Risk Management in the Mining Industry - Case Study Example

Risk Management Name and Number Module and Number Programme Title Name of Lecturer Table of Contents 1.0 Executive summary 2 2.0 Introduction 4 3.0 Case Studies 6 3.1 Case study 1: Quecreek mine 6 3.1.1 Primary causes of water inundation 6 3.1.2 Indicators of potential dangers; water seepage and the mines wet conditions 7 3.1.3 Contributing factors 8 3.1.4 A remarkable Emergency response 8 3.2 Case study 2: Gretsey mining 9 3.2.1 Primary cause of the accident 9 3.3 Case study 3: Sunshine mine 11 3.4 Case study 4: Beaconsfield mine 13 3.5 Case study 5; Copiapo/Chilean mining accident 14 4.0 Common repetitive patterns 15 5.0 Recommendations 16 6.0 Conclusion 20 Bibliography 20 1.0 Executive summary The mining industry employs approximately seven million people worldwide, with economies of many nations thriving on the mineral exploitation. Its strategic role in the economy coupled by massive reliance on the mining sector with the minerals obtained being the key inputs in most of the industries, calls for high safety standards for the sustenance of the mining industry. This industry is however among the most hazardous with multiple causes of fatalities. Mining is an extremely complex process with many locations that are prone to accidents. Research has shown that the highest percentage of mining fatalities occur in the production process, which is mainly underground. The agents of fatalities, which are the root causes of death in these catastrophic incidents, include fall of roofs, sides or the high walls; this is the most incumbent agent of fatality, unintended operations of machines, underground fires, inundation and water inrush and also failure of the workers to adhere to the safe working procedures (Lannacchione et al., n.d). There are also pre disposing factors that increase the risks and hazards of mining. The working environment is underground and must therefore be engineered to allow the use of extensive machinery in the mining operations. Further engineering is done to meet the required health and safety standards but it would be uneconomical for the mining companies to invest in an engineering mechanism that completely eliminates risks or minimises them to the most reasonable levels. The gap between the actual working systems and the most effective systems is a risk for catastrophic incidents and consequent fatalities (Permana, 2012). Mining fatalities keep recurring even when critical analysis of the catastrophic incidents reveals that the situation could have been averted using risk assessment and risk management. This paper carries out an in-depth analysis of case studies involving major catastrophic incidents in underground mining. These incidents have common repetitive patterns that either failed to salvage the situation or aggravated the catastrophe and the primary causes were not natural phenomena. This report recommends the use of KPIs that will seek to address the critical safety factors that surround major accidents and fatalities. The DEPOSE system is also recommended as the best approach to risk assessment in the mining industry particularly underground mining. 2.0 Introduction A holistic approach to the systematic review of risks and hazards in any working place will entail risk assessment and risk management. Risk management involves the identification of risks, assessing the likelihood of the risks occurring and prioritizing the risks in working place environment and more so considered being hazardous (Borghesi and Gaudenzi, 2013). The main aim of risk management is to mitigate the probability of the risks occurring to the lowest reasonably and practical levels if total elimination of the risk and uncertainty is not possible. Risk management involves the identification of all the reasonable and foreseeable risks likely to occur at the work place. A risk can be defined as the measurement of a hazard when taking into account the likelihood of its occurrence and the severity of its occurrence (Borghesi and Gaudenzi, 2013). The identified hazards are then analysed and assessed to determine the level of risk associated with the hazards, which is done by comparing the risks against predetermined standards. A quantitative risk assessment approach is used if the consequences of the loss and the frequency of occurrence can be objectively measured based on historical data. Should this not be the case, and the assessment is based on estimation, judgement and opinion, a qualitative risk assessment approach is pursued. The risks are then eliminated or reduced to the minimum acceptable levels using the hierarchy of controls or adherence to the safe working procedures. Continuous review and monitoring of the implemented controls must be carried out to determine their effectiveness and identify where modifications are needed and this is extremely important especially in uncontrollable events (Borghesi and Gaudenzi, 2013). Accidents in the work place can be reduced or better still eliminated using a proactive and corrective approach. However, most organisations will carry out risk management procedures as a way of conforming to the laid down regulations. Management must recognise the importance of risk management in the work place since a safe working culture can only be nurtured and fostered using top to bottom approach (Borghesi and Gaudenzi, 2013). 