Must Politicians Be Concerned with Military Actions - Case Study Example

An essay on Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan have written that ‘politicians must necessarily be concerned with the minute-to-minute conduct of war and today’s plethora of military actions’. Discuss this statement with reference to appropriate historical case studies. By u5340649 INTRODUCTION Karl Von Clausewitz stated that, ‘war is the mere continuation of policy by other means’.1 Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan, on the other hand, assert that ‘politicians must necessarily be concerned with the minute-to-minute conduct of war and today’s plethora of military actions’.2 These two statements underlie the essence of civil-military relations in the modern world. By stating that politicians should be involved in the fine details of the actual conduct of war3, the statement underscores the essence of the balance of power between the civilian and military leadership at all the three levels that define a military operation: conceptualization, planning and execution. The role of politics in military operations is a complex issue. Politics plays a key role in war: from the initial stage of planning a military operation, campaigning for its implementation, operational management, down to the course of the war, policy plays a central role in aligning the military objectives of a state with the geo-political situation.4 Also, by forming the foundation upon which a state builds its international alliances, allocates national resources and sets conditions appropriate for peace, politics plays a key role in ensuring that the balance of power between a government and the military is maintained.5 Theoretically, there should be a clear separation between military operations and policy formulation. A state should develop and maintain a clear decision-making framework regarding its military and political processes. Such a framework should be well maintained prior to and during the course of a military operation. Intelligence, the foundational ideology of any military operation, should remain pure and non-politicised. More so, prior to and during the course of a military operation, there should be adequate coordination between political and military authorities of a state involved in conflict. However, such a situation is idyllic. Contemporary wars are complex in nature. Apart from being highly unique in character, modern military operations are characterised by the absence of all barriers that existed between strategic and tactical levels of war. The resulting situation is that politicians, having developed policy objectives for the war, cannot merely sit back and watch, but are rather much involved in the actual conduct of military operations. Strategy – the rationally derived policy objectives which can be attained through military action; and tactics – the actual conduct of military operations – are therefore, in a constant and complex interaction. On the other hand, the argument by Sun Tzu holds that once a decision to engage in war has been made, the military leadership should be given complete autonomy in managing the affairs of the war.6 It is further argued that the orders of a sovereign, although being binding in normal circumstances, can be disregarded if the military leadership knows they are not in sync with the situation on the ground.7 This argument remains relevant in the modern times. Since the military leadership remains an integral arm of the state (apart from being well equipped to handle the actual decision-making process in a war environment) they are well disposed to carry out the strategic objectives that have been developed from the military policies formulated by the civilian leadership. War then presents a period of immense stress and controversy which tests the success of the civil-military relations of the countries involved. This paper examines the influence of politics on war. It explores the consequences of political considerations in the actual conduct of military operations in a number of different case studies in the recent past. The consequences of complex interactions between political leadership and the military institution in a state involved in war are examined, with an evaluation of how the interactions affected the final results of the military operations. By examining two military operations; Operation Barbarossa and Operation Eagle Claw, it is argued that successful operations depend on the existence of a balance in the civil-military relationship. It is argued that both extremes are undesirable. Excessive civilian control of the military jeopardises the planning, execution and tactical considerations during an operation. On the other hand, lack of civilian control over the military is detrimental to the process of policy formulation in a state. Influence of Politics on War Victory in a military operation is the outcome of successful reconciliation of military options of a state and its national political ends. According to Echevarria, failure to thoroughly see the strategic purpose for which war is fought risks its very outcome.8 Success can be evaluated in terms of the ends, which are the final outcomes; the ways, which are the employed; and finally, the means, which represents the resources and tactics used in the operation.9 According to Brooks, more often than not, there is failure in attempting to reconcile the two important factors (policy and strategy) by the states involved in war.10 This failure of unity and agreement is the primary cause of failure in military operations. The relationship between politicians and the military leaders in a country determines the nature of institutions and processes which are charged with the responsibility of making strategic assessment as policy objectives in the course of a military operation.11 Politicians interact with the military leadership during times of war as well as in peacetime. Such complex interactions provide an environment in which key decisions concerning the actual conduct of war are carried out. Apart from being highly unique in character, contemporary wars have drastically changed as a result of technological advances, weapon outreach and impacts and telecommunications. This has had the effect of thinning all barriers that existed between strategic and tactical levels of war. Wars of the modern technological era have further set a transparent relationship between the two levels, as well as shared responsibilities and consequences. A soldier wrongdoing, for example, can result in an