Effects of Disaster and Disasters as Effects - Case Study Example

Effects of Disaster and Disasters as Effects An Analysis Introduction This paper takes two cases in order to understand the following premise: “Disasters are not the cause; they are the effect.” It has been seen that disasters are often perceived as the cause of certain events. This is not an accurate description or understanding of disasters. In order to understand disasters, one must understand the following aspects of crisis management; lapses in which can cause disasters, thereby making disaster the effect and not the end result: (Eliott et al, 2006; Pp 532 – 560) Vulnerability assessment & intrusion detection systems Risk assessment & risk management Backups & business continuity planning Disaster recovery planning Computer incident response teams Digital investigation & incident post-mortem Privacy & anonymity in cyberspace; censorship & content filtering Management responsibilities & liabilities The future of information assurance Professional development This paper will study two cases in order to better understand how disaster is the effect and not vice versa. Case One: The Harrow Court Incident The Harrow Court Incident refers to the tragic chain of events where two firefighters – Firefighter Wornham and Firefighter Miller – lost their lives on the 2nd of February, 2005. The cause for this was faulty organization of resources and commands that led to a miscalculation of the risks involved. (Fire Brigade Union) In this regard, everything that has been earlier described in this paper culminates into the fact that the span of control must be open and clear so as to depict a clear understand of the following points: Operational area of command; Strategic Decisions involved; Risk awareness; Span of control; Knowledge management within the relevant agencies; Tactical support; Command support; Sectorisation. These points should be taken into account so as to create a relevant training strategy which in turn will reduce the risk of such events in the future. (Fire Brigade Union) Risk Assessment Principles The basic risk assessment principles cover the following aspects of risk and incidents: Initial Stage of Incident Development Stage of Incident Closing Stage of Incident Post Incident Review Dynamic Risk Assessment (Source: National Incident Command System) The principles in this regard cover all these levels. The basic principle here is that risk, in case of varied operational decisions, is seen as a focus of single determinants of behaviour arising from risk theories. (Andrew D Newton, Western Criminology Review 2004). Various unresolved contradictions can be reconciled by examining the usefulness of placing risk propensity and risk proportion in a more central role than has been previously recognised through effective risk assessment programs. Based on such analysis, it is believed that the propensity of risk dominates both the actual and perceived characteristics of the situation as a determinant of risk behavior. In this case, dynamic risk refers to the changing face of risk the uncertainty that goes with where it might strike from. (Eliott et al, 2006; Pp 532 – 560) On the other hand, generic risk is a more risk averse form that comes from the fact that the risk is foreseen in terms of areas and hazards. Such an observation can safely justify the finding that suggests that apart from being central to any and every situation or organization, risk is something that organizations need to meet in an integrated manner. This can be attributed to the fact that at the end of the day, any damage caused has far reaching implications of its own and is deeply rooted in the genesis of risk taking and management. (Andrew D Newton, Western Criminology Review 2004). In the case of the incident command system, the one question we need to ask before proceeding any further is whether mere risk assessment is enough to act as a strong foundation for resolving all those difficulties arising out of risk management in case of various damage control activities. The answer is, no. (Eliott et al, 2006; Pp 532 – 560) And more and more organizations in the social arena are beginning to recognize this basic premise, which has led to creativity in the sphere of dynamic risk management strategies and principles. It has become necessary therefore, to keep reinventing the methods and strategies to be used in order to overcome the dynamic perils enumerated above, in a timely and cost effective manner. (Andrew D Newton, Western Criminology Review 2004). At the Harrow court incident, the dynamic risk was not taken into account. There was more attention paid to the generic risk which led to the death of the two firefighters. Here, the dynamic risk was the opening of the front door which led to an increase in the fire situation. Further, Wornham got entangled in the cabling which shows a faulty appreciation in the command system. (Fire Brigade Union) The mechanism of dynamic risk management extends to preliminary planning as well. To be prepared and organized for the contingencies in advance will help the managers cope with them more easily. This can be further