3.0 Case Studies 3.1 Case study 1: Quecreek mine Inundation is a primary cause for many catastrophic incidents in underground mining such as Quecreek mining incident (Mine Safety and Health Administration, 2003). The quecreek mining incident was a non-fatal mining accident at Somerset County in Pennsylvania. It resulted to the entrapment of nine miners for 76-78 hours in the underground mine though there were no fatalities (Brady, 2011). During the time of the incident the quecreek mine was under the management of Black Wolf Company. The quecreek mine was located in the surrounding area of an abandoned mine currently known as the Harrison mine, which was filled with water. During the mining operations, the miners made a cut in the 1-left section, which led into the flooded abandoned mining, thereby creating a path for water flow. Water from the Harrison mine broke into the Quecreek mine. Fortunately, miners at the 2-left section managed to escape before the water inrush caught up with them (Mine Safety and Health Administration, 2003). The extent of flooding was such that the continued flow of water flooded in the mining portals located at the pit and the water rose to 17 feet higher above the highest elevation point of the Quecreek mine. Rescue efforts commenced immediately, with the help of mining mine safety and health administration’s mine capsule (Brady, 2011). 3.1.1 Primary causes of water inundation The primary cause of the water inrush was use of an old, undated and uncertified map of the Harrison mine, which failed to indicate the complete and final workings of the Harrison mine. This resulted to erroneous depictions of the Harrison mine workings on the Quecreek mine map (Mine Safety and Health Administration, 2003). The state of Pennsylvania was responsible for the issuing of the map during acquisition of permit and arguable the root cause of the incident was the unavailability of the certified final map of the Harrison map atthe state of Pennsylvania map repository (Brady, 2011). 3.1.2 Indicators of potential dangers; water seepage and the mines wet conditions 3.1.2.1 Water seepage Historically Upperkittamly mine had always been a wet mine, with quecreek mine being termed as a wet mine since water was leaking from the ribs, faces and the floor, thereby necessitating pumping (Brady, 2011). Hydrological conditions indicated the presence of an aquifer that lay above the mine, and was responsible for the wet conditions of the mine. The aquifer, known as Freeport Sandstone, can produce 15 gallons of water per hour (Brady, 2011). The potential sources of water were only two; the aquifer through the joints pores and faults or the Harrison mine, horizontally from the roof and floor. This was further aggravated by the presence of a fault near the faces, which allowed the seepage of water. Regardless of this and prior to the occurrence of the accident, water had been seeping into the mine (Mine Safety and Health Administration, 2003). This should have served as an indicator of the potential hazard of inrush but the miners were not able to distinguish the seepage of water as an indication that they were approaching the abandoned mine from the water seepage they had been accustomed to. Geological conditions also justified the observed wetness therefore the miners felt no cause for alarm (Mine Safety and Health Administration, 2003). 3.1.2.2 Deterioration of the roof Another major indicator of the potential hazard should have been the deterioration of the roof as the miners extended further into the 1-left section mine. Deterioration of the roof, which was made of chalk, aggravated by the water seepage of water should have been a signal to the minors that they were dangerously headed into the flooded Harrison mine, which by then was referred to as the Sax man mine (Mine Safety and Health Administration, 2003). 3.1.2.3 Safety inspection MSHA had conducted the regular inspection of the mine earlier on June 2002 and at the time of the accident, a subsequent regular operation was yet to be completed (Mine Safety and Health Administration, 2003). The company had begun its mining operations on 2001 and until then, it had reported seven accidents and injuries (Brady, 2011). A review of the pre shift examination, which had been conducted prior the beginning of the mining operations had indicated hazardous conditions and poor roof conditions (Mine Safety and Health Administration, 2003). 3.1.3 Contributing factors The company was aware of the potential hazard of mining and naturally an abandoned mine will always fill up with water to fill the void. The company should have taken extra precautions to minimise the threats posed by the hazards of water inrush. Such procedures would have included the dewatering of the abandoned mine or drilling to determine the exact extent of mine. An inefficient and inadequate system of collecting, documenting and recording information pertaining old mines also contributed significantly to the accident. 