Interpretation and Administration of Law - Term Paper Example

 Criminal Justice Abstract The practical and the operational needs as well as the aspirational longings of the society for justice, is still satisfied by how our Courts interpret and administer laws, through their decision making that takes into account public opinion and the changing norms of society. In the interpretation and application of laws, there is no single theory that is applied but different factors are taken into account, as viewed by both Justice Breyer and Justice Frankfurter. This paper presents various law journals and cases which examine how justices and judges make their decisions on different issues taking into account the factors that influence them in their interpretation and administration of law. Although there is no single view that governs the interpretation of law, the confluence of various factors which are taken into account by justices and judges, still serve the needs of society in general. Interpretation and Administration of Law Decision making as regards the interpretation of the law and its administration by our courts definitely have an effect in our society. But do these satisfy the practical and operational needs of society or satisfy the aspirational longings of the people for justice? In my opinion, the interpretation of the law and the administration by our courts still satisfies the practical and operational needs of society. According to Baum & Devins (2010), the decision making of the Supreme Court for instance, is influenced “by social and political forces” (Baum & Devins, 2010). As held in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), the Court often takes into account what the “state practices” are, in order to determine the extent of “constitutional protections” (Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-73 (2003). Furthermore, in Vance v. Bradley (1979), the majority views are also often applied by the Court in order to sustain the judgments of the electorate (Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979). Reference is also made to public opinion in decision making wherein “public opinion polls” relating to death penalty, are made known to the jurors in a case involving the sentencing of a person such as the case of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002). In Atkins v. Virginia (2002), “death penalty for the mentally impaired” was struck down, with the Court showing a polling data what there is “a widespread consensus among Americans, even those who support the death penalty, that executing the mentally retarded is wrong” (Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002). In the case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992), which reaffirmed the decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), again declared “the plurality opinion” wherein the Court was said to protect “its ‘legitimacy’ by speaking and acting in ways that allow people to accept its decisions” (Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992). Hence, as argued by Baum & Devins (2010), these “social and political forces” influence justices in their decision making (Baum & Devins, 2010). Chief Justice Rehnquist in “a lecture entitled Constitutional Law and Public Opinion,” even admitted that Supreme Court Justices “go home at night and read the newspapers or watch the evening news on television; they talk to their family and friends about current events” and, consequently, cannot “escape being influenced by public opinion” (Rehnquist, 1986). Baum & Devins also argued that the decisions of justices is a reflection of the “changing social conditions” which is especially significant during the period of the 1960s wherein there was an active women’s movement as well as the growing receptiveness by the Court on “constitutional attacks on gender classifications” (Baum & Devins, 2010). Decisions made before 1971 shows that “the Court had never invalidated a gender classification under the Equal Protection Clause” (Baum & Devins, 2010). However, in Craig v. Boren (1976), sometime in 1976, the Court took a second look at gender classification, finding it problematic (Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) especially with the “change in gender roles” (Friedman, 2009). These decisions and opinions made by the court takes into account the views of the public and as well as the norms and practices, which more often than not, reflect the needs of the society in general. It reflects the aspirations and desires of the society on a given issue especially as regard the application of laws that affect them. The Courts are not immune to public opinion and as can be gleaned from the decisions made, all these factors are taken into account. The needs of society as well as the aspirational longings for justice therefore, is still satisfied. Views of Justice Breyer and Justice Frankfurter According to Baker, Frankfurter’s idea essentially sought to avoid the liberal or conservative thought, but instead applies the method of “judicial self-restraint” (Baker, 1969). This theory of judicial restraint seeks to “limit the personal and subjective views of a judge in the decision-making process” (Baker, 1969). Frankfurter was said to have expounded that judges should pursue the interpretation in the light of “traditional rules and standards” and also take into consideration “prior decisions or court precedents” (Baker, 1969). This restraint