Terrorist Activity in Bosnia - Coursework Example

Terrorist Activity in Bosnia Introduction Bosnia, as part of an emerging federal democracy that also comprises of the Republic of Srpska and Herzegovina in Southeast Europe’s Balkan region, went through a devastating civil war after declaring independence from Yugoslavia in 1992. This devastating conflict, also referred to as the Bosnia War, broke out among the Croat, Serb, and Bosniak ethnic groups, which saw a series of serious atrocities including ethnic cleansing of Muslims (Lugert, 2012: p21). Bosnia, as a result, became a magnet for foreign Islamic jihadists during and after the war and is today having to grapple with a home-grown terrorism threat, especially by extremists attracted to the idea of a caliphate stretching from Iraq to Eastern Europe to protect all Muslims. Although majority of Bosnian Muslims are moderates, the Salafist form of Islam introduced by foreign fighters flocking to Bosnia during the war has had the effect of radicalizing young Bosnians in relation to protecting Muslims from future attacks by “Christians”. Therefore, although most of the foreign fighters, including Osama bin Laden, left Bosnia after the war, some of the locals have taken up the mantle of protecting Muslims from genocide (Lugert, 2012: p22). This paper will seek to analyze the risk of terrorist activity escalation in Bosnia over the next five years. Assessing the Situation in Bosnia Although Bosnia and the Western Balkans are characterised large populations of Muslims, they have remained mostly secular and, as a result, few academics and policymakers have viewed the assessment of possible terrorist threats in this region as necessary. However, global ideological extremism trends, resentment over EU and Western policies, and expanding foreign influences could be altering Bosnia and the Western Balkan’s social dynamics (Weissman et al., 2014: p258). Radicalization of natives is the main worry for the region today, rather than the infiltration of foreign jihadists that flocked to Bosnia during the civil war that engulfed the country in the 90s. The fear of radicalised natives in Bosnia is becoming increasingly worrisome for the country and Europe, specifically with the return of jihadists from Syria and Iraq raising the threat of extremist violence in Bosnia and the Western Balkans. Prior to the Syrian conflict, a negligible number of Bosnians had joined foreign Islamic extremist missions. Yet, by mid-2014, Hall (2014: p45) reports that there were almost 1,000 Balkan natives fighting in the Syria alongside Islamic militants from ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front., of which almost 450 came from Bosnia. While conservative, militant Islamism is not popular in Bosnia and other pro-Western Balkan countries, there has been increased visibility of radical groups, especially online, in the last decade. Bossong (2013: p28) notes the increased number of women covering their heads with niqabs in Bosnia’s capital Sarajevo and other Balkan capitals as a sign of increasing influence by conservative Islam groups, especially as this sight was rare even five years ago. Particularly disturbing has been the recent phenomena of online photographs and videos that show decapitation of Bosnian citizen based on an ideology that was foreign to the Balkans not long ago. The financial support provided by rich Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar has further encouraged conservatism and radicalism, while persistent coverage of extremist missions in Iraq and Syria are attracting more Bosnian Muslims to join the missions. The Bosnian government has started to fight back, working with the EU and the US to arrest suspected returnees from the ISIS mission, especially as territory previously claimed by the militants is retaken and they are forced to flee back to Bosnia (Dyrstad, 2013: p1230). In 2014, Bosnia passed an anti-terrorism law that seeks to sentence recruiters and convicted extremists with more than ten years on jail. However, Toal and Maksić (2011: p287) argue that the Bosnian authorities can do more, particularly in light of the increased influence of foreign actors and the changing dynamics of terrorism in the world, noting that there is a need to align anti-terrorism policy in respect of how present and future concerns differ from past concerns. Indeed, Western governments in the 90s were worried about lingering foreign jihadists and the threat they posed to the West after the chaotic three-sided Bosnian conflict. During this time, hundreds of Middle Eastern and Arab fighters entered Bosnia in order to protect their fellow Muslim Bosnians against Serbs and Croats. Whereas many of the Mujahedeen fighters were expelled after the conflict ended, almost 1,000 of them remained and became Bosnian citizens (Mustapha, 2013: p750). Western concerns were spurred by the belief then that the remaining fighters would seek to create “European Al-Qaeda” cells that were better equipped to evade security measures put up by European authorities. Moreover, Bosnia was still receiving significant financial investments from Islamist organisations, including some that the EU authorities suspected as Al-Qaeda fronts. Hide (2014: p375) reports that Saudi Arabia between 1992 and 2001 sent approximately $500 million to Bosnian Muslim groups to build Mosques. Most importantly, however, was the fact that Bosnia could serve as a transit point between Western Europe and the Middle East for Islamic terrorists, which is especially dangerous due to the country’s lax border control and thriving black market. This was cited as one of the reasons why foreign agencies like the CIA and MI6 set up joint headquarters in Bosnia to monitor terrorism suspects closely in the early 2000s. Bosnian police, in collaboration with foreign Western intelligence services, captured a terrorist cell planning to blow up the Embassy of Britain in Sarajevo in 2005, while five Bosnians were arrested by Croatian police in the same year while attempting to bomb the funeral of Pope John Paul II (Hide, 2014: p375). The US State Department in 2006 warned that increased decentralisation in Bosnia was making it more vulnerable