3.1.4 A remarkable Emergency response The immediate notification to the miners at the 2 left section of the oncoming inrush and their knowledge of the escape ways and procedures enabled them escape the water inrush.The entrapped miners’ decision to huddle together and stay as a team helped them survive during entrapment as they were able to keep of hypothermia and drowning by staying on the highest point (Mine Safety and Health Administration, 2003). 3.2 Case study 2: Gretsey mining This is an example of another catastrophic incident caused by water inrush. The Gretsey mining catastrophic incidents occurred on 14 November, 1996 at 5.30 am during the night shift (Anon, n.d). It involved eight miners and four of them lost their lives in the accident. The Gretsey colliery was under Newcastle Wallsend Company. The four fatalities were preparing a road way in the mining area using a continuous mining machine. The miner operating the machine unknowingly cut a hole in the face of the mining area and there was a sudden water inrush, which was under extreme high pressure that it swept both the machine and the miners away thereby drowning the miners. The other four miners escaped death narrowly by virtue of the fact that they were in the crib room, though it was also flooded (Phillips, 2006). 3.2.1 Primary cause of the accident The source of the water was an old working colliery of the Wallsend Company, which had been abandoned a long time ago. The plan used in the mining operations at the Gretsey mine indicated that the abandoned mine was 100m away while in actual sense it was 7-8 m away prior to the commencement of the mining operation (Anon, n.d). The plan had been issued by the department of mineral resources. The abandoned mine had collected water over time and some of the water extending through the mine shafts to the surface. The increased pressure of the water was due to the head of water. The plans issued by the department were incomplete and inaccurate and consequently failed to depict the correct workings on the old colliery mine. The mining department ought to have put a special barrier surrounding the suspected area owing to the incomplete and inaccurate nature of the working on the old mine. The mine plan provided was a copy of the original mine plan and the department’s repository did not have the original plan. The provided plan was not signed nor was it certified as would be the case of a plan drawn by a qualified credible surveyor. Apparently, the plan was drawn back in 1892, a time when surveying knowledge was limited (Anon, n.d). Therefore, the department of mineral resources was partly responsible for failure to manage and record mining operations. Additionally, there was no abandonment plan of the abandoned mine as should have been the case of any abandoned mine. This clearly indicated that the plans were incomplete and crucial information was missing. The department also had two other plans known as the Young wallsend Top seam and Young Wallsend bottom seam in its possession.These plans had been drawn based on assumptions as drilling programme conducted after the accident showed that there was only one seam. Even from the very start the two plans were inconsistent with each other and such inconsistencies were salient enough for any credible and qualified surveyors to note the inconsistencies (Anon, n.d). Further probing into the accident showed that earlier on one of the managers had suggested that the companies dewaters the abandoned mine but the company refused to pursue this line of thinking (Anon, n.d). Therefore, the mining company was responsible for the disaster because it failed to conduct proper risk assessment and failed to implement a recommendation to reduce the risk that had been foreseen by one of its managers. 3.2.1.1 Failure of management The mine managers did not conduct a formal risk assessment, which would have pointed out the various potential hazards in the proposed development. They instead chose to blindly rely on the plan obtained from the mining department yet it was clearly obvious that the plans were inaccurate and incomplete. Prior to the accident, unusual water had been noticed. The water seepage in the coal seam was high given the fact that despite Gretley being a wet area that particular mining area was the driest section (Anon, n.d). This in itself was therefore a clear indicator of the potential hazard of water inrush. Even after such observation, the managers did not communicate to the miners of the possibility of water in the abandoned mine. The management failure to act on their speculations regarding the possibility of the water seepage being from the abandoned mine led to the catastrophe. 