Moreton Island Oil Spill Disaster - Case Study Example

Case study: Moreton Island Oil spill disaster Introduction The Pacific Adventurer oil spill was a disaster that occurred in the sea off Brisbane in Australia in March 2009. The cargo ship called Pacific adventurer was registered in China and was travelling form Newcastle to Brisbane. The spill took place about seven nautical miles on the east of Cape Moreton before the ship entered Moreton bay. The oil spill prompted immediate action from the relevant authorities when it was reported. The response action had its strong and weak areas. In this paper the effectiveness of this response initiative has been examined with its strong and weak points being highlighted. Description of the event The Moreton Island oil spill disaster in Queensland took place on 11th March 2009 at about 3:15 a.m. Before the oil spread into the sea the Pacific Adventurer with a Hong Kong flag carrying ammonium nitrate lost 31 containers of the same overboard into the sea. This happened about 7 nautical miles on the east side of Cape Moreton. This made the fuel tanks of the ship to rapture and as a result heavy fuel oil leaked into the sea. The ship later reported the incident to the Harbor master for Brisbane at about 5:00 am in the morning. It was not immediately known how enormous the spill was since initial reports received from the ship showed that the oil spill was just small of about 20-30 tones Miller (2009). This came to be known as having been 271 tones of oil spilled. Large amounts of oil were deposited through weather conditions and tides to the coastline on the South of Cape Moreton. South of Cape Moreton an 8 kilometer area was badly affected with the adjacent 17 km area received some light oiling. On the Northern part of Cape Moreton there is a rocky area on the foreshore lying between the North point and the cape had some light oil with part of it seen as suspensions of emulsified mousse. The Sunshine Coast running from Marcoola to Kawana and Brisbie Island beaches were also impacted by smaller oil quantities. The beaches had about 70 kilometers of their area being oiled lightly with large quantities of weathered oil or tar balls. Since the 1970 incident when the oceanic Grandeur ship spilled about 1100 tones of oil in Torres Strait the oil spill became the largest to occur in the waters of Queensland Julian (2009).The reality of the Pacific Adventurer spill dawned on 13th March ’09 and the government of Queensland declared Bribie Island, Moreton Island and the Sunshine Coast southern area a disaster under the Disaster Management Act of Queensland. In Queensland this happened to be the first time for a disaster declaration to be made in such circumstances. It caused national oil spill arrangements and the disaster management arrangements of Queensland to be brought together. The circumstances in which the Pacific Adventurer oil spill took place were very unique. The oil spill had a specific gravity that enabled it to be submerged before the land came into contact with it. This made it had for the oil to be assessed early enough. The rough sea and heavy weather brought about by ex Tropical Cyclone Hamish reduced the possibility of situational awareness as well. The oil spill took place near places with high population and this had an impact on tourism, recreational and commercial interests. The oil spill was highly conspicuous and the helicopters of the media could reach it easily affording the incident a lot of media interest. The impact created cannot be ignored. It started as a marine hazard from a chemical spill threatening navigation but ended into a disaster event with many facets. Early situational awareness and response options were hampered by inclement weather. The incident contaminated the shore line on multiple locations with others being remote and hard to reach. The disaster contaminated about 70 km of the shoreline. The inaccessibility of some of the areas caused many logistical problems. The incident also took place at the end of a cyclone that had used up the resources spared for disaster management for the staff especially in the local government. Logistical challenges were big especially on Moreton Island being a remote island. With the National plan response arrangements the government of Queensland through MSQ carried the responsibility of managing the response for the oil spilled and the ammonium nitrate from those containers that had been lost Julian (2009). The manager of the national plan AMSA provided logistical and specialist support to the response but since the incident took place out of the state waters it became the responsibility of AMSA to get the containers and choose the action to be taken if necessary. When they received the report about the loss of the 31 containers with ammonium nitrate the Master at Brisbane Harbor notified several agencies operating under the ‘Queensland contingency arrangements for marine chemical spills’ together with the Queensland Fire and Rescue services and the advisor for MSQ and the provider for operational support for chemical spills at sea. AMSA and the MSQ also had to issue navigation warnings on safety to the area’s shipping and requested for the reports of lost containers if sighted. The QFRS confirmed that the spilt ammonium nitrate did not threaten the safety of humans. After receiving the master’s report of the loss of approximately 30 tones of oil, an oil spill response was initiated by MSQ to add to the chemical spill response. Given the short distance to Moreton Island the wind conditions and the knowledge of currents there was an expectation by MSQ that the oil was coming on the Moreton Island shores on that day and may be on the Sun shine coast the following day. Bearing in mind the small size of the spill as reported, a small response team went to Moreton Island to check how far shoreline oiling had gone. They carried basic equipment for establishing the stations for decontamination and do the preparation for the clean operations on the