Misjudgement of the Managers, System Design Blunder - Essay Example

School: PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND ETHICS CASE STUDY Lecturer: PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND ETHICS CASE STUDY Introduction The need to be professional and ethical is often used interchangeably it has been noted that even though the two terms may have some similarities, they are not the same. It is explained further that people may always be professional but not ethical [1]. Being ethical on the other hand involves being professional [1]. This is because to be ethical, a person ought to work to the highest professional standards and at the same time have consideration for the impact of the work that is being done on society as a whole [2]. The case of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster is one that combines professionalism with ethics on one side and natural occurrence on the other hand. This is because the immediate cause of the disaster, which occurred in March 2011, was as a result of the melting of the reactor cores of the Fukushima nuclear power plant, which had been knocked out of normal function by a powerful earthquake of magnitude of 9.0. The earthquake alone was a major disaster as it was the most powerful to hit the country in terms of magnitude and extent of damage. In the figure, an overview of the earth, showing the areas and extent of damage is presented. Source: Kaneko (2013, p. 253). The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster was thus as a result of the earthquake, as the earthquake resulted in the knocking out of two cooling systems within the Fukushima I nuclear power plant. The back-ups in the three reactors found in the plant were also damaged, leading to their meltdown. Subsequent to this, there were fires and explosions that destroyed the entire nuclear plant reactor buildings, leading to three months of after-earthquake leakage of radioactive material from the plant, affecting 80,000 residents within 12-mile radius of the disaster. In this case study, the professional and ethical component of the disaster, which has to do with the engineering viewpoint, touching on the nuclear plant is discussed. The scope of the case study shall therefore not focus directly on the seismological aspect of the disaster. Ethical theories and principles There are three major ethical theories and principles that are reflected as part of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. The first of these has to do with the principle of utilitarianism. It has been explained that utilitarianism is part of theories in normative ethics that emphasises on the maximisation of utility [3]. This state is achieved by maximising happiness and reducing suffering. From a professional and for that matter engineering point of view, utilitarianism would ask the question of how well a person was able to use all available resources to achieve the best results that could promote happiness and wellbeing [4]. Referring to the fact that nuclear plants are considered as sustainable sources of energy that fulfil the vision of green energy, one would expect that every other outcome of nuclear energy production would serve this all important utility based purpose of suppressing the quest for healthy sources of energy that is less harmful to the environment. Later in the case study, the question will be answered if utilitarianism was best achieved at the end of the day in the case of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. The second ethical principle is the principle of nonmaleficence. Nonmaleficence is an ethical principle that advocates people should act in ways that do not inflict evil or cause any harm to others [5]. This principle thus focuses on total avoidance of harm or practices that inflict evil. In some context of ethical literature, it has been said that the nonmaleficence theory is applicable only to avoidable or intentional harm [5]. But in such a state, the need to avoid the risk to harm is also emphasised. Relating the theory to professional engineering practice, it can be said that by this theory, engineers are expected to go about their professional duties in a manner that results in any avoidable harm, or those that may be considered as intentional, even if non-avoidable. One critique of this theory is that harm is very relative and difficult to define. To this end, the judgment as to what acts may be infringing this principle and what acts may not is highly subjective and dependent on the sufferer rather than the initiator. The last principle is what others have considered congruent to nonmaleficence, which is beneficence. The ethical principle of beneficence has been said to apply when a person or group of professional responsible for the delivery of specific tasks are expected to go about their duties in a manner that connotes acts of mercy, kindness and charity [6]. In effect, professionals are expected to as a matter of ethical principle to be mindful of the wellbeing of society in such a manner that they are not only expected not to harm them but also to show goodness to them. The outcome of production, system development, services, and manufacturing are all expected to result in the promotion of the good and benefit of other people. This principle has been said to be highly based on intent on action. In the present case therefore, questions of the intention of management and all people involved at the nuclear plant can be scrutinised for onward analysis as to whether they were applicable of the principle or not. Case Study Analysis Misjudgement of the Managers From the account of the case, one major issues that relates to the ethical principle of utilitarianism that can be pointed to as the solution to a recurrence of the problem is the issue of misjudgement of the managers of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant and the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). This is because even if taken from a perspective where the destruction of the plant by the earthquake is seen to be a non-avoidable disaster or event, rapid utilisation of leadership skills and management competence could have helped in controlling the situation from escalating to the levels that did get to. For example in a report, the fact that managers could have ordered their subordinates to pour sea water onto the cores to prevent the kind of expensive reactors that was experienced was outlined [7][8]. In some cases, the action of the management is actually classified to be negligence rather than misjudgement [9]. This is because there was every evidence that such a simply order could have been issued to curtail the three month long disaster that was experienced. Once people are put in management positions, they are given the responsibility of applying prudent competence that utilises field based interventions to bringing about the wellbeing of the people. But in contrast to the utilitarianism theory, the managers reduced to increase happiness and suppress sadness by issuing a simply command, which if had been made by 8:00 March 12, could have avoided the nuclear disaster as there was no water burning of the fuel rods at the time [9]. Employing the use of a very simple ethical leader’s decision tree, the leaders could have been more effective in knowing if what they had proposed was legal, maximised shareholder value and was ethical [10] as exhibited in the diagram below. Source: Bagley (2003, p. 18). System Design Blunder According to the ethical principle of nonmaleficence, people are expected act in ways that do not inflict evil or cause any harm to others, including