Major USA Underground Coal Mine Disasters - Report Example

Table of Contents 1.0.Introduction 0 2.0.Analyses of the cause 1 2.1.Table 1: Major U.S underground coal mine disasters 2 3.0.Preventive strategies 4 3.1.Figure 2: Model of judgment and decision making 6 4.0.Conclusion 7 5.0.Reference Lists 8 1.0. Introduction It is becoming undisputed fact that even highly regarded planners and architectures have not been able to foresee or control recent American industrial disasters. One of the focal points of the recent disasters is the mining industry. A good example of such is the Centralia Mining Disaster of March 1947 which has since prompted resurgent efforts from safety and health personnel in United States. While recent publication by Bureau of Mines and State Department of Mines and Minerals concur with earlier reports that the explosion was instigated or originated from the head of the first west entry the actual cause is still contentious (U.S. Mine Rescue Association, 2003). Though the disaster did not cause property damage on the surface of the mine, chronology of events leading up to the disaster is essential especially in finding how Illinois public administration officials erred. This review thus seeks to critically asses events leading to the disaster. Such will be integrated with judgment decision-making process, human behavior in the disaster and possible strategies of preventing such disasters. 2.0. Analyses of the cause Comparing it with Texas City Disaster, Centralia Mining Disaster was the mine explosion that ought not to have happened. Citing reports from agencies such as Illinois Secretary of State (2003), not months but years before the disaster, both federal and state mine inspectors reported their concern about the mine but there was no action taken. For instance, quarterly report submitted by inspectors from 1944 through to 1946 did not generate response from either state, federal or mining agencies (Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act, 2006). When the disaster struck a few minutes past 3 o’clock, it is reported that stakeholders had been made aware of the imminent danger. This is a case that can be termed as reluctance or negligence by corporate giants and the governor in charge. This argument posits that the death of 111 men engaged in the site can be put on bureaucracy-laden mining agents but not on individual malpractice or error. Perhaps rules, laws, and regulation resulted from this disaster, but the avoidable death toll from the site should be judged as another situation where the worker is expendable whilst corporate profits supersede human life. Going by scholars such as Martin (20000, there has been general consensus that it was a coal-dust explosion that resulted in the death of 111 men engaged in the site. Whilst 46 died as a result of inhaling irrespirable gases generated by combusted coal dust, 65 deaths came as a result of violence and burns. As reported by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (2006b), the mine was dusty and dry with evidence of heavy deposits of fine coal dust at every active point. To conceptualize this point, Monongah Nos. 6 & 8 mining disaster which claimed 362 lives is reported to have been caused by coal-dust explosion. Furthermore, the then president of United Mine Workers John L. Lewis argued that a dusty and dry mining site has been claiming lives and called for related agencies to address the issue (Nieto and Duerksen, 2008). Statistics show that the period 1902 through 1909 recorded the deadliest period in United States underground coal mining. Looking at table 1 below, a total of 2070 lives were lost. 2.1. Table 1: Major U.S underground coal mine disasters *Occurred in December, 1907. Source: U.S. Mine Rescue Association It was due to this reason that there were congressional and mining industry responses to find lasting solution to the problem. One of the suggested solutions was the adoption of legislations at the state and or federal levels. However, as MSHA (2006a) reports, one of the main cause of the Centralia Mining Disaster was failure to follow legislative process. To be specific, Illinois Department of Mines and Minerals was instituted in 1917 and developed significant regulations for instance not allowing coal dust buildup as such has been regarded explosive. This is one such legislation that was ignored by the site. To conceptualise this point further, in November 1944, UMWA Local 52 recording secretary Mr. William Rowekamp sent a letter to Medill noting that the site had violated the regulation and as a result rendered the site dangerous (Nieto and Duerksen, 2008). 