shore line Laver & Mathews (2008). To help in spill response planning there was undertaken an oil spill trajectory modeling which predicted that there would occur a lot of oiling on the coastline on Moreton Island with the sunshine coast and Bribie Island having lighter oiling. The initial surveillance from the air on Wednesday 11th March at 1030 brought back reports of light sheen patches and a slick of 3nm x 500m at about 10% coverage close to Flinders reef to the north western side of Moreton Island. The next flight of between 1400 and 1500 on the same day showed oil pooling in the bay of honeymoon and heavy oiling on the eastern beach beginning on Cape Moreton to a kilometer in the south with some heavy oil slicks seen off the Moreton Island eastern beach. A bigger part of the oiling took place on exposed beaches because of the strong wave action on the eastern coast of Bribie and Moreton Islands and also on the Sunshine coast beginning at Caloundra to Marcoola. Shorelines and rocky headlands at Moreton’s northern end were impacted by the soil spill. A number of freshwater wetlands also suffered some effects from the oil on Spitfire Creek and Eagers Creek on Moreton Island’s east coast. Mermaid lagoon found on Bribie Island also became oiled. Through the aerial surveillance flight taken by SMPC on Thursday 12th march in the afternoon heavy beach oiling was revealed on Moreton Island with mousse oil being sighted off the coast of Sunshine. On that day the SMPC did estimate that about 250 tones of oil had been spilt. Steps were put in place to increase response including informing MSQ Mooloolaba that there was a likelihood of oil coming to their shore and the creation of Incident control centers on Bribie Island, the Sunshine coast and Moreton Island. Within a period of 100 days a large oil spill response and operation for cleaning up the coast was done on an area of 75 kilometers on the shoreline of Queensland. Response analysis After being notified of the incident on 11th March 2009, Maritime Safety Queensland made control arrangements for the incident under the Queensland Plan. On March 13th 2009 the Premier invoked a disaster declaration which closed the disaster management arrangements at the state level to give the authority required to close the oiled beaches especially Moreton Island to commander resources and visitors if needed to facilitate effective response to the oil spill Miller (2009). Sandy beaches with oil were easier to clean but the process of cleaning was made difficult because the beaches are highly dynamic and this made the oil on the beach to have sand covering it with layers of oil being created under the surface of beach. Since all those areas affected were places of high tourism activity, community amenity value and recreation there was required a very high clean up standard. This was necessary in order to support the tourism industry to recover as well as restoring the former amenity levels. On the side of MSQ, its call out procedures and actions in response were effective timely and appropriate. Bearing in mind the dominant environmental conditions matters of safety and the little time between the discharge and the impact of the oil on the coast the decisions taken initially to do the clean up without applying chemical dispersants or containment booms and the equipment for recovery of oil from the sea were very appropriate and in line with the procedures and policies of state and nation. Because the actual size of the spill was unknown early enough deploying response equipment was not bad. However the booms deployed to protect the river entrances for Mooloolaba and Maroochy rivers was slow. It was supposed to happen within 12 hours instead of 48 hours that were reported. There was lack of evidence that a discharge was going on while the ship was on transit from Moreton Bay to the place of anchorage meaning additional damage could not be suspected. However from behind a hull inspection from under the water could reveal the damaged starboard bunker tank leading to the discovery of 270 tone leakages early enough. If the ship had been boomed when berthing at Hamilton Wharf, then the little oil leakage flowing from the starboard bunker tank into Brisbane River could have been easily contained making it easy to recover or cleanup. However the oil leakage at Hamilton was recovered quickly Lehman (2005). In the process of responding to the oil and chemical spill there was a good establishment of the control and command by the B-ICC. The B-ICC‘s role was completed after the chemical response and the of the oil spill was boosted to handle a bigger spill compared to that which was reported. The ICs were involved in planning for on ground response. The B-ICC took a loner time to recognize this change and went on with the management of the response. This was supposed to be addressed. Under OSRICS or National Plan terminology there should be one ICC and the operations on the scene centers. However considering the large workforce, media interests and the long oiled coastline the operation centers were allocated the roles and responsibilities of ICC. Due to the complexity of the arrangements it was not very clear concerning command and control. The ICCs presented the problem of staffing them because they were five. There was under resourcing in the B-ICC which made it hard to manage and support the ICCs. However, as shown above the B-ICC turned into a provider of logistics. If its role and relationship with other ICs/ICCs had been clarified in the initial response stages then perceptions would have been improved as well as the B-ICC’s operational functions. Initially when the ICCs were being set up the filling of the positions indicated in the OSRICS with people who have skill and experience was not considered may be because of the many ICCs. The SMPC did not have a deputy or the services of a strategic advisor and therefore it got exhausted and fatigued. In other previous disasters an oversight function has been strategically provided on