Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua - Case Study Example

CASE CONCERNING THE MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AND AGAINST NICARAGUA (NICARAGUA v. UNITED S OF AMERICA) In July 1979 Nicaraguas Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) overthrew the Somoza dictatorship and formed the Sandinista Junta of National Reconstruction government in Nicaragua. The United States was opposed to the Sandinista (the Somozas had been American clients) and actively supported the Contra resistance against the new government. While Congress wavered in its support throughout the 1980s Ronald Reagans White House provided covert aid through the Argentine government and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Eventually even Iran and Israel become involved in the scheme resulting in the Iran-Contra scandal that erupted in November 1986 and made Colonel Oliver North a household name. When the Iran-Contra scheme developed into a political scandal the United States the United States was already dealing with a negative ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), widely known as the World Court, condemning the countys involvement in the paramilitary struggle against the Nicaraguan government. The Court also condemned the United States for mining several Nicaraguan harbors in the early spring of 1984 to undermine the ability of the Sandinista government to resist the insurgents. (Sklar, 1988, 164) The following discussion will focus on the International Court of Justice judgment delivered in July 1986, the “Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America. The judgment and justifications will be briefly summarized and assessed. First, the court considered questions of jurisdiction and admissibility. The United States argued that Nicaragua was not a party to the agreements establishing the World Court. They also argued that the regional negotiations known as the Contadora process made the intervention of the World Court unnecessary and that even if the Contadora process did not preempt World Court intervention the dispute was in the jurisdiction of the United Nations Security Council alone. The World Court dismissed these arguments and ruled that Nicaraguas application could and would be heard by the World Court. (Overview, 1986, p. 54-56) All of these procedural issues were decided by large majorities of the fifteen justices. (From thirteen to two, to unanimity.) Nicaraguas application to the court involved two allegations of American actions and two alleged outcomes of those actions, all of which Nicaragua asserted to be illegal in the context of the World Court. First and most straightforward, was Nicaraguas allegation that the United States had placed anti-shipping mines in the maritime approaches to Nicaragua and the harbors of Nicaragua. The facts in the case were relatively straightforward. Between January and April, 1984 the United States directly and through proxies mined harbors on both coasts of Nicaragua. A top secret memo written by Colonel Oliver North and Constantine Menges, both involved in the operation, detailed the mining operations and their objectives: On the night of February 29, [U.S. NAVY SEALS] emplaced four magnetic mines in the harbor at Corinto, Nicaragua.... ARDEs "Barracuda Commandos" took credit for the operation.... Our intention is to severely disrupt the flow of shipping essential to Nicaraguan trade during the peak export period. [ CENSORED ] In this case, our objective is to further impair the already critical fuel capacity in Nicaragua. (North and Menges, 1984) The United States Congress became aware of American involvement in this operation and condemned it. The facts of this part of Nicaragua are straightforward and simple, U.S. documents confirm that the U.S. Participated in the placement of explosive anti-shipping mines with Nicaraguas twelve mile maritime limit and in Nicaraguan harbors. Therefore it is not surprising that the World Court ruled in favor of Nicaragua by a majority of twelve to three: By laying mines in the internal or territorial waters of the Republic of Nicaragua during the first months of 1984, the United States of America has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligations under customary international law not to use force against another State, not to intervene in its affairs, not to violate its sovereignty and not to interrupt peaceful maritime commerce. (International Court of Justice. (July 1986). CASE CONCERNING THE MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AND AGAINST NICARAGUA (NICARAGUA v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA). http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=367&code=nus&p1=3&p2=3&case=70&k=66&p3=5.) The second part of the Nicaraguan case was sightly more complicated. It alleged that the United States, directly and indirectly, supported the military activities of the mercenaries and paramilitary forces that were actively attempting to overthrow the Sandinista government of the FSLN in Nicaragua. However, before the World Court ruled in 1986 reports of the links between the Contras and the United Sates were appearing in the American media. (Chamora and Morley, 1985) Edgar Chamorro served as a director of the anti-Sandinista rebel