The Impact of Nuclear Weapons on the Cold War - Essay Example

Did nuclear weapons make the Cold War more stable? Historians place the Cold War from 1945 to 1990 and describe it as an era in which two bitter rival super powers, the US and the USSR engaged in an arms race characterized by the possession of nuclear weapons (Beyer 2005, 4). The possession of nuclear weapons was predicated on the concept that the ability to destroy the enemy, would secure world domination. However, as the arms race gained momentum, the knowledge that the enemy possessed the same capability generated an aura of mutual assured destruction (MAD) (D’Anieri 2009, 218). It was therefore the MAD doctrine that “stalemated” or “stabilized” the Cold War (636). The MAD doctrine was built on a concept that military superiority was insignificant. It was a strategy used to convince the enemy that a nuclear attack would have the consequences of an equally lethal retaliation to the extent that both would be destroyed. Therefore MAD became a conceptual framework for constraining weapons because only minimal numbers of nuclear weapons were required to bring about a catastrophe (Painter 1999, 57-58). The bipolar nature of the Cold War era together with the concept of MAD helped to stabilize the Cold War. The bipolarity existed in the fact that the US and the USSR both developed significant alliances that provided guaranteed security to their allies which was largely “backed by a promise to use nuclear weapons if attacked” (Gavin 2009, 10). Backed by either one of the two super powers with MAD, the rest of the international community was ironically able to co-exist relatively peacefully. As Gavin (2009) explains: Given the bipolar structure of the international system and the relatively equal strength of each side’s alliances, small or medium powers had little incentive to develop or acquire nuclear forces (10). The stabilizing impact of MAD during the Cold War as a result of the US and the USSR’s equally lethal supply of nuclear weapons is adequately described by Mearsheimer in his work The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. According to Mearshimer (2003), neither the US nor the USSR were able to obtain “nuclear superiority” over the other (130). Therefore each side was forced to co-exist in the knowledge and fear that other was “likely to have a survivable nuclear retaliatory force that could inflict unacceptable damage on an attacker” (Mearshimer 2003, 130). In this regard, the fear of nuclear proliferation during the Cold War era was not a primary concern. The major concern was strategic and political relations between the two super powers. The focal point was the control of “vertical proliferation or the strategic arms competition” between the two super powers (Gavin 2009, 12). The possession of nuclear weapons therefore created an atmosphere where MAD cultivated what has come to be characterized by political scientist as the “long peace” (Mearsheimer 1990, 5). Ultimately, the possession of nuclear weapons stabilized politic relations among the international community during the Cold War by acting to prevent political conflicts growing into arm conflicts. As it were, there were no political conflicts that were significant enough to warrant the destruction of the entire planet (Gavin 2009, 12). Essentially, the possession of nuclear arsenal by the US and USSR gave way to the MAD doctrine which in turn acted as a deterrence against nuclear attacks. The US and the USSR were by virtue of MAD forced to exist with equal constraints on their conduct (Cimbala 2001, 112). It is entirely ironic that stability would be the result of the possession of nuclear weapons via the emergence of MAD during the Cold War era. Theorists have long held the view that conflict and wars are caused by the competing interests among states and it is likewise believed that the competition in arms only serves to aggravate those competing interests to the extent that they contribute to procuring war (Osgood 2003, 22). As Osgood (2003) explains: All competition for military power is bound to be provocative in so far as it threatens the security and other vital interests of adversaries (22). Yet, competition in arms also has the capacity to cultivate and foster caution as well as restraint among adversaries (Osgood 2003, 22-23). The Cold War demonstrated this theory to a great extent, substantiating the concept that the arms race, like any other form of international competition can and very likely will have a “moderating and deterrent effect” (Osgood 2003, 23). Mearsheimer (2003) observes that military power in a MAD world is “highly stable at the nuclear level” (130). The fact is, under such an environment, “there is no incentive for any great power to start a nuclear war that it could not win” (Mearsheimer 2003, 130). During the Cold War this was evidenced by the ongoing fear and knowledge that a nuclear war would more than likely give way to the great power’s destruction. Although the possession of nuclear weapons and the fear of their consequences if used, did not prevent states engaging in conventional war, the two super powers appeared to always be mindful that once a conventional war broke out, there was a heightened risk that it could turn into an all-out nuclear war. Thus far, no conventional war has escalated into a nuclear war. However, the Cold War era demonstrates that the fear of this occurring kept the two super powers out of direct military conflict during that era. Mearsheimer (2003) maintains that: great powers in a MAD world have little reason to worry about the conventional balance because nuclear-armed great powers are simply not going to attack each other with conventional forces because of fear of nuclear escalation (131). Mearsheimer (2003) argues that on the other side of the theory, the mere threat of a conventional war turning into a nuclear war can act as a strong incentive for great powers to ensure that conventional war does not turn into nuclear war, thereby defeating the theory that nuclear weapons could act as a stabilizing factor in preventing armed conflict between two great powers(131). However, the Cold War illustrates otherwise. While the two super powers fought proxy wars such as the Korean and Vietnamese wars during the Cold War, these two great powers did not directly engage in armed conflict. There is evidence that nuclear weapons were not always a stabilizing factor during the Cold War however. For instance, Syria, fully aware of Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons launched an attack on Israel in 1973. There were reports of armed conflict between China and the Soviet Union near the Ussuri River in 1969 which could have broken out into an all-out war (Mearsheimer 2003, 132). Even so, neither or these conflicts and so many others during the Cold War gave way to global conflict to the extent that the conflicts prior to the Cold War gave way to two World Wars. In the final analysis, the Cold War could not eradicate conflicts between diverse nations. This is probably only possible in a perfect world. However, the Cold War never erupted into an all-out war, nor did it escalate into a global war despite political tensions and the great risk of military conflict on a global level. Historians for the most part take the position that the arms race under the auspices of the possession of nuclear weapons takes the credit for the relative stability during this time. It was the MAD doctrine that contained and controlled states’ conduct and as such had a stabilizing effect. Bibliography Beyer, M. (2005) Nuclear Weapons and the Cold War. The Rosen Publishing Group. Cimbala, S. (2001) Deterrence and Nuclear Proliferation in the Twenty-First Century. Greenwood Publishing. D’Anieri, P. (2009) International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs. Cengage Learning. Gavin, F. (Winter 2009) “Same As It Ever War: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War.” International Security, Vol. 34(3): 7-37. Greenberg, E. (1998) The Struggle for Democracy. Longman. Mearsheimer, J. (Summer 1990) “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War.” International Security. Vol. 15(1):5-56. Mearsheimer, J. (2003) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W.W. Norton and Company. Osgood, R. (2003) “The Place of Disarmament in America”. Cited in Goldwin, R. (ed) Beyond the Cold War. Ayer Company Publishers. Painter, D. (1999) The Cold War: An International History. Routledge. Read More