immediate and dramatic effect on national strategy, best known as the ‘strategic corporal’. The success or failure of an operation can largely be attributed to the success or failure of this relationship. In reality, there are always disagreements between the two institutions. Such conflicts arise from several factors including lack of a balance of power between the two levels of leadership, failure to understand the key role of the military as that of providing accurate assessment of the operation efficacy, an attempt by the political leadership to usurp the role of the military and clashes over security and other issues within the state.12 These factors vary in degree of intensity and frequency. Their prevalence, however, is a strong determinant of the nature of a military operation and its actual outcome. The effect of politics on military operations is not confined to the civil-military relationship; political influence on the military commences with shaping the domestic and international ideological stance of a state.13 This is then reflected in the strategic policy objectives developed by the leadership of the country with regard to its military capabilities. It is based on this assessment that influential decisions are made. This decision-making framework not only determines the conception and conduct of a military operation but also affects the final results of the operation. Accomplishing victory depends on how well the balance of political and military coordination at the strategic level is maintained. Operation Barbarossa Operation Barbarossa, the failed invasion of USSR by the German-led Axis forces during the Second World War, provides a classical case of how increased political interference can contribute to complete failure in a military operation. It provides a case study in which strategic disagreements among the leading military staff and the civilian leaders led to the development of a strategy that was weak, fragmented, incoherent and infeasible. Although substantive disagreements between the military leadership and the political establishment of a state are a common occurrence that differ significantly in terms of place and time, it is observed that their extent and severity in the case of this operation led to a mismatch between the means and ways of achieving the objectives of the whole operation; thus leading to its failure.14 This is because of the fact that such conflicts can have a strong negative effect upon the military leadership; who fail to maintain a strong bargaining power against the civil leadership. For the case of Operation Barbarossa, sharp disagreements over the real ideology of the war were not reconciled by both the civil and military leaderships. There were contradictory analyses to the question of viability and desirability of the operation in the first place. The entire planning team was split between two rival camps. On one side was the group of military leaders who were in favour of the operation. Led by Hitler, they believed that attacking the USSR was an appropriate objective given the geopolitical conditions of the time. On the other side was a group of military officials who felt that carrying out an attack of such a scale was way too far from the capacity of the resources at hand. This position of invading the Soviet Union was proposed by Hitler and won the support of leading military commanders and political leaders like Albert Speer, minister for armaments and war production, who viewed the invasion as having the potential to bring several benefits to the German state and the Axis forces in general. First, the German policymakers believed that invading the Soviet Union would help relieve the acute labour shortage in German industries. Also, a successful occupation of the Soviet Union would provide oil through control of the Baku oil fields. This was considered a primary motive for the invasion since oil was badly needed for the success of the German war machinery. Moreover, the political leadership in Germany believed that an invasion of the Soviet Union would enable the Axis forces to occupy Ukraine. This would not only provide a reliable source of agricultural products but also improve Germany’s geo-strategic position by isolating the allies.15 This situation influenced the civil-military relationship in several ways; for instance, the discord between the military and civilian leadership led to failure in not only the operational preparations of the operation but also in its tactical execution. Also, it can be seen that the disagreements between the military and civilian leadership affected the preparation, conduct and overall outcome of the entire operation. Failure to discuss divergent perspectives during the actual conduct of the operation crippled the initial success the operation had. This means that although the dual system of civilian control over the military is necessary in both wartime and peacetime, oversights, disagreements and lack of a strategic vision that unifies the two may lead to the failure of a military operation. Strategic planning for the operation was characterised by many fundamental oversights and mistakes which proved costly in the long run. For instance, the German military high command did not have accurate information about the military capacity of the Soviet Union. Their planning and anticipation for a quick victory was based on the illusion that the Soviet Union was completely inferior and totally unprepared to handle an aggression of such magnitude.16 Also, the German military leadership failed to consider the possible political and economic impact of the operation.17 For instance, there was oversight over the industrial capacity of Germany to sustain such an operation.18 Such technical oversights and mistakes in the conduct of the operation were a result of strained civil-military relations which were manifested in terms of lack of a single strategic vision, absence of a strategic link between policy and planning and lastly, a mismatch in formulating clear objectives in the actual conduct of the operation. It is important to note that many of the operations carried out by the German military under the political leadership of Hitler failed as a result of failure in the civil-military relations.19 Sustained disagreements and overriding authority of political leadership created an environment of poor coordination between the political leadership and the German military high command. On several occasions, Hitler assumed sweeping powers that allowed him to disregard contradictory opinion to his plans, which