3.0. Preventive strategies The investigation conducted by U.S. Bureau of Mines reported that, “…it was a case of localized explosion confined to four working sections. Such explosions did not propagate as it approached the rock dusted zones of the entries” (Bureau of Mines, 1947 as cited in Nieto and Duerksen, 2008). The fact that the propagation of the mine explosion stopped when it attempted to reach rock-dusted zones within the site supports the idea that such disaster would have been avoided had the stakeholders did rock dusting as the control or safety measures for dusty conditions. This strategy is supported in Article VI of Coal and Rock Dust, Section 1a-Coal where it suggests that the best possible strategy of avoiding disasters witnessed at the Centralia Mining Disaster (1947), Jim Walter Resources No.5 Mine (2001) and Sago Mine in West Virginia (2006) is not to permit accumulation of dust on roadways of working places or haulage entries. After the case of Centralia Mining Disaster, Jim Walter Resources No.5 Mine and Sago Mine in West Virginia still become victims of the disaster after failing to apply rock dust within 80 feet of the faces in all open and other entries as contained in Sections 2a and 2b of the same Act. The second strategy that can be used to prevent the occurrence of such disaster is the enactment of pertinent mine safety legislations that are specific to the problem. For considerable number of years, state and federal mine safety agencies have considered aspects of mine disasters and the response to this has been the enactment and adoption of legislations. For instance, after public pressure that culminated as a result of the explosion of the Lick Branch of 1909 that claimed lives of 67 citizens and the Cherry fire that claimed 259 Congress passed Public Law 61-79 in 1910. Though this law was supposed to form United States Bureau of Mines, the sole responsibility was to control and mitigate underground coal mine disasters by ensuring that such mines are developed and run through application of research. As a result of its ineffectiveness and failure to address specific problem, more coal mine disasters were reported including Stag Canyon No. 2 mine (1913), Castle Gate (1924) and Mather mine (1928). Therefore the bone of contention is not just enactment of a law but those that are specific to the problem. A good example of such laws could be the Public Law 82-326 which allowed for the crafting of the first Code of Federal Regulations for lignite coal mine safety and bituminous (Nieto and Duerksen, 2008). Worker behavior in mine emergencies is the other strategy that should be adopted to mitigate cases of disasters as one witnessed at Centralia Mining. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) interviewed 48 miners from 1988 through 1990 who managed to escape three separate mine explosions (NIOSH, 2001). Analysing the interviews, it was realized that there were array of decision variables linked to aspects of group and individual behaviors. One of such behaviors is the complexity workers find when trying to mitigate the disaster as well as complex decision making as they attempt to escape. The figure below shows a model constructed by the research to show the complexity workers encounter when faced with such disasters. 3.1. Figure 2: Model of judgment and decision making Source: NIOSH (2001) As it can be noted, workers find themselves in difficult position when disaster strikes and when making attempts to mitigate such. Therefore solution would be to simply the process by placing mechanisms that are friendly to workers. 4.0. Conclusion This analysis finds that it is only recently in the history of mining that research have started impacting on the catastrophe. It still finds that Centralia Mining Disaster was avoidable had legislations enacted implemented fully. For future research, this paper also notes that public safety professionals must be results-oriented relevant and goal driven. The case of Centralia Mine No. 5 explosion is a case study of failure to focus on results and suggestions. 5.0. Reference Lists Illinois Secretary of State. Illinois State Archives, Record Group 245.000: Department of Mines and Minerals. Retrieved Oct. 26, 2003, from http://www.sos.state.il.us/departments/archives/di/245__002.htm Martin, J.B. (2000). The blast in Centralia No. 5: A mine disaster no one stopped. In R.J. Stillman, Public administration concepts and cases (7th ed.), pp. 31-45. New York: Houghton Mifflin. Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act), Pub. L. No. 108 236 (S 2803) (June 15, 2006). MSHA. (2006b). A Comprehensive Guide to the Inspection, Care and Use of Self-Contained Self Rescuers, DVD 013. Beckley, West Virginia: US Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration, National Mine Health and Safety Academy. MSHA. 2006a. Accident, illness and injury, and employment self-extracting files (part 50 data). http://www.msha.gov/stats/part50/p50y2k/p50y2k.htm Accessed September 2009. Nieto, A. and Duerksen, A. (2008). The effects of mine safety legislation on mining technology in the USA. Int. J Mining and Mineral Engineering 1(1): 95-103. NIOSH. (2001). Mining disasters. Washington, DC: Author, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Retrieved Oct. 24, 2003, from http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/data U.S. Mine Rescue Association (2003). Historical data on mine disasters in the United States.’ Retrieved Oct. 27, 2003, from http://www.usmra.com/saxsewell/historical.htm Read More