3.3 Case study 3: Sunshine mine Underground fires are a primary cause of catastrophes in underground mining. This is mainly due to the increase in the use of diesel and electrical equipment in underground mining (Day, 2007). Humans can survive only for a very short time without oxygen and the products of combustion such as carbon monoxide are even more dangerous as they cause death within a matter of seconds that lead to very high number of fatalities. Sunshine mine accident occurred on 2nd May, 1972 and it claimed 91 lives out of the 173 workers in the mine (Brady, 2011). The sunshine mine fire started out as a small fire, which if handled properly would have been contained. However, spontaneous combustion of the timber used to backfill worked out stops was the most likely cause of fire. More lives would have been saved. The disaster began when electricians at the 3700 level detected smoke. The foremen decided to investigate the course of the smoke; it took them twenty minutes, a deadly move in that the workers would have evacuated the mine (Day, 2007). Once the smoke was detected the fire doors automatically close, and workers were supposed to go to the #10 shift where they would use a hoist to get out. Activation of the stench system whose purpose was to communicate warning signals to communicate to workers in all areas required twenty six minutes to fill the entire mining operation area (Day, 2007). Therefore, it is apparent that most workers became aware of the smoke not through the emergency system but because the smoke had reached their work place. The emergency hoist designed to move people during the evacuation process failed due to the smoke and the production hoist had to be used. However, this hoist failed after a while and the men could no longer be hoisted outside. Additionally, this hoist had not been designed for moving people and therefore the evacuation process was very slow. Workers were hoisted to the 3100 level and were to use the jewel shift out. The workers had never been to this section before during their entire mining operation, which means they would not be fast enough to evacuate the mine (Day, 2007). Failure of the ventilation system, due to a short circuit, aggravated the problem further and the main fans no longer pumped fresh air and the bulk heads that were designed to control airflow failed and therefore smoke was entering through the main shaft. The root cause of death was carbon monoxide poisoning. Conclusively, it is apparent that the company’s management was to be blamed for the loss of 91 lives owing to lack of proper risk management. A number of factors aggravated the situation leading to 91 fatalities, which include: i. Inadequate emergency escape way for rapid evacuation ii. The absence of top mine officials during the time of accident, thereby there was no figure of authority iii. Delayed evacuation die to system failure iv. Failure to train the underground employees on the use of self-rescuers and mining survival skills such as barricading and hazardous nature of gases and defective rescuers v. A serial ventilation system that exposed every person to smoke and carbon monoxide. The ventilation system allowed unrestricted movement of smoke even to vital areas such as the #10 vi. Failure to seal the abandoned areas allowed the entry of contaminated gases in the ventilation airstream. vii. Inadequately trained foremen who wasted time investigating the source of smoke instead of initiating an immediate evacuation plan viii. Ineffective warning system that took too long to warn workers of the dangers, which would have helped them to evacuate before being caught up by the smoke. 3.4 Case study 4: Beaconsfield mine Ground fall is a principal hazard in underground mining. It can be triggered by many factors with one of them being seismic activity. This was the case in Beaconsfield mine. The incident happened on 25th April, 2006 resulting to the death of one miner who was buried underneath while the two survivors remain trapped underneath for fourteen days while awaiting rescue (Bourke, 2000). Collapse of the mine was caused by a local magnitude 2.3 seismic event. The seismic event was however a natural event but was induced by the mining activity being carried out. Earlier on, BGM had noted the effects of mining induced stress and seismicity. A risk assessment report had indicated that there was an increased risk of rock falls and mining below the 800m level was extremely hazardous. The report recommended the upgrading and improvement of the ground support and change of the mining strategy in light of the increased seismic activity (Ward, 2007). Despite the findings and recommendations, the company continued to use its mining extraction method. Prior to the accident, Beaconsfield had experienced similar rock falls with one being on 9 October, 2005 in which there was a 350 tonne rock fall as a result of a local magnitude seismic even (Ward, 2007). Another rock fall had also occurred on the same month involving a 2.1 seismic event (Ward, 2007). These were clear indicators of the potential hazard of risk fall; it is therefore clear that the mining company was fully aware of the fragmented nature of the rock mass and the potential risk of rock fall and should have put in place adequate ground support system in order to avert the impending disaster. The company also conducted a risk assessment procedure that was not independent and not comprehensive (Ward, 2007). This catastrophic incident could have been avoided had an independent and thorough risk assessment been carried out. It would have identified the insufficiency of the ground support and ensured that corrective measures were put in place. 