were mostly based on ideological ambitions of dominating the largest part of continental Europe.20 His insistence on the generals not to retreat but rather to stand and fight made the Axis armies to be trapped in the USSR in the face of growing Soviet counterattacks.21 Lemay notes that at the peak of the ensuing conflict, Hitler issued the ‘stop and fight’ directive to the Axis soldiers who were evidently besieged by the strong Soviet counteroffensive, as a way of stopping a massive withdrawal in the face of the repulsion.22 On December 5th 1941, the Germans believed that the Soviet counteroffensive had reached a critical point. This forced the Axis armies to take a defensive position, forcing many generals to order retreats.23 The second instance happened immediately after Operation Barbarossa, prior to the Siege of Leningrad and Operation Nordlicht. Immediately after the war Hitler dismissed more than 35 generals for the slightest hint at retreating.24 Later, he accepted the resignation of the Field Marshal Brauchitsch, assuming the command of the military himself. This interference by Hitler compromised the operational efficiency of the army in the battlefield because the whole army structure was directly subordinate to Hitler. Even the chief of the Supreme High Command of the German Army (OKH) staff generals found themselves sidelined in the combat operations in the theatres of war. This conflict of interest further caused divisions between the OKH and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW), thus weakening the general performance of the Axis armies in the operations. Finally, it is fair to say that Operation Barbarossa demonstrated an example to the failing civil-military relations. This was demonstrated in the strategic failure which links actual military planning and execution with the policies that have been developed. Operation Eagle Claw Operation Eagle Claw was a failed American military mission to rescue over fifty-two American hostages held by Iranian militants. Its inception, planning, execution and eventual failure represent a strong case in which turbulence in civil-military relations influences the implementation and outcome of a military operation. In November, 1976, the United States embassy in Iran was invaded by a group of fanatical supporters of the then Iranian leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. The invaders held over fifty two Americans hostage and staged a demonstration against the deposed Iranian leader and the United States. The militants were acting under the instructions of the Ayatollah. This was evident in January 1980 when, after six Americans escaped under the help of the CIA and with fake Canadian passports, the Iranian Foreign minister vowed to take action against the Canadian government.25 A background examination of the relations between the civilian leadership and the United States Military is important in evaluating this case. The civilian and military relations in the United States are defined by the role of the Congress, the President and the Department of Defence in funding and developing policies for the military. The civilian leadership depends on advice from the military leadership in order to develop policies and allocate resources. On the other hand, it is the duty of the military leadership to give feedback to the civilian leadership in terms of planning and strategy in military operations. Turbulence in the balance of these relations bears a negative impact on not only the conduct of military operations but also in the overall coordination between the two institutions. According to Celmer, the seizure of the United States embassy presented a clear chance for testing the American policy on counterterrorism.26 Under the Reagan administration, a strong stance against terrorism attack was adopted. This placed the Department of Defence in the limelight with the sole responsibility of dealing with international terrorism. The prerogative of the Department of Defence was to deal with special operations in response to international terrorism through a series of activities, the most important one being to conduct special operations with ‘specially trained and equipped and prepared forces.’27 The operations were targeted to achieve military, political or economic objectives. This operation was a test of the United States’ anti-terrorism policies which developed after the emergence of international terrorism as a new security concern for governments worldwide. Prior to this operation, there had been a series of policy changes on the mode of operations of national security apparatus. First, the policy objectives of the Department of Defence were completely distinguished from those of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).28 Such a distinction was a result of a series of failed operations, like the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba. Congressional pressure, coupled with a strong desire by the Kennedy administration to distinguish clandestine political or military activities from overt military operations, led to formulation of policies that made a clear distinction between the two forms of operation, as practised by both the CIA and the Department of Defence.29 Prior to the operation, the failed attempt at the life of the then Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi in the 1960s had further strained the relations between the military and the civilian leaders.30 After the failed attack, the policy objective of the United States shifted to developing strong capabilities of fighting terrorism, akin to those of Israel and other nations, which favoured commando-style raids aimed at destroying the regimes that support terrorist activities. However, such attempts to repress terrorist activities worked to promote the, ‘vicious cycle of strikes and counter strikes’.31 Following the cue from such nations, the United States also developed a commando unit in 1979. The essence of these policy changes was to strengthen the civilian control over the Department of Defence, increase the input of technical military advice on policy formulation and establish operational efficiency in military operations. Several reasons have been cited to have contributed to the disastrous abortion of Operation Eagle Claw. For instance, with the loss of several soldiers and three military helicopters, it is argued that oversights from the military leadership and top policy makers were the main reason behind the failure of the operation.32 Such oversights created a breakdown in coordination between