Essays on Pay Backlash Prompt Shift to Bonuses Assignment

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The paper 'Pay Backlash Prompt Shift to Bonuses' is a perfect example of a Management Assignment. The company’ s objectives are to maximize shareholders' wealth by maximizing the worth of its stock in the security market; the managers of the company can only attain this by making the appropriate decision on the investment appraisal of the projects in which the company is to undertake (Galbraith 2008). The success of a company relies on the excellence of executives in adapting to the varying situations as well as the ability of the managers to respond promptly to changing the business environment.

Shareholders of a company will want to have good returns in the form of dividends as well as excellent corporate governance due to investment appraisal and the managerial skills from the company’ s executive (Canice 2007). The problem arising between the shareholders and the managers are as follows’ Relationship between pay and performance Managers’ compensation as received a lot of consideration in the current years and concern has arisen on the manner in which managers are paid and not the concept of the worth they are paid (Galbraith 2008).

Shareholders of the companies believe that the relationship between pay and performance is not mutually exclusive, they deem these links as scrawny, and consequently, the connection needs additional consideration. Conflict of interest between the managers and the shareholders The stern disagreement of interest is depicted between the shareholder and managers. The disagreement is observed despite the fact that shareholders have a right to administer the company by way of voting during the company’ s annual general meeting (Hernandez 2008). Their voting right can either appoint or sack the manager as well as either accepting the company’ s statement of performance or appointing the auditors.

The disagreement arises due to the following reasons; a) The company’ s executives would prorate a higher level of spending with minimal exhaustive work since their regarded aspects do not reduce their compensation and the worth of the company’ s shares they own. b) Manager’ s priorities are vested in investing in short term projects which are less risky with lower financial leverages since managers believe that the level of bankruptcy will be minimized and hence getting rid of losses on their administrative assets and portfolios (Stanley Morris 2009).

However, shareholders will have excess benefits due to returns from the manager’ s intensive achievement s on ensuring that the company oriented goals and objectives are achieved within the financial years. The discrepancies between the managers and shareholder’ s remuneration are not equitable since managers workload is inversely preoperational to amount of the remuneration they receive (Stanley Morris 2009). Many corporations vest the powers of decision making on the company’ s objectives to the executives where the managers should enhance the policies of the company to facilitate higher returns to the company which therefore enjoyed by the shareholders.

For these reasons, the shareholders will maneuver the distribution limit to their advantage where their contribution towards achievements of the company’ s objectives less as compared to that of a value-maximizing manager in achieving the set objectives. Reducing the agency cost and the conflict of interest between the managers and shareholders, advance compensation strategies should be adopted to enhance fair and equitable remuneration incentives. The incentives to decrease the disparity existing on remuneration and performance enticement between shareholders and managers should be critically established to enhance motivation on the company’ s performances and earnings that will also facilitate shareholders' benefits (Charles T 2007).

The extent to which the expropriation of wealth from the security owner is reliant upon the company’ s dissent attributes as well as the executive's control over these discrepancies. Therefore, it is predominantly essential to deem the company’ s precise attributes when putting up the pertinent payment packages and incentives in disparity to the previous assessment, which has evaluated the consequence of executive payment on variance-altering judgment as well as the company performance (Canice 2007).

The examination begins with the fundamental of utility hypothesis as well as the assets pricing to present an assessment of the company's explicit distinctiveness necessary to employ a complete structure that will reduce the agency problems.

References

Briggs, Xavier. "Social Capital and the Cities: Advice to Change Agents." National Civic Review 86 (2009): 111-118.

Canice, Pendergast. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms." Journal of Economic Literature , 2007: 37-43.

Charles M Kahn, Emilson C D Silva and James P Ziliak. "Performance-Based Wages in Tax Collection: The Brazilian Tax Collection Reform and Its E." Economic Journal, 2001: 188-205.

Charles T. "Accounting for Enron: shareholder value and stakeholder interests." 598–612. Corporate Governance, 2007.

Freedman, M. "Social Disclosure and the Individual Investor on company's performances." Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 2008: 94-109.

Galbraith, Jay. "Designing Matrix for Organizational shareholders to managers performnces design for success." 2008. John Wiley’s and sons.

Hernandez, M. "Stewardship Behavior in Organizations acheivement Model." Journal of Business Ethics, 2008: 121-128.

Paul M, C. Techniques introduced to make management remuneration incentives more relevant to modern performances. Cengage Learning, 2009.

Stanley Morris, Gully. "Organizational Behavior: Tools for Success." 482. Cengage Learning, 2009.

William R. "The Divided Society and the Democratic Ideal of Managers acheivement." 212-214. 2009.

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