The Alliance between Syria and Iran - Essay Example

Name Course Tutor Date Strategic Alliance between Syria and Iran Introduction Chronological variances have always shaped alliances in the Arab world with the latest being the Syrian and Iranian alliance. This enduring alliance between Syria and Iran dates back to 1979 after the Iranian revolution authenticating it as a facet in the political landscape in the Middle East. It has ignited controversy among many nations globally, especially those that view it as an impediment to attaining long standing peace in the Middle East. The Sunni Arabs perceive it as a threat to the Arab world’s stability as it threatens the region’s status quo. In addition, it has been analyzed as being purely proactive and not reactive. This is due to the fact that the two nations feel threatened both regionally and globally by the Western allies led by the USA. The Arab world has seen the Syrian and Iranian alliance as part of Syria bureaucrat propaganda to present itself as being under attack by hostile forces mainly in the Arab region hence justifying its own dissident policies and regional hegemonic ambitions (Goodarzi, 288). Analysis of the Iranian-Syrian Alliance The Syria and Iranian coalition has played a key function in international relations especially because Syria and Iran had a hand in sponsoring the Shi’i movements in Beirut and had deviating stands on the Palestinian Liberation Organization. According to Yiar Hirschfeld, the relationship has been termed as an odd couple affair (Yiar Hirschfeld, 29). This alliance is described as having been divided into three consecutive segments (Goodarzi, 23). Firstly, there is the initial segment witnessed when Tehran and Damascus replaced acrimony with partnership between February 1979 and May 1982. This was followed by the alliance exercising its influence in the Arab regional affairs between June 1982 and March 1985. The last or third segment which took place between March 1985 and August 1988 is referred to as the last era and is viewed as a state of stagnation and descent. The dealings among the Arab states, Israel and Palestine in particular have a pivotal role in the objectives and the shape of the alliance. Moreover, the shift in Syria- Iraqi relations has contributed to shaping the alliance. This is explained by the fact that Syria began to make overtures to Iran rather than Iraq after the Iranian revolution. The judgment by Hafiz al-Asad followed denying Iran public support to conduct military exercises in the east for fear of domestic and regional political repercussions on the regime (Goodarzi, 33). This identifies the fear of political and military sanctions that Syria has in respect to the alliance with Iran. In addition, Syria dreads being sidelined by the other Arab countries for taking sides in the conflict. Syria alignment with the new religious establishment can only be unwritten in the perspective of inter Arab and Syria domestic politics. For instance, Syria-Iraq relation failed to materialize after the former was accused of having a hand in the attempt to topple Baghdad’s Ba’ath’s regime. Realizing its instability, Assad continued to cultivate closer relations with Tehran (Goordazi, 17). This was the best resolution for the leader as it reserved the relevance of Syria in the Middle East politics since the crevices between the US and Iraq had started to show. The alignment was strategic as the elimination of Iraq would eventually have them as the force to reckon with both regionally and internationally. Syria and Iranian alliance is a marriage of convenience as the two countries have fundamentally irreconcilable ideologies that are only merged by the antagonism to the US and Israeli policies. The Syrian pan-Arab nationalism and the Iranian Khomeini approach to an Islamic insurrection are incompatible. This is transient predominantly because the two governments are judged to be at odds. For instance, Iran is mainly dominated by the Persian and the Shiite regime whereas Syria has Suunis as the majority but is ruled by Alawites who are a minority. Such divides are too deep to allow the eventuality for more than procedural, strategic variance. In this regard, the alliance only offers strategic benefits and considerable limitations in return. The two nations have signed bilateral monetary accords casing virtually every field. As a result, technical delegations visiting their capitals have grown strikingly since 2005. This is explained by the fact that though Iranian monetary support is seemingly higher than it is reported to be, only a few projects and public investment have started. The Syria-Iranian alliance is economically scrounging as the private sector investors in Iran always nitpick of unfavorable investment conditions while Syria grumble over the plummeting oil prices. This implies that minimal fair trade transpires between the two states. The alliance has also incurred a cost since the ties have harmed their relationship with other Arab countries. As a result, one of the core strategic interests of Iran which is of particular importance to the Baathism foundation has been undercut. Consequently, there is fear of the return of sectarianism. Syria had the fear of it becoming the target of Shiitasation movement through vigorous Iranian proselytizing. The marriage between Syria and Iran suffered a major blow after Syria’s alienation by the US which knocked it off balance. The US made deliberate attempts to embolden the Syria and the incursion of Afghanistan eradicated two of Tehran’s strategic challenges (Rubin, 67). Secretive decision making exercised in each of the two nations makes it difficult to ascertain the thoughts of each (Goodarzi, 6). The alliance to Khomeini is based on great principles of Islam despite Syria being a proclaimed secular state. In accordance to Goodarzi, the conception of the alliance is to the greatest interest of the Iranian people and the Arab region. This is not certain as Hafez Assad’s brother Rifat sent envoys to Tehran to discuss ways through which the two countries could collaborate particularly against