frequent basis by AMSA officers Lyons (2002). The lack of people with experience not long ago translates into an inability by AMSA to play this role. As a result SMPC lacked strategic advisors from the private sector because they are not there. The approach of the Regional Council at Sunshine Coast looked reasonable in their perspective. However the way the heavy machinery were being used on the beach could have exacerbated the process of cleaning up. Unless it is correctly used heavy machinery causes the oil to sink in the sand and makes the amount of sand and waste material that should be taken away from the affected beaches. Along with this there is a cost for handling and disposing these wastes. A better and cost effective clean up of the beach could have been done by the regional council of the Sunshine coast if graders were used in the place of front end loaders. Graders have an accurate control for skimming the surface of the beach instead of the rough control seen on the front end loaders. A grader operator with enough experience and training in the techniques of cleaning up the beach is good at pushing oily sand into windrows before it is picked up. The oily beach would only be impacted by the wheels at the frond part of the grader. Considering the remote location and the circumstances Public Works deployment, that of RoadTek and the workforce of Brisbane City Council on Moreton Island was done with little pre-planning, onsite supervisors and logistics support to manage and sustain response personnel numbering 300 in an area that is remote. Another related issue to the public sector workforce involvement was that certain organizations knew little about with State and National Plan arrangements. They also lacked knowledge on the logistics and planning that was needed to support field personnel of such a huge number. Other organizations like RoadTek gave their logistic support and went on to supplement the logistic support for the rest of the organizations. From a general viewpoint the workforces from the private and public sector performed well. Better procedures of handing over needed to be in place when large sections in the response workforce are being changed over. EPA could have coordinated the work done by SAP and the independent consultants as a way of playing its role as an ESC. However EPA did not appear to have an adequate number of people who are trained and understand well the National Plan or have relevant skills and knowledge for performing the required tasks Walker, Stanton, Slamon (2009). SAP establishment was a good way of fulfilling the need of independent advice needed to inform the process of decision making. The delayed acquisition of appropriate approvals resulted in very sensitive environments like the Spitfire Creek wetlands failing to be cleaned at the right time and this brought about very expensive disruptive methods being needed at a later time. This was an issue that needed attention at the time from the people concerned. The procedure used in approval of the response plans for areas that are environmentally sensitive must be streamlined so that very effective clean up action that has very little impact can be started shortly after the effect on the sensitive areas has been known. The disaster was declared and this mobilized the entire government resources to help in the clean up of the oil and by giving the response personnel legal authority to commandeer facilities for accommodation and resources for transport on Moreton Island was unnecessary. However it is worth noting that even though the Queensland Premier declared a disaster situation there was no formal activation of the Queensland Disaster Management Arrangements. The involvement of EMQ in helping the ICC management especially the B-ICC revealed some differences between OSRICS applied through the National Plan and the AIIMS utilized by many other agencies. The differences had among other things no planning and elements for financial recording under AIIMS which are very important under OSRICS. Maritime safety Queensland has expertise and knowledge in oil spill responses although its ability to deal with oil spill incidents of a large scale is limited unless it receives additional support. The disaster management arrangements of Queensland give the additional support needed for provision of logistical support and to take care of the all the issues of the government among them recovery McFee (2005). The collateral influences and the logistic support for the oil spill required resources and energy that Maritime Safety Queensland could not be able to manage without help. This brought another twist to the complicated process of response management. At the moment there is no model for use in triggering the escalation arrangements for engaging Queensland system of disaster management to provide support to an oil spill response. The control and command arrangements utilized in the oil spill incident happened to be a hybrid model which with time emerged and resulted in role ambiguity. The impact was felt in every area even in decision making. The lack of the role of centralized planning at BICC contributed much to the challenges felt in control and command in the beginning of the response. The compatibility existing between the administrative arrangements of disaster management and oil spill response is very small and therefore duplicated systems need not be used. With 5 incident control centers among them MI-ICC, S-ICC, B-ICC, BI-ICC and SC-ICC brought about uncertainties about control and command especially with BI-ICC. The flow of information, reporting and directions some times skipped the BICC which had a responsibility of managing the ICs on the scene. There was no clarity in the establishment of the responsibilities and roles of the ICs. This resulted in a lot of problems in the coordination process. As a way of example there were several logistic requests which were duplicated and in other instances supplies that were not requested for were sent especially on