Why Intelligence is in Fact a Profession - Term Paper Example

Is intelligence in fact a profession? Institution Name Table of Contents Table of Contents 2 Introduction 3 Background 4 Intelligence as a profession 6 Intelligence requires use of specialist and expert knowledge 6 Academic preparation and practical skills set 7 Intelligence compares with fully acknowledged professions 8 Intelligence analysis as a craft 9 Craft culture by nature 9 Autonomy and judgement of practitioners 10 Lack of clear-cut systematic theories 11 Intelligence occupation has no formal associations 12 Lack of consistently defined roles 12 Lack of prerequisite courses 13 Dependence on individual skills and judgments 13 Lack of standardised best practices 14 Conclusion 15 References 17 Introduction Intelligence agencies generate analyses and estimations of events in foreign countries with the view of protecting and advancing the interests of their countries (Kahn, 2006). Critically, intelligence analysis bears both features of standard professions and crafts. While intelligence is often considered a profession, in reality, it is practiced more as a craft. On the surface, intelligence lacks a range of aspects that characterise formal professions, including quality control mechanism, standardisation of best practices and structured personal practices, so as to ensure individual analyst’s output is reliable and consistent. On the other hand, intelligence requires application of skills through specialised knowledge and practical experiences, gained through academic training. In which case, analysis and interpretation of data and application of knowledge, skills and expertise are striking features in intelligence analysis occupation. Therefore, it could as well be reasoned that intelligence is a profession. The Classic Trait theory identifies the different features that differentiate professions from crafts, such as existence of assessment processes for entry into the profession, existence of professional association and code of ethics (Katan, 2009; Sundin & Hedman, 2005). The Classic Trait perspective also suggests the possession and application of specialist and expert knowledge, exercising autonomous judgement and thoughts, as well as responsibility to clients or the society. Basing on these divergent perspectives, it is clear that considering intelligence work a profession is indeed debatable. Marrin (2006) defines a craft as a trade or occupation that required artistic skill or manual dexterity. On the other hand, a profession is depicted as a field of practice requiring specialised skills, expertise and extended rigorous academic preparation. While these two definitions can point to why intelligence is in fact a profession, the differences in the definitions for a profession and a craft may present a false dichotomy. In the present digital age, where knowledge instead of artistic and manual dexterity forms the foundation of many occupations, typical professions require long and extensive academic preparation and application of the practical skills set (Coyne et al., 2014). Here, intelligence work has characteristics of both craft and profession, which means that it can qualify as a profession and a craft. Yet, further analysis of the distinction between craft and profession reveals that intelligence possesses more characteristics of a craft than a profession. It is therefore argued that intelligence analysis occupation is in fact a craft rather than a profession. Background National security intelligence analysis has historically been practiced as a craft rather than a profession. Marrin (2006) traced the history of intelligence as an occupation and how it has dominantly been a craft. In his review, when national security intelligence agencies became institutionalised, following the Second World War, fairly new entrants practiced intelligence analysis. In which case, skills in the profession were passed on from the experienced or retired intelligence analyst to the new recruits (Aldrich, 2005). Essentially, individual skills development was primarily ad hoc rather than structured. Marrin (2006) further observes that during the initial periods of intelligence in the Second World War, the occupation was monitored by the ‘guilds’, which consisted of skilled craftsmen operated in closed organisations. Today, intelligence analysis occupation is invariably termed as a ‘tradecraft”, a conception CIA (2009) used to depict the practices and doctrines used in producing intelligence analysis. During the Cold War era, certain elements of professionalism were welcomed into intelligence occupation (Aldrich, 2005). Marris (2006) explains that this was primarily because of the efforts of intelligence community, specifically led by former CIA officers and intelligence analysts, such as Sherman Kent (1955) to include analytic code. In his view, this marked the start of intelligence literature, particularly after the launch of the CIA’s intelligence journal in 1950s. In the same period, systematic intelligence literature was created to deal with first principles and description of terms to advance knowledge in the field. This led to the establishment of Defense Intelligence College, now the Joint Military Intelligence College, in the United States. Additionally, formal associations such as the Association of Former Intelligence Officers were started. Essentially therefore, intelligence analysis occupation has become marginally more professional today than it was in the 1950s, when the need for intelligence literature and institutions as foundations for intelligence professionalism were first articulated. Indeed, what is extrapolated from the background analysis is that intelligence analysis has several features related to those of a formal profession, including academic preparation and knowledge and skills set requirement and informal profession or craft, such as lack of sound recruitment and training strategies. The real bone of contention therefore is whether intelligence is, to a greater degree, a craft. Intelligence as a profession Intelligence may be considered a profession as it requires use of specialist and expert knowledge and academic preparation and practical skills set like fully acknowledged professions. Intelligence requires use of specialist and expert knowledge Intelligence analysis occupation fits within the definition of a profession. But first, what is a