Iraq as its elimination would see the alliance gain regional supremacy. Eventually, the alliance was given a blessing after Ahmad Iskandar presented Ayatollah Khomeini with an illuminated Quran during his visit to Tehran. Khomeini was against the dominant Iraqi Su’uni role and monarchy rule against the Mustakbareen in Iran. Despite the harsh reaction to his support by the Iranian jurists, Khomeini still earns respect from the Iranian community. This makes it possible for him to influence decisions domestically. However, not all leaders of the Islam religion were considered as Khomeini’s verdict seems to dictate. Iran and Syria are haggard together in a pragmatist defensive concordant against regular aggressive regional enemies. With the threat of Iraq being waned, the major focus of Syria is Israel which it has identified as the biggest threat. Technically, the two states are still at war as indicated by the fact that the two signed an armistice in 1967 and not a peace treaty. According to Schulte, the forging of the alliance after the Shah rule was imperative as the current regime is not pro Israel (Schulte, 34). In this regard, the alliance was aimed at asserting their strength in the Middle East. This was evident when the bombing of the US embassy in Beirut took place in 18th April 1983 and was received with great support from the pro-Iranian Shiites. The destabilizing effect of Syria and Iran in the region is also evident through the bombing of the CIA covert operations in Pakistan. In this case, the base was being used by the US for offensive attacks on the Taliban Groups in Afghanistan (Woodward, 56). According to Green, a stable Iraq is of no interest to Syria since victory for US policy in Iraq will be an obstacle to Iran-Syria alliance (Green, 16). Moreover, Iraq as a US client state threatens Syria as an end to the uprising would free up the US chattels to be used against the Syrian –Iranian alliance. Syria’s main aim in the alliance was to wage an offensive against Iraq and pursue harsher policies against Israel. International Crisis Group argues that the peace negotiations between Syria and Israel would play a pivotal function in the regional ambiance. According to Goodarzi, Assad’s repudiation to detach himself from Iran and collaborate with the conventional Arab politics was to minimize the risk of its conflict with Israel (Goodarzi, 78). Observers argued that this would have conveyed the government substantial benefits. Syria’s security quandary would have further been alleviated by forming a formidable coalition with Iraq and denouncing Iran. This would have guaranteed a full flow of monetary and pecuniary aid to remedy its domestic economic position (Salloukh, 165). It is obvious that by the look of current events and history, United States have constantly held long interests both in the strategic positioning and resources of the Middle East region. Originally, the involvement of the West comprised of the Soviet Union which highly negotiated with Arab countries as way of securing their oil supplies. As time passed by, the concern shifted from acquiring Iranian oil to supporting Israel in securing leadership within Middle East region (Alasdair, 100). The current struggle being witnessed by Russia and constant rising of power by China and India still makes Middle East a main focus in the containment of US energy policy. It is a clear indication that this policy has just reinvigorated the Syrian-Iranian alliance especially on attacks made by the US against the rule of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. This attack has made the alliance to intensify in their coordination through coming up with policies that will ensure they meet the new challenge (Hinnebusch, 250). It was only after the US invasion to Iraq (the Gulf War) that the alliance between Syria and Iran started to focus and draw attention in the West circles whereby Iran sought to fight Israel and America in search of regional influence. As part of understanding the involvement of the West in this alliance, it is essential to answer questions such as; was the alliance between Syria and Iran tactical or strategic? Is there possibility that Syria will be nudged away from Teheran? Is there any significant reason why Syria should give up its relationship with Tehran and what will be the price for giving up Teheran? Answers to these questions clearly reveal geostrategic and natural significance of the alliance (Hinnebusch, 141). All these questions seem to revolve around the definition of animosity displayed by the two countries towards western countries especially the U.S. Anti-western posture called for strategic importance for an alliance as a way of fighting the West and balancing power in Middle East. Due to increased interests in the Middle East and their collaborated antipathy to the West, Syria and Iran alliance is characterized by certain differences characterizing these countries as secular versus theocratic, Arab versus Persian and Sunni-majority versus Shiite. Even with the named differences, Syrian-Iranian alliance has remained intact in the past three decades and the countries have constantly received isolation from the West especially in the United States (Karmon, 116). The two countries have criticized the role of the U.S. in Iraq placing their support to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas. The main strategic objective for their coming together was to define a new Middle East which will be at the forefront in rejecting influenced being displayed by Americans in the region. Potential information indicates that tension in Syria’s alliance with Iranians is a strong one and that the alliance will run for a medium term if not full term. It is evident that even though Syria is not the key partner in the alliance, both Tehran and Damascus are still committed in unifying the Middle East region so as to intensify the fight against US. According to the United States, attempt to withdraw one country from the alliance serves as a greater opportunity of finding its way towards economic richness found in the Middle East. It is for