3.5 Case study 5; Copiapo/Chilean mining accident This accident is well known because the 33 trapped men, well known as Los 33, remained trapped underground for 65 days after which the rescue team, an international collaboration, managed to evacuate all the 33 men alive. The accident, which occurred on August 5, 2010, resulted from a cave in resulting to a collapse of the mine. The miners near the mine entrance escaped unhurt but the 33 miners deep in the mine, about 700 meters underground, were trapped (Lusted, 2011). The cave in was as a result of geographical instability that had been previously noted but the company had failed to put in place control and corrective measures that would minimise the risks of ground fall (Lusted, 2011). The company was widely known for its breach of safety regulations and its failure to comply with the basic safety standards (Lusted, 2011). Prior to the cave in of the mine there had been warnings of unsafe working conditions but the company had failed to act on these concerns that posed the threat of being a potential source of hazard (Lusted, 2011). This is a clear indication that the company might have breached safety regulations with this mine, which most probably led to the accident. In fact, poor risk management was blamed for the accident because the trapped miners could not escape owing to the lack of escape ladders. The failure of the company to complete the emergency ladder in the ventilation shaft, led to the entrapment of the men for that long period of time as the emergency ladders would have offered a way out. The company had also built a spiral shaft instead of the recommended vertical main shaft therefore making the rescue process to be extremely difficult. Conclusively, this situation could have been avoided if the company had complied with the safety regulations and standards and through the use of risk assessment to review the risks and put in place the corrective measures. 4.0 Common repetitive patterns Based on the study of the fore mentioned catastrophic incidents, the following common inferences can be drawn 1. There were clear indicators of potential source of hazards; wet conditions in the quecreek mining and the Gretsey mine, earlier ground falls due to seismic activity, clear signs of ground instability in the copiapo mine. The events were therefore to be anticipated. Regardless of this, respective management failed to address the risk through use of control measures and where they did the measures, they were inadequate and ineffective therefore failing to prevent a situation that could have been avoided. 2. The mining company’s failure to comply with the basic safety and regulation standards further aggravated the catastrophes. The ineffective emergency response plan whereby no drill or simulations had been conducted and workers had never been to any of the escape ways, compounded by the defective self-rescuers or the little knowledge on their use aggravated the situations. This was also the case in the copiapo mining incident where failure to complete the emergency ladder in the ventilation shaft led to the entrapment of the workers for several days. 3. Existence of a production vs. safety culture in the operating environment: The aforementioned mining companies all had their speculations and uncertainties regarding safety in the mining areas. They all decided to continue with the production process basing their judgements on unwarranted assumptions such as the supposed accuracy of the map plans they got from the state or assuming their systems were adequate enough therefore they did not conduct comprehensive risk assessment procedures. 5.0 Recommendations The recurring nature of fatalities in the mining industry requires that the industry shifts from a reactive approach to risks and pursue a proactive and holistic approach to risk. The industry’s use of key performance indicators such as lost time injury, Lost time severity, Lost days and lost time injury frequency only addresses the minor injuries in the incidence spectrum; those with a high likelihood of occurrence but low severity (Renk, 2013). These performance indicators cannot address the major accidents and fatalities. This is mainly because injuries in the former category are as a result of organisation health and safety standards issues while those in the latter category are due to both engineering and OHS issues (Fernand, Arruda and Gontijo, 2012). The company must therefore incorporate KPI that will seek to address the critical safety factors that surround major accidents and fatalities. An example of such an indicator is the ratio of defect free work permits issued to the total number of work permits issued. There is also use of the zero harm indicators, which is in line with top quality management. This kind of KPIs will incorporate the aspect of continuous improvement through risk assessment and both collective and individual efforts and responsibility at promoting and maintaining a safety culture in the operating environment (Parreira et al., 2009). Mining activities and interactions are highly coupled and interlinked. Any risk assessment approach to be adopted must understand the various coupling and interactions if the potential risks are to be identified and completely