profession? Saks (2012) traced back the impetus for defining a profession to the taxonomic approach, which proposes that the traits, competence, and functions of a line of work should be viewed in determining what really a profession is. Building on this proposition, it could be reasoned that profession is any line of work that requires judicious and habitual use of information, knowledge, communication, emotions, values, reflections and reasoning in day-to-day practice to benefit the community and individual being served. These features relate to what Lefebvre (2004) considers as an intelligence analyst. Lefebvre (2004) observed that intelligence practice requires use of skills, expertise, and dexterity. In describing the specific roles in intelligence work, Ratcliffe (2009) explained that intelligence analysts make use of technological tools to gather, analyse, and interpret data. Intelligence analysis also calls for application of skills gained through practical experiences and expertise, as well as knowledge gained through academic training. The practitioners also use estimations provided by empirical methods -- such as experimentation, hypothesis, observation, and conclusion in organizing and interpreting information gathered. In taking these perspective into consideration, it could be reasoned that intelligence is in actual fact a profession. The existence of specialist knowledge and expertise depict that competence is critical in intelligence occupation, just like in other professions. Academic preparation and practical skills set Intelligence occupation requires both academic preparation and practical skills set. The concept of experience and expertise gained from learning and development is based on the trade model, which emphasises practical training and developing expertise through experience. Dover and Goodman (2013) suggest that a profession requires extensive academic profession and practical skills set and expertise. This idea is premised on classical model, which places emphasis on the significance of professional education, in defining what a profession is. According to the theory, professionalism is based on culture and learning (Lester 2010; Evans, 2008). Basing on the model therefore, a professional practitioner is expected to have a broad general education, in addition to specific expertise in the field of practice. In Marrin’s (2006) view, the academic preparation and practical skills requirement in intelligence analysis is what distinguishes intelligence analysis occupation as a profession. Marrin further discusses that at first glance, the difference between craft and profession may appear academic, although a range of important implications for knowledge acquisition and accumulation and personnel management have also become necessary in this categorisation. Therefore, both profession and craft lead to different personnel practices and management. For instance, in craft, emphasis is placed on skill development through training and experience. In profession, emphasis is placed in structured academic curriculum that is complemented by on-the-job training and apprenticeship programme. Marrin (2006) states that craft relies extensively on word-of-mouth based proficiency. In Mayer and Lloyd’s (2011) view, professions rely extensively on externally applied certification standards that must be met by the individual practitioners. Additionally, crafts chiefly rely on skills of individual practitioners. On the contrary, intelligence work relies on extensive consultation, including with the pats practitioners. Lester (2010) noted that unlike crafts that rely on individual skills or practitioners, professions rely on consultation and knowledge of former practitioners. Intelligence compares with fully acknowledged professions Intelligence occupation relates to major professional occupations, in terms of training and practice. Intelligence work could be compared to the medical profession in a range of aspects. The medical profession is fully acknowledged as a profession. While the two fields have divergent substantive focuses, the medical profession, like intelligence, has characteristics of a profession and craft since it needs extended and rigorous training. Medicine practice also requires application of skills, expertise, and dexterity. Moore (2010) shows that physicians and intelligence analysts make use of technological tools to gather, analyse, and interpret data. Intelligence analysis compares to medical profession as it calls for application of skills gained through practical experiences and expertise, as well as knowledge gained, through academic training. Additionally, practitioners in both fields use estimations provided by scientific methods, such as experimentation, hypothesis, observation, and conclusion in organizing and interpreting information gathered (Clark, 2007; Epstein & Hundert, 2002). Marrin (2006, p.2) cited former CIA officer Richards Heuer (1999), who stated that medical diagnosis can be used as “an effective analogy” for gaining an insight into how intelligence works. Additionally, Huer’s model of “diagnosticity of evidence” used in analysis of competing hypothesis was derived from medical literature. Intelligence analysis as a craft Intelligence analysis cannot be wholly defined as a formal profession. In fact, it is practiced more as a craft, based on its nature, and lack of clear-cut systematic theories, formal associations, consistently defined roles, prerequisite courses, on individual skills and judgments, standardised methods of entry or best practices and autonomy. Craft culture by nature Intelligence operates on ‘craft culture.’ Security analysts such as Marrin (2006; 2012a) have reiterated that intelligence remains a ‘craft culture’ that operates within the apprenticeship and guild system. Indeed, it has self-consciously been termed as “tradecraft.” Using a related perspective, Herbert (2006) argues that such a culture builds logically on the coalesced practices that were initially successful, and which lack the strong formal epistemology of true discipline and is dependent on the implicit transmission of tacit expertise and the field knowledge to novice. Therefore, intelligence analysis is by nature a craft rather than a profession. To demonstrate that intelligence work is partially professional partially a craft, Marrin (2006) cited Wilhelm Agrell (1970) who noted that intelligence analysis is “a kind of semi-profession” that has features of early forms of organised skills, such as the medieval guild. Under such practices, the secrets of the craft are transferred through apprenticeship – from the master to the trainee using a process of initiating and chipping in silent knowledge. Hence, the craft is not developed. Rather, it is reproduced. Additionally, its knowledge is static while its processes are cyclic. Autonomy and judgement of practitioners Intelligence work does not entirely rely on autonomy and judgement of practitioners. This disqualifies it from being considered a profession. Lester (2010) considers a professional as an individual who makes proficient use of specialist and expert knowledge, voluntarily commits to a set of principles, and exercises autonomous judgment and thought. According to Lester (2010), formal professions are dependent on the independence, self-sufficiency and decisions made by the certified practitioners, although subject to certain occupational standards that ensure performance competence are complied with. Gul and Kule (2010) explained that intelligence analysts depend on measure of accuracy to predict the future or determine a pattern of behaviour. Their day-to-day work involves searching for meaning of raw data, a process that requires skills and expertise. However, as stated by Vervaele (2005), they do not have autonomy in decision-making or dissemination of the intelligence, as the policymakers or decision-makers, at the national level, make the decisions. Such lack of autonomy is also indicated by Hausmann and Lage (2008). Lack of such autonomy implies that intelligence is not a profession. Accordingly, the individual mental and intellectual processes are the key assets in making autonomous judgements or drawing judgment of intelligence. Existence of the independence qualifies an occupation as a profession. Lack of clear-cut systematic theories As indicated by Rose and Nestorovska (2005), intelligence analysis lacks well-defined systematic formal knowledge and regulations, including logical regulations and consistent theory or doctrine. A similar perspective is shared by Sparrow (2011), who also added that the occupation also lacks high level of individual autonomy because of high involvement of management in approval of dissemination and application of analysed intelligence. It also lacks standards designed specifically by members of the organisation. This implies that it is yet to be recognised as a full-fledged profession. Intelligence analysis occupation is in this regard distinguished as a craft. For instance, in the United States, the organisational reforms of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) often result from recommendations proposed by the task force, or consultation with external experts. Despite this, each time there is a change in the process or structure existent practices that are tied to theoretical constructs of purposes and functions are recreated. However, once the recommendations are executed and the task force is disbanded, the lessons derived concerning transformation of theory to practice waste away. Accordingly, the field of intelligence has essentially been unrelated to historical development and has non-cumulative knowledge of how theory should be applied in the practice. As Marrin and Clemente (2005) stated, the intelligence community lacks sufficient job documenting recording, analysis, or distilling lessons from previous experiences. Such discrepancies from typical features of a profession imply that intelligence is not in fact a profession. Intelligence occupation has no formal associations While some intelligence produced have sought to establish more meticulous development programs and standards, in the ultimate, each agency establishes own standards for hiring and growing new breed of intelligence analysts. Therefore, there are no associations entrusted with the roles of setting standards. Such contradictions lead to broadly varied quality performance and analytical duties among the intelligence-producing components. Critically, formal professions do have associations that identify, delineate, and verify the requirements required for entry into the profession (Saks, 2012). The association also defines the standards of professional practice. As stated by Marrin (2012a), while autonomy and sound judgement is expected from intelligence analysts, intelligence occupation has no formal associations that identify, delineate, and verify the requirements required for entry into the profession. However, this does not mean it cannot be viewed to be a profession. Marrin (2012b) showed that occupations without formal associations or formalised practices that legitimise them and set the standards of practice may still be regarded as professions. Lack of consistently defined roles In their review of literature, McGarrell et al (2007) summated that while some intelligence analysts undertake the role of information processing by sieving through raw intelligence data for likely correlations or patterns, some senior intelligence analysts may engage with the security policymakers or decision-makers at the national level, on matters of foreign policy. Such lack of clear-cut definition of intelligence analysis or standard set of procedures and practices implies that intelligence analysts will do whatever they are assigned to. This however disqualifies the occupation from being considered a profession. Lester (2010) noted that professions have standard set of professions and procedures, where occupations are assigned specific job descriptions. Such discrepancy implies that intelligence analysis occupation does not fit in as a profession. Lack of prerequisite courses According to US-based Association of Former Intelligence Officers (2013), there are no standard prerequisite courses for candidates seeking a career in intelligence analysis (AFIO, 2013). Although some attributes may be available, such as interest in foreign travel, international affairs, analytical mind and street smarts. In the United States for instance, IT and cyber training, forensic science, hard sciences and languages may be a requirement. Essentially, intelligence analysts are expected to accumulate a collection of indistinct intellectual virtues, including intuitiveness and tough-mindedness based on repetitive practice of undertaking analysis or exposure to principles of critical