Chinas Military Modernization - Example

China talks of its 'peaceful rise' or 'development'. What are some of the major concerns arising out of China's defence modernization? Is China seeking simply to better secure its national borders or does the concept of China's 'core national interests' redefine those interests in global terms? The populous China, one of most debated eastern nations of the world, has a rich ancient civilization. On the contemporary note, China has been making stride upon stride in terms of modernization. It terms this modernization, which includes modernization on the defence front too, a journey towards peaceful development. By peaceful development China claims that the development is intended for the uplift and prosperity of all the nations and promotion of common development in the same. China's reiteration in this regard came again on the occasion of Communist Party of China's (CPC) 90th founding anniversary. The reiteration stressed the point that peaceful development was part of a strategic choice made by the nation in order to realize modernization, strengthen it, make it prosperous and contribute to the overall growth and betterment of human civilization (Wang, 2011). China path to peaceful development has been seen as having a flip side. It intends to use world peace for its own development, it wants to achieve its development through its own efforts that involve innovation and reform, and it, at the same time, wants to keep itself open to other countries so that it could learn from them and use the learning as a process for its own development. Peaceful development, thus, is an umbrella term used to define open, independent, scientific, common and cooperative development. The results have been encouraging for the nation; something which is seen as a threat by other developed or developing nations, which include Western superpowers and as well as its immediate nations, which too are making strides if not equal to it. In the recent decades China's overall growth and strength has seen phenomenal changes; both on economic and defence fronts. In 2010 China recorded as much as 16 times economic output in comparison to what it was in 1978. The output was pegged at US$5.88 trillion, which meant around 9.3 percent of the whole world. In 1978 it was a meager 1.8 percent. The progress is seen as steady and is taken as a catalyst towards China becoming an information-based, industrialized, urbanized, internationalized and market-oriented nation. Not delving too deep in the past statistics, if China's recent growth is tabulated, then it comes as a surprise that in comparison to the world's average its per capita income grew to 46.8 percent in 2010 from 24.9 percent in 2005. But it is not these figures that are bothering rest of the world. What is of major concern for it is that China's defence budget has experienced unimaginable double digit growth in the last two decades! The nation's defence spending, on the per annum basis, in 2000, was $30 billion; the same in 2010 was $210 billion. On the basis of these figures it is expected that China's defence spending in 2012 would touch around $160 billion. This is bothering no nation as badly as America which is expected to lag behind China by 2035 if this trend goes on. This is and would be expected to change the very basic defence equations within the region while it has far reaching implications elsewhere. America is concerned about China acquiring “anti-access/area denial” capabilities, for which a slang popularly used is called A2/AD. China's defence capabilities would be practically redefined when it has such capabilities in place which will be able to disable from afar another nation's defence shield however distant it might be stationed. As a result of this, China's strategic peaceful development is, actually, not as peaceful as it claims. This has triggered a major concern in the western world, particularly America, which is considering reorganizing its thoughts and actions that it aims to focus in the Asian region. That China boasts one of world's largest and most capable army has got another shot in its arm by this so-called strategic peaceful development. But certain actions undertaken by China recently under the garb of defence modernization have provoked the world to introspect and see whether China is actually doing one thing and meaning another or indulging in a diabolic doublespeak. In 2008 members of the U.S. Congress raised this issue and expressed anguish over China's modernization of its submarine fleet. These members included Senator Jim Webb and Representative Duncan Hunter (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2007). China's action of test-firing a direct‐ascent anti‐satellite (ASAT) weapon triggered panic buttons throughout the world. Even though China destroyed a weather satellite of its own, perched AROUND 530 miles above earth, it began to be seen as an exhibition of the nation to showcase its defence might. China refuted these allegations and said it was merely fired to destroy its own weather satellite. The test firing created history in the sense that it sent floating enormous human-created space debris and raised concerns on safety pertaining to space environment. U.S. saw this as a threat to its own satellite system susceptible to attack by this type of capability acquired by China. China said that weaponization of space was the last thing on its mind while conducting this test and that it was only intended for modernization of its own defence mechanism. When faced with the barrage of international questions to which China could not give any fulfilling answer, the ASAT program has till date been shrouded in controversy and allegations and counter allegations have been swirled at both sides (Ross and Watt, 2011). In spite of widespread condemnation after China's test-firing of ASAT spread debris in space, China kept on saying that its modernization was only meant for peaceful development, but could not prove why its actions were signaling otherwise. Consequently China peaceful development initiatives have been debated as having potential dual-use linked with its space program. It is argued that one of its uses is to give impetus to its national prestige and another is to reinforce the fact that China's army is mighty enough to enter a full-blown space warfare bout (Fravel, 2005, pp96–97). That means thee development programs are not only securing its borders but also preparing the nation