propagated by the use of timeliness and efficiency in the response stage with a reliable communication system, logistics and flawless coordination to boot. For this purpose, in the incident command system, damage assessment and reporting should constitute of the preliminaries of restoration and restructuring apart from playing an important role in the formulation of a crisis management plan. (Andrew D Newton, Western Criminology Review 2004). Inter Agency Liaison A conjoined effort by a variety of organizations and authorities is a prerequisite for the success of the plans that have to be implemented in terms of the agreements between these agencies. There is also a need for a more concerted effort to coordinate and plan activities and events that first and foremost help these agencies interact with other, and then formulate plans as to how people in such incidents can be helped. In this regard, it is imperative to note that these activities must be presented as platforms where there is a raising of awareness regarding the issue and the policies attached to the same. Further, these events must be places where victims and their families come together to interact and help each other. Further, the need for specialist services is imperative to make sure that there are guidelines that dominate the operational spheres of each of these agencies with respect to tools like local forums as well as the conditions of the services offered. (Eliott et al, 2006; Pp 532 – 560) In this regard, the various agencies involved for the aftermath in terms of appreciation, investigation and medical support as well as decontamination and sanitisation were: Police: appreciation, investigation Ambulance: medical and clinical support Local Authority (municipality): decontamination and sanitisation Environment: decontamination, study of cause and effects Government: financial and institutional support The role of housing department could have been included and expanded in the Harrow Court incident so as to carry out deeper research and analysis as well as propose recommendations to avoid such cases in the future. Further, the social services needed to step in so as to understand and promote the interests of the bereaved. (Eliott et al, 2006; Pp 532 – 560) This case demonstrates that a lapse in the chain of command or span of control is a lapse for life. It has to be understood that undertaking and understanding risk are two different things. For risk awareness, there first of all needs to be a strong policy that differentiates between dynamic and generic risk so as to deploy resources according for the benefit of all. The command system must be transformed in accordance with these two kinds of risk in any situation. The Harrow Court incident basically shows a lapse of appreciation and this is something that needs to be fixed at the planning and tactical stage so as to garner results in the operational and command stages. (Fire Brigade Union) In this regard, there is a need for a systems based approach in training and development practices within the incident command system. Case Two: Crime on the DFT and the London Blasts of July, 2005 (London) The Department of transport (DFT) is structured on the basic objective of “transport that works for everyone”. In this context, a public transport system can be defined as a multifaceted arena, with a complex interaction of settings (buses, trains and trams), facilities (stops, stations and interchanges) and users (staff and passengers). The level of crime experienced on the system is said to be influenced by factors like the design of these facilities, and the internal (inside a vehicle) and external (that a vehicle traverses) environments (Andrew D Newton, Western Criminology Review 2004). The crime situation on the DFT was not in compliance with a proper risk and disaster management program which led to the London Blasts of 2005. Studies suggest that nearly a third of British households do not own a mode of personal transport – i.e., a car. Therefore, it wouldn’t be too far off the mark to say that the number of people using public transport systems would be larger because not every member in a household owning a car may be able to use it. However, it has been found that 11.5% more journeys would be made on an everyday basis, if people felt more secure using public transport (Department Of Transport, UK). Here, it is imperative to trace the genesis of such insecurities. Reports show that apprehensions to use public transport are often reflected in factors like the person’s age, gender or ethnic background. Further, a recent survey of both users and non-users of public transport indicates that, after service and reliability, over 50 percent of respondents felt personal security should be the priority area for improvement. While concern for personal security is not necessarily born during the time spent on board the train or bus, witnessing anti-social behaviour, criminal damage and graffiti can cause more discomfort or insecurity besides isolated routes and the walk home from the bus or train during the night hours. (Department Of Transport, UK). This brings us to the policy commitments