thinking (Herbert, 2006). These imply that prerequisite courses may not be of utmost relevance compared to indistinct intellectual virtues, including street smarts, intuitiveness, and tough-mindedness in recruiting the analysis. Thereby, intelligence is not a profession. Dependence on individual skills and judgments Intelligence analysis, along with its management, is practiced as a craft that is dependent on skills of the individual practitioners rather than a profession that aggregates knowledge and which has the capacity to improve by imparting accumulated best practices to the new entrants. From the perspective, it is reasoned that intelligence analysis has no formal professionalization. Indeed, Herbert (2006) stated that intelligence evaluations are classically generated through multiple repeated performance or iterations of judgements, such as historical generalisation, inference based on explanations, pattern recognition, educated guess, and statistical analysis, in addition to an imprecise number of strategies for discovering the truth. Herbert (2006) called this process layering, which he further defines as repackaging highly processed judgments for subsequent use as simple fact. Lack of standardised best practices The lack of a defined professional focal point for intelligence analysis has contributed to a failure to acquire cumulative knowledge and standardised application in the field of practice. Accordingly, best practices have haphazard application in a range of intelligence generating or producing agencies and developments in intelligence analysis processes that are executed in haphazard manner. Indeed, analysis of the history of intelligence analysis occupation provided by Gill and Phythian (2006) indicate that efforts made severally to improve the management and practices of intelligence analysis have mostly been haphazard or consisted of the use of ad hoc methods. In Herbert’s (2006) view, this is since intelligence analysis has been administered by individual department or agency that practices intelligence analysis, in addition to the lessons derived from their executive, which have hugely lost both within the implementing institution and individuals poised to learn from the experience. Sociological perspectives of professions such as Hoyle’s functionalist argument and Neo-Weberian’s structuralist approaches contend that professions, rather than crafts, carry out or execute functions related to improving the society (Bisman, 2005). In this regards, professions could be viewed as aimed at making expertise available for public good. Lester (2010) however draws on the sociological perspectives to argue that professions must also have professional ethics that oversee the standards of practice and whether they are aligned towards ensuring public good, as well as safeguarding a profession from external pressures of the market or bureaucracy. This implies that for an occupation to qualify as a profession, it should have professional ethics, as well as be autonomous from external pressures. In his analysis of CIA and FBI ethical practices, Hudson (2010) concluded that intelligence analysis intrinsically lacks ethical standards. Findings were consistent with early research by Hulnick and Mattausch (1989). This shows that intelligence is in fact not a profession. Conclusion Intelligence analysis occupation is in fact a craft rather than a profession. While intelligence work has characteristics of both craft and profession, which means that it can qualify as a profession and a craft, analysis of the distinction between craft and profession reveals that intelligence work possesses more characteristics of a craft rather than a profession. First, intelligence remains a ‘craft culture’ as it operates within the apprenticeship and guild system. Indeed, it has self-consciously been termed as “tradecraft,” a term that links it to a craft. Additionally, intelligence work does not entirely rely on autonomy and judgement of practitioners, a typical feature of professions. It lacks high level of individual autonomy because of high involvement of management in approval of dissemination and application of analysed intelligence. This also disqualifies it from being considered a profession. Intelligence analysis also lacks well-defined systematic formal knowledge and regulations, including logical regulations and consistent theory or doctrine. The occupation also lacks standards designed specifically by members of the organisation. This implies that it is yet to be recognised as a full-fledged profession. Intelligence analysis occupation is in this regard distinguished as a craft. Intelligence occupation has also no formal associations. While some intelligence produced have sought to establish more meticulous development programs and standards, in the ultimate, each agency establishes own standards for hiring and growing new breed of intelligence analysts. Intelligence analysis occupation also lacks consistently defined roles. Such lack of clear-cut definition of intelligence analysis or standard set of procedures and practices disqualify the occupation from being considered a profession. Lack of prerequisite courses implies that prerequisite courses may not be of utmost relevance compared to indistinct intellectual virtues, including street smarts, intuitiveness, and tough-mindedness in recruiting the analysis. This however means that intelligence is not a profession. Dependence on individual skills and judgments shows that the occupation has no formal professionalization. Intelligence analysis, along with its management, is practiced as a craft that is dependent on skills of the individual practitioners rather than a profession that aggregates knowledge and which has the capacity to improve by imparting accumulated best practices to the new entrants. Intelligence occupation lacks well-defined professional ethics that oversee the standards of practice and whether they are aligned towards ensuring public good, as well as safeguarding a profession from external pressures of the market or bureaucracy. Intelligence analysis profession also lacks distinct systematic formal knowledge, such as logical theory or doctrine. References AFIO. (2013). Intelligence as a Career Is It Right For You and Are You Right For It? Virginia: Association of Former Intelligence Officers Aldrich, R. (2005). 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