Rational Actor Model and the Foreign Policy Decision-Making - Essay Example

Introduction When people go to the polls to select their leaders they may do so on the basis of many factors: charisma, knowledge, empathy, and identification with the masses. At the heart of such choices, however, is the notion that the leader would follow a common sense approach that is based more on reason than on emotion. While the masses may follow their instincts in choosing a leader, in policy circles, the rational actor model follows this same idea, and is a framework that guides policymakers with regard to how to conduct foreign policy using all the resources at their disposal, including knowledge, clear identification of issues, clear knowledge of goals and purposes, an understanding of the benefits and costs of different approaches, all of which should assist the chief executive to make decisions that rank high in logic and reason. Although many leaders would like to follow this model the realities of international politics and the dearth of information surrounding major issues that require quick decision making simply dictate that the rational model cannot always be followed and that in its place officials have to muddle through. To say that all foreign policy making is rational, therefore, is to be unaware of the forces that impinge on the decision makers and the limited information upon which they sometimes have to make their decisions. I. Rational actor model and foreign policymaking The rational actor model, whether in economics or politics, makes decisions based on having all the relevant knowledge. Because the rational actor lives in a simple world where the information he needs is available, he is able to make the necessary calculations regarding the value of different courses of action. A rational actor can be expected to do things that are in his own interest. And this is what states are expected to do, thus, the rational actor model underpins the realism that is supposed to guide the actions of nations. In recent years, this element of realism is reflected in the efforts of the United States government to rethink its nuclear arsenal and to make changes that depart from assumptions made during the Cold War. Whereas in the past, the Soviet Union was seen as the big enemy, in recent years, because of the thaw in the relationship, the United States’ continued interest in nuclear weapons is not based on a potential threat from the Soviet Union’s most powerful new incarnation, Russia, but because of some potential rogue states such as those identified by Bush as the axis of evil: Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. As the article, “United States Nuclear Strategy in the Twenty-first Century,” notes, ‘The Bush administration’s vision of the American nuclear future, recently articulated in its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), is part of a broader effort to restructure US defense policy. The NPR thus reflects the key concepts of dissuasion, deterrence, defence, and denial articulated in the Quadrennial Defense Review, which was released in the autumn of 2001” (Russell & Wirtz 2004 91). In effect, after assessing all the information, including the behavior, expressions, and other elements of Russian behaviour, the US government is quite certain that it would be foolish to continue to operate under the assumption that a state that wants to be a partner of the United States for the sake of Russia’s economic development ought to be viewed still as an enemy. In spite of this positive case of rational decision making, often, in the real world, things are not so simple. In some cases, information that a state might need in order to make a critical decision may not be forthcoming. As interesting as the rational actor model is, however, “It is obvious that ordinary human beings hardly fit into this stylized model of the rational actor. While it might be an adequate representation for human decision making for a limited number of cases, it lacks explanatory and predictive power for many others” (Klause 2001 2). In fact, the usual lack of complete information available to actors such as the state has given rise to what Herbert Simon has described as bounded reality, which acknowledges that “human beings have only a limited amount of information available, and their capacity to calculate is limited. Because it is in most cases impossible to do everything related to a decision, we will take what we know, and decide on the basis of this available information, evaluating alternatives and their consequences only until we are satisfied with the result” (Klaus 2001 3). It is apparent that the new model, bounded reality, is not necessarily better than the first but is much more rooted in the real world where information is often hoarded in order not to give tactical victory to the opponent. Another very important element of rational theory is that a state that operates rationally would expect that it would get rational responses. For example, a state, that is prepared to establish treaties with foreign governments does so on the basis and belief that the other party, the foreign state, is also a rational actor that will play by the rules. It is obvious then that the rational actor model does not apply to every situation. This is one of the major critiques of the model. Also, even though on the surface state actors might advance to the point of signing treaties or making agreements, all ostensibly following the rational actor model, it must be noted that politics, and life in general is far from being value-free. This means that there are times when against their better judgments actors might be moved to take action or undermine existing treaties and agreements because of the values that they hold dear, values that may conflict with their outward efforts and expressions. Often, in making the decision whether to trust the other parties and the declarations that they have made the rational actor will have nothing more than the past behaviours of the individual or state in question. But even where the entity has misbehaved in the past, it is possible for that same entity to declare in no uncertain terms that because of changed conditions it can be trusted to do the right thing. As Leach and Sabatier (2005) explain, “The decision to trust a policy adversary also involves assessing their incentives to cooperate or defect in the future. Institutional rational choice scholars view these incentives as being shaped largely by he presence of rules governing the negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of consensual agreements…Such rules reduce opportunities for misunderstandings regarding the terms of an agreement or whether an agreement was reached. Monitoring rules provide confidence that people who break agreements will be detected. (Leach & Sabatier 2005 492). One of the biggest critiques that have been leveled