of the DFT in context of crime. As part of its safety measures, the DFT has various schemes under the category of proactive and reactive elements. The proactive elements include measures like the use of CCTVs, wide publicity and public information in the form of posters and leaflets, clear signage, real time information displays, public address systems, improved lighting, and help points at less busy rail and bus stations. Besides this, elements like crime prevention, additional staff and spot patrols by the British Transport Police, package measures like the secure station scheme and partnerships for crime and disorder, Safer Travel on Buses and Coaches programmes, among various others, are incorporated in the crime prevention system. Also, it has been suggested that crime prevention groups like the British Transport Police as well as Crime Concern, should adopt proactive measures to tackle vandalism, especially in vulnerable areas. While passengers need to be aware of a comprehensive and appropriate approach towards the evolution of a secure travelling station, like the Secure Stations Scheme, it has become imperative to take certain reactive measures like targeted police initiative. These can guarantee a sizable impact on crime reduction and anti social behaviour on problematic routes. (Department Of Transport, UK). In view of its policy commitments, a major issue is raised in the fact that episodes of crime and disorder rarely come to the notice of crime agencies, irrespective of the fact that they are serious concerns that are beginning to shape people’s choices when it comes to mode of transport and the time or situation when they avail public transport facilities. Since instances of crime are mostly low and local in incidence, a well kept environment and locally developed strategies to combat such occurrences has been deemed fit. Such programmes have to be structured along the lines of reactive measures, so as to have maximum impact. Further, increased feasibility of such policies can be attained through measures like the identification of a separate category or system to record incidents of crime on public transport, with a national or local policing unit, separate from the transport police, dedicated to overseeing the implementation of these measures. The fear of crime and concerns for personal security, a generic problem in many aspects of society today, are clearly a limiting factor to patronage and levels of usage. In addition to this, difficulties in obtaining accurate data on the location of public transport crime have further restricted analysis into the manifestation and distributions of such crimes. Finally, it cannot be said enough number of times that the importance of designing appropriate vehicles and infrastructure is as decisive a factor in crime rate reduction, as is the importance of a well maintained environment in providing reassurance to passengers. Therefore, it is imperative to not only understand the mind where the fear is generated, but also confront the threat of terrorism and crime besides taking suitable action at the suitable time, so as to make sure that the system is taken seriously, as are the policies surrounding it. (Andrew D Newton, Western Criminology Review 2004). Conclusion According to the above case studies, one may find that the disasters have been studied as and effect of events and not the event of certain emergencies. In both the above cases, one can find that after the disaster took place, the risk assessment and incident command strategy was not well through out to avoid the death of fire fighters or the crime incidents on the DFT which further led to less people using the DFT. The DFT’s crime situation was not taken care of with a proper risk assessment plan which led to the London blasts in July 2005. Therefore, a proper risk assessment plan with the points discussed throughout the paper in the two cases must be appropriately orchestered and implemented. References Eliott, D; Gill, M (2006). “Chapter 23: Disaster and Crisis Management”, The Handbook of Security, pp. 532-560. Palgrave Macmillian. Marquardt, Michael J. (1996) Building the learning organization: A systems approach to quantum improvement. Mc-Graw Hill. West Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service. URL: http://www.westyorksfire.gov.uk/ (Accessed during: August, 2008) Fire Brigade Union. URL: http://www.fbu.org.uk/workplace/healthsafety/pdf/harrow.pdf (Accessed during: August, 2008) National Response Team. URL: www.nrt.org (Accessed during: August, 2008) National Incident Command System. URL: http://www.environ.ie/en/Publications/LocalGovernment/FireandEmergencyServices/FileDownLoad,2099,en.pdf (Accessed during: August, 2008) Department of Transport (DFT). “Crime And Disorder On Public Transport. URL: http://www.dft.gov.uk/stellent (Accessed during: August, 2008) Department of Criminal Justice, California State University, San Bernardino, Newton, A.D. 2004."Crime on Public Transport: 'Static' and 'Non-Static' (Moving) Crime Events" Western Criminology Review 5 (3) (Journal). URL: http://wcr.sonoma.edu/v5n3/newton.htm (Accessed during: August, 2008) Read More