eliminated or mitigated. The case studies reveal that engineering systems have a direct impact on the risks and consequently catastrophic incidents. The best approach to risk assessment is the DEPOSE system (Perrow, 2011). This is an engineering system that comprises of six subsystems, which are the pivotal pillars of the mining operations; therefore this kind of approach will offer a systematic review and a comprehensive approach to risks in the mining industry. The first subsystem is design, which comprises of geological mapping, an assessment of the ground competency and the adequacy of the ground support design and the assessment of slope stability. It helps address the primary causes of catastrophe in the major mining accidents such as flooding and inrush by ensuring use of updated and accurate map; ground falls by assessing the adequacy of ground stability and ground support and also helps avert situations caused by landslides. The second subsystem represented by the letter E is plant and equipment. This ensures that the equipment used in the production process are fit for use and their design conforms to the require specifications and they are of utmost high quality. It will therefore call for regular inspection and routine tests (Perrow, 2011). The letter P represents the operating procedures. This includes a list of the working procedures, maintenance procedures, preventive and emergency procedures (Perrow, 2011). This kind of information is very important especially during emergencies as everyone has a clear defined role and knows what is expected of thereby reducing chaos as was the case of the Sunshine fire accident where inadequate knowledge of the emergency procedure aggravated the fire thereby resulting to several lost lives. The fourth subsystem is the operators. Onsite competency is extremely crucial in any mining operation (Perrow, 2011). This system ensures that the mining operations are undertaken by qualified personally who are well versed on the preventive, maintenance, identification of the potential hazards in the work place. The systems would also requires that each and every worker is not only equipped with the emergency procedures but must also have undergone the emergency drills and simulations in order to root out the shortcomings regarding the emergency plan. The fifth subsystem denoted by the letter S is the suppliers and materials. This unit comprises of the storage of raw materials, the equipment spare parts and the quality of the materials (Perrow, 2011). Finally, the six sub system denoted by E is the Environment. The environment comprises of the internal and the external environment. The internal environment entails the ergonomics while the external environment includes the regulatory bodies (Perrow, 2011). This system aims at ensuring that a safe working culture is nurtured and the conflict between production and safety is eliminated. This kind of environment envelops all the other subsystems and regulatory bodies are therefore required to ensure that the mining companies adhere to the required guidelines and standards. This is through conducting of independent audits. The mining companies should open up their mining operations to scrutiny by independent and external bodies. The audits should be continuous and at intervals set depending on the nature of operations. This approach should be reinforced using the Safety management system and the principal mining hazard plan. A PMHMP is a plan that seeks to identify the principal mining hazards (a hazard with low probability of occurrence but high severity) and based on the assessment controls are put in place to address the hazard (Tasmanian Government Department of Justice, 2013). Every miner is required to have a copy of the plan and this goes a long way in improving the disaster preparedness of the personnel thereby reducing fatalities. An SMS is a list of all the procedures policies and practices aimed at preventing catastrophic incidents and will include the OHS and engineering safety. It includes the safe case regime. The safe case study approach is a practical way of approaching hazards as it is based on likely scenarios and how the company under scrutiny can handle the situation. The safe case regime will identify the potential hazards and come up with controls that adequately address the risk either through elimination or mitigation. The safe case regime and the previous key performance indicators should be used in assessing the ability of a mining companies to safely carry out mining operations. This is the criterion that should be used in the issuing of permits by the state. Collaboration between all the stakeholders in the mining industry is also recommended so that it can address issues such as the regular updating of maps and mine plans in the state repositories, emergency response and the evacuation process and any other factors that impede safety in the mining industry. 6.0 Conclusion Technology has evolved over the years and mining can therefore no longer be accepted as inherently hazardous. The fatalities in the case studies could have been prevented with the right procedures and processes. 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