against rational theory came from Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro in their book, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science which was published in 1994. Despite the title, however, it seems that the critique is not against rational theory per se but directed against researchers in the field who tend to focus more on theory building than in testing those theories in the laboratory of real life. Among other criticisms Green and Shapiro level at rational theory researchers is the “tendency among some theorists in the rational-choice tradition to fall back on ad hoc arguments when empirical data appear to contradict the predictions of their theories” (Hedstrom 1996 278). That much, unfortunately, can be said about any number of researchers and does nothing to overthrow rational theory completely as a viable theory by which to analyse how political entities deal with one another. In the book The Limits of Policy Change by Michael T. Hayes, the author notes that those who gravitate towards large-scale policy experiments, as well as promote logical coherence, and perfect solutions to problems, that is rationalists err because they underestimate the reality of human fallibility. Rationalists also have the naïve faith that government, by itself, can accomplish a lot. A number of other constraints to rationalism follow below: II. Three types of constraints Nature of international politics International politics is complicated because there are many forces that impinge on the actors, many of which are not overt. This means that even though one might have been able to wangle an agreement out of a foreign power, due to pressure from home it is possible for that government to turn its back on the agreement that it had signed. Even looking at the history of such countries as those in Western Europe it is a marvel why they did not conceive of the issue of unity so many centuries back rather than fighting. Over the centuries the countries in Europe went back and forth between war and peace. Even though the actors on the political stage continued to change, each one, it seemed was ready to resurrect old wounds or start new injuries and so the uncertainties remained. Even today, with many countries bounded together in Europe, the uncertainties remain. Would the admittance of countries such as Turkey into the European Union strengthen the alliance or create a weak link in the chain? Would a stronger Europe inadvertently challenge Russia to start a new arms build up? Even though a state might have its own reasons for doing something another state might well interpret those actions through a hostile lens, leading to trouble that no one might have seen coming. The world of politics, therefore, remains a field of uncertainty, which is why it is difficult to strictly apply the model of rationality. Individual misperceptions There are also times when personal miscalculations enter the negotiations on an international scale. This was very much the case with the events that led to a war between the United Kingdom and Argentina in 1982 over the Falkland Islands which to the people of Argentina are known as Malvinas. The Argentinean leaders whipped up a frenzy of patriotism and emotion over the islands. The fervour that ensued, with support coming from other Latin American countries were all misinterpreted as strength for their course; adding to that, the fact that the Falkland Islands did not have any legitimate defense and that the United Kingdom lies thousands of miles away convinced the military leaders that this was a war that they could win. And this was hardly the end of the personal miscalculations that were involved in this case. In a book written by a former military leader of the Argentinean army wrote that the military in Argentina made the assumption that “the United States was going to be neutral I the conflict or was going to help Argentina. This represented ignorance of the United States and its wars…” (Argentina 2003 1). In this case, the assumptions upon which any rational actions were taken by Argentina turned out to be false. Even though Britain was indeed thousands of miles away, the Falklands turned out to be important enough for the country to commit troops into a shooting war. And the United States, far from remaining neutral, supplied the United Kingdom with critical information about Argentina that helped make the defeat of Argentina swift. Groupthink Groupthink represents another situation where rationality is turned on its head. As explained above, it is an assumption of rational theory that all options would be considered based on available information and the best of these chosen. Time and again, however, groupthink has been allowed to interfere with this process. In the book, Victims of Groupthink, famous Yale psychologist, through interviews of people who were with John F. Kennedy when he made the decisions that led to the infamous Bay of Pigs fiasco, has been able to pin that failure to groupthink. “Why is it that John Kennedy was sitting at a table with about 18 of the brightest human beings and that such a brilliant group comes up with such a dumb decision?...One of the thins that (Janis) pointed out after interviewing the people about how the decision was made is that Kennedy expressed his view, what alternative was best, within the first 20 seconds of the first meeting” (Tucci 2004 C5). Once the boss had spoken, no one felt free to exercise his freedom of thought. People were concerned about the perception they would create by disagreeing with the Chief Executive and if their own idea turned out to be wrong they wondered how that might affect their career. It was safer, most would have assumed, to simply go along with whatever the Chief had decided to do. Groupthink, therefore, is a killer of rational thought and decision making. The definition that Janis gave to groupthink was that it is “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group; when the members, striving for unanimity, override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action” (Rosen 2003 F9). Already, the decision to go to war in Iraq is being described as a possible case of groupthink. It is no secret that such people around President Bush, including Condoleezza Rice, Dick Cheney, and former defence secretary Rumsfeld were hawks who were eager to go to war. On the other hand, one voice of open caution was Colin Powell, who was the former secretary of state. In fact, “An Italian commentator has argued that the decision by both US President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair to go to war in Iraq can be explained by their being afflicted by “groupthink”, a term borrowed from psychiatry to describe a state of “collective ecstasy”. The paper argues that this “sickness’ is what prevented politicians from heeding “devil’s advocates” against the war in Iraq, such as UN Chief Inspector Hans