the vital civil-military balance of power, thereby creating an environment of high uncertainty for decision-making by the military leadership charged with the responsibility of carrying out the operation. It can be seen that the failure of the operation was a result of an unhealthy relationship between the military leadership and the civilian leaders. Tactical oversights and other operational mistakes were as a result of the military leaders feeling that their advice was being disregarded by the civilian leaders. It can be seen that an unhealthy relationship between civil and military leadership (as opposed to a completely dysfunctional relationship) can lead to poor coordination between the strategic and operational levels of a military operation. By failing to have a balanced pattern of relations between these two institutions, the United States was exposed to risks in terms of wasted resources. This was also exemplified in the Iraqi War of 2003, where it is argued that the whole military operation was flawed right from the conceptualisation stage.33 Over-reliance on force as the only prerogative in fighting terrorism at the expense of the prevailing political and diplomatic environment on the part of the United States and her allies led to a prolonged war. Initial successes resulting from the use of superior weapons were wiped out in the following several months as growing insurgency and sectarian attacks ran out of control.34 The result of the operation was a protracted campaign that not only sucked resources and casualties longer than expected but also shaped the nature of the domestic political landscape.35 Conclusion This paper has examined the essence of civil-military relationship in times of conflict. It has been argued that a balanced position between the two institutions should be attained and maintained both at peacetime and in times of military operations. Such a balance is characterised by the following scenario: respect of military culture by the political administration of a country; political considerations by the military leaders in undertaking their duties and lastly, the existence of coherence and harmony in handling divergent opinions between the two institutions. In practice, civilian control over the military is exercised in terms of resource allocation and policy formulation. It has been seen that such periods present a case in which the relationship between the civilian leadership of a country and its military leadership is presented with extreme stress and pressure. It has been noted that a balance between the two levels of leadership can be attained and maintained not only during peacetime but also in times of military operations. Whereas the military leadership should be concerned with planning and execution of military operations, the civilian leadership should be charged with the responsibility of formulating national policies. A dysfunctional relationship between the military and civilian leadership results into lack of clear strategic objectives and harmony in conducting military operations. This was exemplified in the case of Operation Barbarossa. On the other hand, disturbances in the balance of relations between the civilian leadership (represented by the Congress and the presidency) and the leadership of the military; creates an unhealthy environment in which the strategic and actual conduct of an operation is compromised. This was exemplified in the conduct of Operation Eagle Claw in which the whole operation failed as a result of lack of a single unit of command in the course of the operation. Bibliography Antulio J. Echevarria II. Toward an American way of war. Strategic Studies Institute, March 2004. Barany, Zoltan. The Soldier and the Changing State: Building democratic armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012. Bland, L. Douglas. ‘A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations.’ Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 26, No.1 (Fall 1999): 7-26. Brooks, Risa A. Shaping Strategy: The Civil- Military Politics of Strategic Assessment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. Burk, James. ‘Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations.’ Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 26, No.1 (Fall 2002): 7-29. Celmer, Marc A. Terrorism, U. S. Strategy and Reagan Policies. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1987. Cimbala, J. Stephen. The Politics of Warfare: The Great Powers in the Twentieth Century. Pennsylvania; Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. Clausewitz and his work website, accessed on June 15, 2013, http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Cworks/Works.htm. Edstrom, Harkan and Gyllensporre, Dennis. Political Aspirations and Perils of Security: Unpacking the Military Strategy of the United Nations. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMilan, 2013. Fishel, T. John. Civil Military Operations in the Civil World. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Press, 1997. Forczyk, Robert. Moscow 1941: Hitler’s First Defeat. Oxford: Osprey Publishing Limited, 2006. Kasselmann, Hans-Jürgen. ‘Civil-Military Cooperation; A way to resolve complex crisis situations.’ PRISM 4, No.1 (Dec 2012): 17-29. Kelly, Justin and Brennan, Mike. Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy. Strategic Studies Institute, Sep. 2009. Lawrence, D. Freedman. ‘Calling the Shots.’ Foreign Affairs, 81.5 (Sep/Oct 2002), 3. Lemay, Benoit. Erich von Manstein: Hitler's Master Strategist. London: Casemate Publishers, 2010. Nielsen, C. Suzanne. Political Control over the Use of Force: A Clausewitzian Perspective. US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, Stone, John. Military Strategy: The Politics and Technique of War. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011. Sun Tzu. The Art of War, translated and with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith, foreword by B.H. Liddell Hart. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963; Oxford University Press Paperback, 1971. Regan, Geoffrey. Someone Had Blundered: A History Survey of Military Incompetence. London: B.T. Batsford Ltd, 1987. Rietjens, H. Sebastiaan and Bollen, Myriame, edit. Managing Civil-Military Cooperation: A 24/7 Joint Effort for Stability. Ashgate, 2008. Trahair, C. S. Richard and Miller, L. Robert. Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies and Secret Operations. Enigma Books, 2009. Wiest, A. Andrew and M. K. Barbier. Infantry Warfare: Strategy and Tactics. Osceola: MBI Publishing, 2002. Read More