engineers and system designers who design various systems for use by the public. This means that in the context of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, engineers and creators of the plant were expected to apply very form of professional competence and professional knowhow that would have ensured that the plant that was being produced had all that it took to guarantee the safety and security of people at all times and in all conditions. Meanwhile, there is a very interesting relation in the Fukushima Report as it has been emphasised that there were virtually no counter-measures that ensured a fail-safe for the plant [7]. More particularly, system design ethics is said not to have been followed as there was a weak last fortification in the creation to protect against the unknown, such as the earthquake that was experienced, which was a very natural phenomenon without any iota of doubt. From the figure below, it has been explained that the part labelled IC, is the Isolation Condenser, which should have acted as a last fortification to protect against the unknown [8]. Source Yamaguchi (2011, p. 12) As an system design blunder, which defeats the nonmaleficence ethical principle, the plan designed above was made without the kind of back-up emergency power support plan in the IC that could protect against power loss or any form of malfunction that was experienced as a result of the earthquake. Lack of Technology transfer Technology transfer has been explained as the transfer of skills, technologies, methodologies and other forms of solution based interventions to bring about scientific and technological developments that can be accessed by users in the creation of new products, processes or services [11]. Technology transfer is one of the best ways to ensure the utility of technological knowledge and skills [12]. This is because through technology transfer, there is an equal transfer of technology from a heavy source of technology to another less endowed source that may need technological support. In the case of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, this simple principle to bring about utilitarianism was woefully overlooked and disregarded by authorities who were in charge of rescue and disaster management. This is because even though it is true that the Japan-US coordination that was in charge of rescue was an exhibition of technology transfer to a large extent, there are expects who have argued that there was more that could have been done from other government science policies, universities and nearby countries other than the U.S. that could have lessened the burden that was experienced [13]. Until now, it is known that the nuclear disaster, which was a target of nuclear terrorism, lasted for three months because there was not much utilisation of technology transfer principles. Absence of ethical corporate climate Ethical corporate climate has been explained as a “working environment that is conducive of morally responsible behaviour” [14]. In such working environments, there are formal policies, informal traditions and personal attitudes that are all aimed at preserving the wellbeing of the organization and other people who are related to the organization in one way or the other. Once such ethical corporate climate is created, one can expect that the beneficence ethical theory will be fulfilled. This is because in relation to the theory, the organisation and its workforce will be mindful of the wellbeing of the society around the organisation and do things that promote the happiness of society. In the case of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, the TEPCO and the management of the plant have been criticised for doing very little to display any moral responsiveness within the early hours of the disaster 13]. This is because instead of admitting the facts behind the disaster, the management kept playing blame games and denying the facts on the ground. As a result, the core people who needed help were somewhat neglected. The approach to support exhibited by the company was evident that the company had no formal policy that forecasted support system in case of such magnitude of disaster [15]. Conclusions From every indication, if the four major issues raised in the case study analysis namely misjudgement of managers, system design blunder, lack of technology transfer and absence of ethical corporate climate had been checked, the extent of damage that was witnessed would not have been the case. But from all fairness, the nature of the nuclear disaster indicates that the nonmaleficence ethical could not have been the best means to control or avoid the harm that was caused. This is because with the nonmaleficence, there is an expectation of avoiding harm all together. Meanwhile, because the nuclear disaster was triggered by an earthquake which is a natural phenomenon, it is virtually unthinkable that total harm could have been avoided. On the other hand, the utilitarianism ethical principle was the best that had to be in place to ensure that right at the onset of the nuclear disaster the harm could have been contained and managed early enough. Until now, very little excuse can be presented by the management in charge of the plant because they did not utilise their competences and other ethical standards well enough to safe the people. References 1. Knapp, J. C. (Ed), (2007), Leaders on Ethics: Real World Perspectives on Today’s Business Challenges, Praeger: London. 2. Whitby, B. (2013). ‘Professional Ethics for Engineering and Design 2: The R101 - A lesson from history?’ Unpublished. 3. Smith, W. (2004) ‘William Paley’s Theological Utilitarianism in America’, The William and Mary Quarterly Third Series, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 402-424 4. Adams R. M (2006), ‘Motive Utilitarianism’, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 73, No. 14, pp.471 5. Smith, C. M. (2005). "Origin and Uses of Primum Non Nocere — Above All, Do No Harm!". The Journal of Clinical Pharmacology. Vol. 45 No. 4: 371–377 6. Standard Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2013). The Principle of Beneficence in Applied Ethics. [Online] Available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/principle-beneficence/ [March 26, 2014] 7. Mizuno, H. et al. (2012). Fukushima Report. Nikkei BP: Tokyo. 8. Yamaguchi, E. (2011). Fukushima Disaster: What was the key factor which brought about the Nuclear Power Plant Disaster? ECO JAPAN.[Online] Available:http://eco.nikkeibp.co.jp/article/report/20111109/109720/ [March 27, 2014] 9. Kaneko Y. (2013). ‘Engineering Ethics on Fukushima’, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science. Vol. 3 No. 3; pp. 252-267. 10. Bagley C.E (2003). The Ethical Leader’s Decision Tree. Harvard Business Review. Vol. 24 No. 2, pp. 18-19. 11. Hargadon, A. (2003). Harvard Business School Working Knowledge for Business Leaders. Harvard Business Review. Vol. 34 No. 2, pp. 23-32. 12. Harris I. (2011). Ethical Assessment of New Technologies: A Meta-Methodology. Journal of Information, Communication & Ethics in Society Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 1-20 13. Hale B. (2011). Fukushima Daiichi, Normal Accidents, and Moral Responsibility: Ethical Questions about Nuclear Energy. Ethics, Policy and Environment. Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 263–265 14. Whitby, B. (2013b). Professional Ethics for Engineering and Design Corporate Cultures. Unpublished. 15. Xiang, H., & Zhu, Y. (2011). The Ethics Issues of Nuclear Energy: Hard Lessons Learned from Chernobyl and Fukushima. Online Journal of Health Ethics, Vol. 7 No. 2, pp. 1-11 Read More