Blix and British government weapons scientist David Kelly” (Italian paper attributes Bush, Blair Ira war decision to “collective ecstasy” 2004 1). Studies that have been done both in the United States and in the United Kingdom suggest that there were major errors made by the US administration in heading to war even though the supposed grounds for the war, weapons of mass destruction were nowhere to be found. It seems that in the case of Bush and Blair there was a feeling that overthrowing Saddam Hussein was the right thing to do. They sought desperately to find a good pretext upon which to base what appeared to have been a predetermined goal – to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Under such circumstances, the people around the president, like those around President Kennedy in his own time, saw it fit to go along with the decision, a classic case of groupthink. III. Alternative solution: Incrementalism or Muddling Through It has been established that because of the uncertainties in the real world, it is not always feasible for governments or individuals to subscribe to the rational model. Moreover, there is hardly ever complete information or time to consider carefully all available options. What has emerged as an alternative to the rational actor model, therefore, is the use of trial and error. In effect, government leaders feel their way through decisions. This explains why there are so many leaks. When the government makes a leak before an official decision is made it is an opportunity for the government to buy time and to gauge public reaction as to whether the decision will be approved or not. In some cases, the leak may actually be a way to gauge how the other side would respond before the official decision is made. Since the information that has come into the public domain is only a leak rather than an officially sanctioned response, the decision-makers still have room to maneuver. If constituencies of great importance express their dissatisfaction of the decision the government is able to change it without losing face or facing retaliation that carries a heavy cost. This idea of trial and error has been described as incrementalism or the art of muddling through. In the book The Limits of Policy Change: Incrementalism, Worldview, and the Rule of Law, Michael T. Hayes writes that there is a need to educate the public on what the possibilities are for political accomplishment and at what rate. Hayes was thinking of incrementalism and noted that among its benefits are ““partisan mutual adjustment”, its understanding of “the importance of checks on the arbitrary abuse of power,” and “its ability to draw on the dispersion of knowledge throughout the political system” exceed its costs (e.g. delay and incoherent policy outcomes” (Durant 2002 639). In effect, even though incrementalism is slow, in the end, it produces results that are better than any attempts to follow the rational model, which is often impossible because of the lack of adequate information. While incrementalism is able to deal with the uncertain nature of international politics it is often criticized for making little or no progress. It appears that incrementalism is a synonym for fear of acting. According to Hayes, incrementalism is slow because often it takes into consideration the views of so many interest groups. This takes away any possibility of making bold strokes. There is also not only the issue of wasting time but also of wasting resources. While the government dawdles and waits things may be going awry. At the heart of incrementalism is the belief that “small steps are the best way to move forward” (McBeth 2002 22). IV. Conclusion: In a perfect world where government leaders, agencies, and those playing on the international stage can collect copious amounts of information rationalism would be the best way to deal with one another. It would be even better in such an environment if trust was high among the nations meaning that promises are kept. If governments were sure that they could trust other governments or that they could trust their counterparts in other nations, it seems that we would already be moving towards utopia or paradise. As things stand, some world leaders are scoundrels who can say with a straight face, backed up with official seals that they are going to do one thing or another even though they may have absolutely no interest in following through. They may, for practical reasons, agree to do various things but they know that when they do not follow through there is not much anyone can do to them. Even in the case of North Korea and Iran who face the pressure of sanctions it seems that there is not much fear. The truth of the matter is that the outside world is hardly ever sure about what these countries have and so the proposals that are made often fall short in being able to put proper pressure on the countries. It is this lack of access to information that makes rationalism what might at times seem like a porous model. To argue that all foreign policy is rational, therefore, does not hold much water in the light of realities on the ground. Incrementalism, which is based on taking small steps while listening and watching the environment for various signs takes the path of pragmatism and seems to work better in the real world. It would be a mistake, nevertheless, to view incrementalism as a much better alternative to rationalism. Incrementalism is slow and can result in massive waste but it is safe because it does not usually involve any bold steps that might surprise the opposition into taking a dangerous step that will escalate matters beyond what is comfortable. As the world has become even more uncertain, with the threat of terrorism hovering perpetually over humanity, one wonders if muddling through is really the best way. Certainly, terrorists, especially these days do not much like to negotiate. In the past, governments refused to negotiate with terrorists. These days, it is the terrorists who refuse to negotiate and even more they do not allow any time for decision making when they pack up their bombs with the intent of going on a suicide mission. Even though there are limits t rational theory it nevertheless offers a roadmap for decision makers regarding what incredible possibilities might exist in a perfect world of full information and trust. While it would be untrue to aver that every foreign policy is rational, it is probably closer to the truth to say that many governments continue to hold rationality as a model while muddling through in these moments of uncertainty. Should the political terrain change, however, to one of certainty and trust, not a few governments would revert to rationality or some version of it since it is within that framework that bold experiments can be made for the good of the people and in the interest of international relations. 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