusion In conclusion, it has been argued that development of an unfathomable understanding of the human error causes as well as consequences can offer management with the basis from which to instigate effective strategies for error management. Organisational acknowledgment as well as recognition of the ubiquity in addition to certainty of human error should be subsequent step in these strategies development. Furthermore, introduction and development of non-punitive aviation policies concerning responses in the organisation with regard to non-deliberate human error is a vital element of error management. Whereas the safety culture concept has been essentially used in aviation industry, its application at individual level is still difficult, since the system boundaries are somewhat unclear. Guaranteeing high performance in the epoch of intricacy is particularly imperative in aviation industry where the potential for disaster and error is devastating. References Course Readings: AVA80007 Organisational Change in Aviation Christenson, D., 2007. Build a Healthy Safety Culture Using Organizational Learning and High Reliability Organizing. U.S. Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center. Flannery, J.A., 2001. Safety Culture and its measurement in aviation. Thesis. John A. Flannery. ILO, 2013. Civil aviation and its changing world of work. Issues paper. Geneva: International Labour Organization. Jones, P.W., 2004. The Airline Industry: Facing The Challenges Of The 21st Century. White Paper. Washington DC: Economic Development Institute Global Thinking Research & Development. Kleiner, M.M., Nickelsburg, J. & Pilarski, A., 2012. Organizational and Individual Learning and Forgetting. Industrial & Labor Relations Review, vol. 65, no. 1, pp.68-81. Lofquist, E.A., 2010. The art of measuring nothing: The paradox of measuring safety in a changing civil aviation industry using traditional safety metrics. Safety Science, vol. 48, no. 10, pp.1-24. Wensveen, J., 2010. THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY: Trends, Challenges, Strategies. New York, USA: Dowling College The University of Sydney. Wiegmann, D.A., Thaden, T.L.v. & Gibbons, A.M., 2007. A review of safety culture theory and its potential application to traffic safety. Illinois: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety. Read More