is essentially “conservative,” as it attempts to make only minor changes in attempting to settle questions of law by judges (Baker, 1969). This theory espoused by Frankfurter also limits judges in “making decisions on policy” which he believes “should be left to the legislature” (Baker, 1969). Frankfurter was said to have advocated the views of Holmes and Brandeis which stressed on judicial restraint to arrive at “a proper jurisprudential credo” (Parrish, 1982; Hutchinson, 1980; Urofsky, 1985). This view constrains courts “to limit their jurisdiction to matters of public law.” (Urofsky, 1988). Although he knew that personalities and prejudice also “played a role in court decisions,” he stressed on the judge’s obligation “to keep their personal considerations from affecting their decision.” (Urofsky, 1988). In the case of Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis (1940), Frankfurter in his opinion, settled the issue using judicial restraint and stressed that he Court “defer to the wisdom and prerogatives of local school authorities” saying that, “To stigmatize legislative judgment in providing for this universal gesture of respect for the symbol of our national life in the setting of the common school as a lawless inroad on that freedom of conscience which the Constitution protects, would amount to no less than the pronouncement of pedagogical and psychological dogma in a field where courts possess no marked and certainly no controlling competence. . . [T]o the legislature no less than to courts is committed the guardianship of deeply-cherished liberties” (Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 597-598). Hornstein says that Frankfurter also recognized that the Court’s decision making process was enlightened by the “interpretative choices” of justices and “policy concerns” (Hornstein, 2003). Justice Frankfurter elucidates that “constitutional interpretation is most frequently invoked by the broad and undefined clauses of the Constitution, and their scope of application is relatively unrestricted, and the room for play of individual judgment as to policy correspondingly broad.” (Frankfurter & Landis, 2007). He recognized further the constitutional interpretation is essentially what the “controlling conceptions of the Justices are in their ‘idealized political picture’ of the existing social order.” (Frankfurter & Landis, 2007). Taking these into context, Justice Stephen Breyer’s views coincide with that of Justice Frankfurter which essentially, takes into consideration the legislative history as well as traditions, precedents, purposes and consequences but is not confined only to one view. The discretion of justices and judges in making their decisions is not simply based on what the legislature intended but what the policies are, taking into consideration different factors. Given these, Justice Frankfurter would definitely agree with the statutory interpretation of Breyer considering that both justices espouse the same theory of how justices and judges should decide cases. Reference List Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002). Retrieved from http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/00-8452.ZS.html Baker, L. (1969). Felix Frankfurter: A Biography. New York: Coward- McCann, 1st edition. Criminal Justice. Retrieved from http://www.bookrags.com/biography/felix-frankfurter-cri/#bro_copy Baum, L. & Devins, J. (2010). Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People. The Georgetown Law Journal, volume 98, p. 1519, 1521. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976). Retrieved from http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=429&invol=190 Frankfurter, F. & Landis, J. L. (2007). The Business of the Supreme Court. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. Friedman, B. (2009). The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Hornstein, R., Atkins, D. G. & Kaye, T. A. (2003). The Politics of Equal Justice. American Univerisity Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law, volume 11, pp. 1089, 1091-103. Hutchinson, J. (1961, 1980). Felix Frankfurter and the Business of the Supreme Court, O.T. 1946-O.T., Supreme Court Review, p. 143. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-73 (2003). Retrieved from http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-102.ZS.html Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 597-98, 600 (1940). Retrieved from http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=310&invol=586 Parrish, M. (1982). Felix Frankfurter and His Times: The Reform Years Passim. New York. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992). Retrieved from http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?vol=505&invol=833&court=US Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Retrieved from http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0410_0113_ZS.html Rehnquist, W. (1986). Constitutional Law and Public Opinion. Suffolk University Law Review, volume 20, pp. 751, 768. Urofsky, M. (1985). The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, Supreme Court Review, volume 299, p. 65. Urofsky, M. (1988). Conflict Among the Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas and the Clash of Personalities and Philosophies on the United States Supreme Court, Duke Law Journal, volume 71. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979). Retrieved from http://supreme.justia.com/us/440/93/case.html Read More