for any eventuality which emanates from or uses space as the turf (Tellis, 2007, pp41–72). China, thus, not only leverages a favourable security environment but also, and almost in the same breath, creates a deterrence system that is potently credible (Cheng, 2005, pp109–110). In this way China has been effortlessly able to communicate to the external world that should a military conflict arise, it would be able to conduct ultra-modern and high-tech counter measures in outer space (Saunders et al, 2002). This is one of the crucial concerns that its peaceful development program has raised. Hitchens (2003, p22) has argued that it cannot be said that U.S. was caught napping hen China demonstrated ASAT might, but what is of concern is that China's public statements have not been convincing ever since it initiated the peaceful development program. They have mostly been misleading and it is often difficult to read between the lines and amid China's official rhetoric. The rhetoric is as mysterious as its “peaceful rise”. China cites three reasons for its development programs. The first one finds quite an elaborate mention in its White Paper, which claims that the programs are intended for non-traditional threats (which include piracy) and in helping China manage disasters and relief missions better. The second reason that it cites is that it wants to stabilize Asia-Pacific region by creating an environment of security and peace. And last but not least it wants to see this region as more independent from external powers. The recent Pentagon Annual Report (2011) has added weight to these concerns. The report has specifically mentioned how China has deployed advanced and a survivable solid-fuelled CSS-5 medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) against India to create a stance against the country that is highly deterrent (Singh, 2011). China has positioned these missiles in Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions and the number of missiles positioned at around 1000 is by no means a small concern and can certainly not be for peaceful reasons. These missiles have suddenly shifted the focus of China's peaceful rise and development from U.S. to India which, say analysts, is the real target of its missions that it has been conducting since the program began. The report, among many other concerns, adds credence to India's fears on Sino-Indian borders where China is building road infrastructure which, say some analysts, link it to Pakistan, a long-time, die-hard Indian foe. Concerns have also been raised that once China's new weapon technology, most of which is still under testing, is operation, how People's Liberation Army - the largest military in the world - would be capable of doing. Recently the news of China' J-20 stealth fighter jet, first time tested in 2011, came as a shock to the defence observers across the world since the only country that has stealth capability in the world i the U.S. The timing, when images of J-20 appeared for the first time, is also seen as "strategic" by defence analysts since the same surfaced soon after U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates' Beijing visit was over. Concerns have been compounded by Dong Feng 21D, which is a land-based missile that can annihilate an aircraft carrier moving as far as 2,000 miles away. Dong Feng 21D is being considered as the first weapon of its kind ever produced in the world. Such a capability on part China can wreak havoc in naval commanders’ minds; be they from Japanese or U.S. naval forces. Analysts see several reasons responsible for the widespread concern that Chinese defence modernization raise. Its foray into space, and that too with a bang as it created by destroying its own weather satellite up there in space, is a clear indication to the external world that when the need arises it would not be bound by either Western conventions in general and U.S. conventions in particular. It also signals that it would not be under pressure to cede the ubiquitous high ground to other powers that be. Another factor that worries world opinion is that China is known to keep its military growth in secrecy and denial and what it says publically should not necessarily be construed as an internal truth. It is deceptive in what it says and what it does. China has been at the forefront of supporting the ban on weaponization of space, and it first came out with such notion in 1980s; a decade that precisely matches with its own efforts to make inroads into space technology programs. Reports indicate that laser space weapons and missiles that can wreak ground-to-space havoc have been one of foremost priorities of its space programs (Fisher, 2010. p2). Third reasons that probably no other country is making as much progress as China in development of military capabilities using unmanned weapons, nanoweapons, energy weapons and cyber warfare. China is known to have high adaptability for gaining military technology and its assimilation and advancement is matchless. Countries like U.S. know this since it cannot forget how China developed DF-21 intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) after it obtained motor technology from U.S. Concern over China's military modernization attains more menacing proportions as China hints at attacking its asymmetric vulnerabilities like space information systems without which, it is said, U.S. military can do anything except wage a war. All said and done, that gives China another vehicle to spread what have come to be known as its "core national interests". Primarily, the definition of its core interests was confined to some specific areas, which included territorial integrity, national security and national sovereignty. But all these three interests cover almost all issues that are China's topmost priority. Tibet issue, for example, falls into its territorial integrity area, and also does Taiwan, which had been under Japanese control since 1895 and now on its own as a democracy. Recently, the terms pertaining to core interests have found focus in its Xinjiang province, a vast Chinese area that witnesses unruly clashes between Han Chinese and local Muslims. To give core national interests a global tint, China used these terms with Hillary Clinton in 2010 in a meeting with regard to South China Sea. Dai Bingguo, a senior official from the foreign policy department, made a strategic move when he referred to South China Sea while talking of core national interests. The