This argument remains relevant in the modern times. Since the military leadership remains an integral arm of the state (apart from being well equipped to handle the actual decision-making process in a war environment) they are well disposed to carry out the strategic objectives that have been developed from the military policies formulated by the civilian leadership. War then presents a period of immense stress and controversy which tests the success of the civil-military relations of the countries involved.

This paper examines the influence of politics on war. It explores the consequences of political considerations in the actual conduct of military operations in a number of different case studies in the recent past. The consequences of complex interactions between political leadership and the military institution in a state involved in war are examined, with an evaluation of how the interactions affected the final results of the military operations. By examining two military operations; Operation Barbarossa and Operation Eagle Claw, it is argued that successful operations depend on the existence of a balance in the civil-military relationship.

It is argued that both extremes are undesirable. Excessive civilian control of the military jeopardises the planning, execution and tactical considerations during an operation. On the other hand, lack of civilian control over the military is detrimental to the process of policy formulation in a state. Influence of Politics on War Victory in a military operation is the outcome of successful reconciliation of military options of a state and its national political ends. According to Echevarria, failure to thoroughly see the strategic purpose for which war is fought risks its very outcome.

8 Success can be evaluated in terms of the ends, which are the final outcomes; the ways, which are the employed; and finally, the means, which represents the resources and tactics used in the operation.9 According to Brooks, more often than not, there is failure in attempting to reconcile the two important factors (policy and strategy) by the states involved in war.10 This failure of unity and agreement is the primary cause of failure in military operations. The relationship between politicians and the military leaders in a country determines the nature of institutions and processes which are charged with the responsibility of making strategic assessment as policy objectives in the course of a military operation.

11 Politicians interact with the military leadership during times of war as well as in peacetime. Such complex interactions provide an environment in which key decisions concerning the actual conduct of war are carried out. Apart from being highly unique in character, contemporary wars have drastically changed as a result of technological advances, weapon outreach and impacts and telecommunications. This has had the effect of thinning all barriers that existed between strategic and tactical levels of war.

Wars of the modern technological era have further set a transparent relationship between the two levels, as well as shared responsibilities and consequences. A soldier wrongdoing, for example, can result in an immediate and dramatic effect on national strategy, best known as the ‘strategic corporal’. The success or failure of an operation can largely be attributed to the success or failure of this relationship. In reality, there are always disagreements between the two institutions. Such conflicts arise from several factors including lack of a balance of power between the two levels of leadership, failure to understand the key role of the military as that of providing accurate assessment of the operation efficacy, an attempt by the political leadership to usurp the role of the military and clashes over security and other issues within the state.

12 These factors vary in degree of intensity and frequency. Their prevalence, however, is a strong determinant of the nature of a military operation and its actual outcome.

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