organization, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, from 1982 to 1984. In “Confessions of a Contra” (published before the World Courts 1986 ruling) he detailed the links between the Contras and the U.S. government. In November 1982 he had a meeting with CIA operatives and states that when he left that meeting, “I was glad to see that the Americans were committed enough to our cause to be taking such an active role, and I was flattered as well.” H also states that the purpose of the meeting was to present a popular front of widely accepted opponents to the FSLN government to prevent Congress passing the Boland Amendment from stopping U.S. military aid to the Contras. Thus, this article makes it clear that the United States government was supporting the Contras and was taking action to ensure that that support would not be stopped by the Congress. This article and similar media reports appeared before the World Court ruled in the summer of 1986. Therefore, it is not surprising that again, the World Court ruled in favor of Nicaragua and decided that he United States was supporting the Contras directly and indirectly, and militarily and by other means. The Iran-Contra scandal eventually revealed the extent to which the United States was doing so and how far it was willing to go to prevent the Congress, the American public and world opinion from appreciating the links between the Contras and the American government. Implicitly the World Court ruling on the mining operations and support for the Congress meant that American actions also violated two sections of Chapter 1, Article 2 of the United Nations Charter: All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. (Charter of the United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml.) The United States did not use peaceful means, they endangered international peace and security, and justice. Also, they used both the threat of force and force against the Nicaraguan government. Evidence that these actions were directed toward overthrowing the Sandinista government and allowing the Contras to take power speak to motive. In legal terms it is easier to try to prove that a factual issue is or is not true—was the U.S. involved in mining Nicaraguan harbors and did it support the Contras—than it is to try to prove that the mining was an attempt to overthrow the Nicaraguan government and interfere in its sovereignty and right of self determination. However, again, the evidence was overwhelmingly supportive of the Nicaraguan case. The publicly stated and oft repeated purpose of the Contras was to overthrow and replace the FSLN government in power in Nicaragua. (Chamora and Morley, 1985). Second, the North/Menges memorandum quoted above stated, “our intention is to severely disrupt the flow of shipping essential to Nicaraguan trade” and, our objective is to further impair the already critical fuel capacity in Nicaragua.” (North and Menges, 1984) Evidence of this nature clearly established the purpose of he American actions and the motives underlying them. The mining was intended to disrupt the Nicaraguan economy and undermine the Sandinista ability to resist the military activities of the Contras. The support of the Contras with both money and military equipment was designed to strengthen their ability to overthrow the Sandinista government. Both of these motives speak to a desire to interfere in the sovereignty of Nicaragua and overthrow the government. For these reasons the World Court ruled that the Untied States had attempted to overthrow the legitimate government of Nicaragua, a sovereign state. References Chamora, Edgar and Jefferson Morley. (August 1985). Confessions of a Contra. The New Republic. http://www.tnr.com/article/confessions-contra. International Court of Justice. (July 1986). CASE CONCERNING THE MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AND AGAINST NICARAGUA (NICARAGUA v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA). http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=367&code=nus&p1=3&p2=3&case=70&k=66&p3=5. International Court of Justice. (July 1986). CASE CONCERNING THE MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AND AGAINST NICARAGUA (NICARAGUA v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA): OVERVIEW. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=66&PHPSESSID=05fad554ae9feec6f32e8fcea282db53&case=70&code=nus&p3=4. International Court of Justice. (July 1986). CASE CONCERNING THE MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AND AGAINST NICARAGUA (NICARAGUA v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA):PRESS RELEASE. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/9973.pdf. Maier, Harold G. (January 1987). Appraisals Of The ICJs Decision: Nicaragua V. United States (Merits). The American Society of International Law 81: 77. 81 A.J.I.L. 77. http://bailey83221.livejournal.com/57749.html. North, Oliver North and Constantine Menges. ( March 1984). “Special Operations in Nicaragua”. http://portland.indymedia.org/en/2005/04/315106.shtml. Sklar, Holly. Washingtons War on Nicaragua. Boston: South End Press, 1988. United Nations. Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 1: Purposes and Principles. http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml. Read More