this reason that Iran has invested a lot of billions towards the alliance as a means of solidify strong relations across various spheres in Middle East (Magnus, 120). Consequently, the US has not been able to tear up this alliance due to the heavy investment being put up by Iran. Such investments result to strong military connections, economics and political ties which are difficult to unwind. As time goes on, it is clear that these ties especially that involving the economy will be more mutually reinforced furthering a more strong alliance. The US is trying to use Syria as bait so as to break this alliance. This may not be the case since Syria’s workers highly depends on Iran investment especially in terms of jobs and training (Moaddel, 150). The solidified ties enacted resulting from constant joint good infrastructure between these two countries is acting as a barrier for the United States to break the alliance. The current leadership displayed by Tehran and Damascus clearly places a hard line and is less likely to engage itself with the West especially US. The United States government asserts that as long as both Assad and Ahmedinejad are in power, the union between these two countries will form basis for the two governments to correlate (Shaul, 156). These two leaders focus on ensuring that they will use the Middle East hatred against United States so as to facilitate the propulsion of the alliance further. It is evident that the centre of power in connection to this alliance is more diffuse and directed towards Iran. President Ahmedinejad appears to focus on Iran thus strengthening ties to Syria. For the two countries, the union is considered as a demonstration of deeper principles which widely rejects the views of united state key enemy in this alliance. On the other hand, Syria president asserts that the alliance is significant in the sense that her economy will grow and it will further isolate itself from the west (Shaul, 156). Syria and Iran are constantly becoming defiant in the face of US with difficulties being experienced in Iraq, a weak pro-western government operating in Lebanon and problems being noticed in Palestinians territories. Each instance requires Iran and Syria to work in accordance with decisions made as way of perceiving potential opportunities so as to maximize their influence hence minimizing the projection displayed by US in Middle East (Mufti, 50). It is therefore important for these two countries to remain united so as to accelerate their agenda in the region and to isolate their governance from that of the west. The fight against U.S. involvement in Middle East is extensive as displayed by the cooperation of the two countries in the military activities. In June 2006, the two countries signed mutual defense treaties and extended military cooperation agreement later in 2007. The agreement was to provide missiles to Syria government in addition to intelligence training and access to information (Olmert, 180). The alliance between Syria and Iran cannot be termed as one without strengths and weaknesses. At one moment, observers indicated that it was open to manipulation by United States. For instance, sometimes Syria seemed to be moving away from Iran based on its Arabic roots. Goodarzi clearly explains that difficulties within the alliance were mainly arrived at in the last stage of Lebanon war where these two countries supported different factions (Mokhtari, 181). But this was later resolved through various diplomatic negotiations indicating how strong the union was despite their indifferences. Other difficulties were connected to the current attempts by Arabian countries to accomplish a Pan-Arab rapport with Syria. However, Syria chose to remain loyal to Iran. Their strengths include strong diplomatic roles that existed between them comprising of mutual antagonism to U.S. adventurism especially in Lebanon (Mokhtari, 180). Conclusion In conclusion, it is evident that the alliance between Syria and Iran which began purely as a defensive mechanism for about two decades has proven to be useful to the two. This is explained by the fact that, having been established on a geostrategic foundation, it was not shaken even during transfer of power in Syria which took place in 2000. After the fall of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad, Syrian –Iranian union fully developed to a complete fledge alliance which signified Iran’s growing weight in the region. The presence of United States military in Iraq gave Syria an open chance of getting closer to Tehran as a major way of taming American effort of destabilizing it Similarly, Iran viewed Syria as a key factor in Arab-Israeli conflict placing a significant role of Iran in Middle East. It is clear that the main benefactor to this alliance is Iran as it is noted that it constantly used its provincial cards as a bargaining chip towards its nuclear programs and threats issued by Western countries. Even as U.S. continues to pressurize Syria to withdraw itself from the alliance, it is not likely that Syria will fall into their trap. This clearly indicates that as long as these two countries find themselves receiving same threats from the same source, their union will always remain stronger. It is evident that the alliance between Syria and Iran is one which is classical and widely defined by perceived threats as compared to commonalities such as collective values or similarity in culture. Works Cited Alasdair, D. ‘The regional equalization of health care and education in Syria since the Ba’thi Revolution’. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1981. Goodarzi, M. Syria and Iran: diplomatic alliance and power politics in the Middle East, London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2006. Goodarzi, M. Syria and Iran: diplomatic alliance and power politics in the Middle East London: I.B. Tauris, 2009. Green, J. “Syria suspected of concealing nuclear activity“, WTOP, 19 November 2009. Hinnebusch, R. ‘State and civil society in Syria’, Middle East Journal, 47/2 Spring 1993: 243– 257. 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