mention of South China Sea was intended to kill many birds with one stone since it borders multiple nations including Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, the Philippines and China itself. These borders have been in news more often than not and skirmishes have erupted mostly between fishing vehicles from these nations and Chinese boats. In other words just as China's "peaceful rise" and "development" have given it a platform to be assertive, the term "core national interests" too is providing the same. Time and again China is leaving no chance to spread the term such that it gets defined on a global platform and in the process it redefines many other terms in which China' core interests lie. However, amid all this bonhomie and hoopla, the world welcomes a China that intends to shape and strengthen norm and international institutions that work towards the peaceful resolution of problems, stability and prosperity. But, a history pertaining to China goes; the nagging concern that arises is that when China appears to do one thing, it actually does otherwise. But a real shot in the arm for China came when U.S.-China Joint Statement between Barack Obama used "core interests" term officially in November 2009 during Barack Obama's visit to China. Since then this term ha found enormous mention and attention in the world media and discussed widely among political experts and pundits alike. The 2009 joint statement made the term more assertive than it was in the past. Analysts say that three factors could be said a responsible for this upswing of the term. One the concept has found greater elaboration in the recent years; two it has been communicated directly or indirectly by the Chinese officials that core interests concept is not negotiable and it is rigid, and three China has gradually gone up the ladder in taking up and defining issues of international importance that have an impact on China; for example sales of arms to Taiwan by the U.S., disputed South China Sea territories and of course the perennial Dalai Lama problem. Political analysts argue that the widespread use of this term by Beijing particularly with regard to the United States and international community is a recent phenomenon. They say its increased usage grew from early 2000s the decade that highlighted the Taiwan issue. Its use with regard to Xinjiang and Tibet has been termed as unambiguous. What is, however, more intriguing is that China has expanded its coverage to socioeconomic development, national security and the political system in China (Christensen, 2011; Lawrence and Lum, 2011). Even though core interests draws its primary precursors from territorial and sovereign issues, the fact that it has been recently used explicitly in diplomatic documents and official statements is seen as a smart move on part of China that signals its strength and assertiveness to command greater deference and respect from other nations for China on issues that sensitively affect it. China's core interests are seen as a softer version of measures that it might otherwise employ should someone force it to compromise on certain vital issues. Both core interests and peaceful rise concepts are, thus, seen as a veiled warning from China to other countries that it should be taken seriously (Glaser, 2010). Every nation has a "core" or a "vital" issue, and China could not be an isolated case. But what is worth debating is that China is using this term more emphatically and more explicitly. Also, it has developed a stance that is very rigid towards it and it is using this term more in relation to controversial issues rather than non-controversial and issues expected to yield positive outcomes when addressed. Should China go ahead with this concept with the current pace, it is expected that the very concept that it encouraged in 2009 might be for it a challenge to handle in future. References Christensen, T. J. 2011. “The Need to Pursue Mutual Interests in U.S.-PRC Relations,” United States Institute of Peace Special Report, forthcoming. See also “AIT Chairman Raymond Burghardt Press Roundtable Taipei,” American Institute in Taiwan, January 25, 2011. Available at http://www.ait.org.tw/en/officialtext-ot1102.html. Accessed July 09, 2012 Cheng, D. 2005. “Zhanyixue and Joint Campaigns,” in China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, eds. James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, 2005), pp109–110. Fisher, R.D., 2010. China's Military Modernization Building for Regional and Global Reach 2010. p2 Fravel, M.T., 2005. “The Evolution of China’s Military Strategy,” in China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, eds. James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, 2005), pp96–97 Glaser, B. 2010. “U.S.-China Relations: Obama-Hu Summit: Success or Disappointment?” Comparative Connections, January 2010. Available at http://csis.org/files/publication/0904qus_china.pdf. Accessed July 09, 2012 Hitchens, T. 2003. “Monsters and Shadows: Left Unchecked, American Fears Regarding Space Assets Will Drive Weaponization,” Disarmament Forum, no. 1 (2003): p22. Lawrence, S.V. and Lum, T. 2011. “U.S.-China Relations: Policy Issues,” January 12, 201., Available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41108_20110112.pdf. Accessed July 09, 2012 Ross, T and Watt H, 2011. “WikiLeaks: US vs China in battle of the anti‐satellite space weapons,” Telegraph (London), February 2, 2011. Saunders, P et al.,2002. China's Space Capabilities and the Strategic Logic of Anti‐Satellite Weapons, Available http://cns.miis.edu/stories/020722.htm.  Accessed July 09, 2012 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Hearing on Maritime Disputes and Sovereignty Issues in East Asia, 111 Cong., 1st sess., July 15, 2009; and House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade, Hearing on Legislation Related to Trade With China, 2 August 2007, 110 Cong., 1st sess., August 2, 2007.   Singh, B.K. 2011. China’s Military Modernization: The Pentagon Report and Indian Fears. Available http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/chinas-military-modernization-the-pentagon-report-and-indian-fears-3453.html. Accessed July 09, 2012 Tellis, A.J. 2007. “China’s Military Space Strategy,” Survival 49, no. 3 (2007): pp41–72. Wang, Y (ed). 2011. China's Peaceful Development. Available http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-09/06/c_131102329_2.htm. 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