Moreton Island. In certain cases there were problems since the process of appointing senior officials as ICs who did not have any National Plan training before resulted in uncertainties and a difference in approaches and methods Whitfield, Alison and Crego (2008). The complexity in the arrangements brought about some uncertainty over command and control. There were some difficulties in staffing the ICC with adequate amounts of people who have been trained and have experience. There should be an endorsement by the NMPC of an approach in cases where there is slowness on the side of the environmental agency to approve a response to places that are sensitive and have been affected by oil spills. The IC needs power to take the right actions. The government of Queensland made investments of specialist resources in the media to take care of media enquiries and make press releases regularly. This was done effectively and efficiently with the MSQ website and the 1800 telephone service being used very well. In the initial response stages senior technical personnel among them ICs took time and effort to deal with media. For example on Moreton Island the manager for Tangalooma Resort made himself a de facto spokesman for the media doing interviews and giving the media certain advice on the happenings. There was confusion as well on the demarcation of responsibilities and roles and command, control and disaster situation being declared under QDM Act contributed to the confusion. The way that EPA gave priority to the places of environmental interest and its lack of ability to give advice and agree on the techniques of clean up to be applied in the wetland regions of Moreton Island also presented another challenge. The EPA personnel located on Moreton Island thought their role was more in ensuring the compliance with EPA regulations than providing assistance to the response. The Premier invoked a declaration for the disaster on the 13th of March 2009 activating the disaster management arrangements at the state level. The declaration made it possible for people to get accommodation on Moreton Island immediately as well as ferry use when necessary. The duration and the scale of the incident needed good logistical support to help in the clean up of the oil. Activation of the Disaster Management Arrangements of Queensland mobilized multi-agency resources in government. The disaster declaration was therefore done very appropriately in a timely manner and effectively Paton (2003). The declaration of the disaster made certain responders perceive that MSQ did not have command and control meaning the response to the spill was under coordination by a different agency. Even though the Queensland premier declared the disaster situation there was no formal activation in the Queensland Disaster Management Arrangements. The disaster situation being declared created some uncertainty initially about command and control and pointed at the clarification and development of the linkages between the State and National oil spill plans and the plans for disaster management. Conclusion The Moreton Island Oil spill was a big disaster in Queensland’s history. The incident was surrounded by unique and complex circumstances. Initially, bad weather and hardships in getting situational awareness was a frustration to the response efforts. The disaster caused a lot of interest and debate in the public domain which made the response effect suffer some influence from peripheral issues. The duration and the scale of the incident went beyond the ability of Maritime Safety Queensland, the combat agency to handle alone. Activating the disaster management arrangements of Queensland served as a wise decision since it brought on board government resources. It also made agencies to start addressing long term issues of recovery. Just like in any other incident of disaster certain issues suffered from lack of proper coordination. The result was poor communication, underutilized resources and duplicated efforts. At first the command and control preparations were misunderstood and the responsibilities of decision making were not clear. The command and control that came out was hybrid involving the National Plan and the Disaster Management Arrangements of Queensland. These two being integrated immediately resulted into connectivity issues at first in which several response agencies were involved. All the agencies were committed to achieve a ‘whole of government outcome’ in a big area. This was impressive and helped in dealing with the numerous challenges that emerged in the incident. The response to the oil spill succeeded and was closed in ten weeks after many agencies had been putting in heavy concerted effort. Effective combined operations from various agencies need clear command, coordination and control arrangements. The coordination of the recovery arrangements must be left to the ‘combat agency’ that has been designated and in the case of this disaster Maritime Safety Queensland. This is so because of the esoteric nature of the response, particular international agreements, oil spill equipment and techniques, legislation and the recovery arrangements accepted internationally. There should also be developed strong partnerships with the local government and between MSQ and DERM to get effective response that can help in recovery arrangements. The joint arrangements newly formed must be well refined and exercised regularly to increase familiarity with combined arrangements. References Miller G. (2009) Pacific Adventurer Oil Spill, Independent review of responsiveness of the disaster management system support; Department of Transport and Main Roads (Maritime Safety Queensland) TMS consulting. Julian M (2009), Report on the Pacific Adventurer Incident; Report of the Incident Analysis Team; Strategic Issues Report; Maritime Safety Authority, The Australian Government. Whitfield, K., Alison, L., and Crego, J. (2008) Command, Control and support in critical incidents. 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