to terrorists who could exploit it as a safe haven, as well as a launching pad for attacks in Europe. Today, Bosnia’s terrorist concerns are slightly different in scope, although the threat of Bosnia as a transit country for terrorists headed for major European capitals still looms large. Baker (2014: p464) notes new developments that relate to threats of terrorism within Bosnia’s borders, with the Syrian government detaining 16 people in 2014 accused of recruiting and financing Bosnians to leave for Iraq and Syria to join ISIS. Bosnian authorities also arrested 11 individuals and charged them with suspected acts of terrorism, especially the recruitment of over 1,000 Bosnians to fight for ISIS, and facilitation of their return following the capture of territory from ISIS. Considering the delicate balance that Bosnia must maintain socially to avoid another conflict, these threats are serious, especially in light of the frailty of institutions mandated with upholding the religious balance. Most significantly, there seems to be a worrisome change in Bosnia’s socio-cultural landscape. Indeed, Sikman and Ivetic (2011: p31) note a gradual transformation in Bosnia from a unique form of Islam that has characterised the Western Balkan regions and allowed for peaceful co-existence over centuries, to a foreign, imported form of Islamic radicalism. Anticipated Changes in Bosnia’s Security and Terrorism Context According to Istanbullu et al. (2013: p10), the biggest terrorist threats to Bosnia and, indeed, the entire Balkans region, has to do with increasing cooperation between terrorists and organised crime, which in the next five years could develop into a substantial security threat for Bosnia and the region due to a deteriorating economy, corruption, and weakening institutions. Islamic fundamentalism in Bosnia, while not as serious as that in Africa and Asia, could exploit the ethnic tolerance seen in the region, as well as the global war on terror. Transnational organized crime groups have also sought to exploit increased corruption and institutional weakness in Bosnia to destabilise the country and region, increasing the levels of sophisticated crimes, violence, racketeering, and extortion at local and regional level. This connection between organised crime and terrorism has been facilitated by the end of the Cold War, ICT advances, and globalisation (McCauley, 2012: p145). As such, terrorists may be expected to increasingly take advantage of access to weapons and crime routes used by organised crime, allowing them to challenge Bosnia’s armed forces and public security. This link between organised crime groups and Islamic terrorist cells in Bosnia and the Balkans region is raising important concerns for law enforcement, both in Bosnia and the wider European context. Bojarczyk (2014: p53) notes that although criminal groups and their activities have different incentives compared to Islamic terrorism, both cannot be examined as unrelated and isolated entities over the coming five years because of their increasing convergence. Already, Bosnian Muslims are fighting for ISIS and there is evidence that their entry into Syria from Bosnia was facilitated through routes used by organised crime. Increasingly, terrorism and organised crime are operating globally without any recognition of borders or nationality. The Balkan route has served, and will continue to serve, the illegal activities of terrorism and organised crime in Europe and the MENA region. Increasingly, it is becoming clear that terrorism and organised crime in Bosnia and the Balkans are developing interdependencies and links, increasing the asymmetric threat levels to Western Europe (Bojarczyk, 2014: p53). The interests and aims of terrorist cells in Bosnia and the Balkans are expected to continue converging with those of organised crime in the future. Illegal migration flows into Europe, which increasingly use Bosnia and its neighbours as a transit point, continue to facilitate illegal shipments that are not detected by law enforcement authorities, in turn enabling the flow of terrorists to and from the MENA region. Moreover, Roberts (2015: p71) states that Bosnia and the Western Balkans in general are not only a transit point for illegal migrants, some of whom are Islamic extremists, but are also a major trading route for illegal drugs and firearms. Increased convergence of terrorist organisations and organised crime may mean that terrorist cells may begin to profit from illegal trade, in turn enhancing their funding capabilities for terrorist training and acts. There is a growing danger that Islamic militant groups will increasingly use Bosnia’s transport routes for logistical support. For instance, terrorists could access the Schengen region from Bosnia through either Serbia or Croatia, which are drawing closer to EU membership. Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb is an example of Islamic groups that has turned to organised crime and, in this case, has taken advantage of the heroin trade routes from West Africa through Bosnia and the Western Balkans to Europe (Roberts, 2015: p71). In addition, terrorist groups are increasingly taking part in organised crimes to gain logistical and financial support in their attempts to strike at the heart of Western Europe. This, as stated by Kornfein (2013: p37), will only increase in the coming years as terrorist groups seek to self-finance and independently organise their activities, especially as support from traditional benefactors dries up due to the concerted efforts of Western governments. This growing alliance will be defined by access to counterfeiting and other specialised services to allow terrorist cells avoid detection, as well as access to money-laundering and other specialised forms of knowledge to make tracing of terrorism-related funds increasingly difficult for law enforcement. Moreover, organised crime will continue to provide terrorist groups with financial and operational support required due to increased surveillance capabilities of terrorist targets like the UK. Most importantly, this enhanced level of cooperation that is expected to grow stronger in coming years is determined by the geographical nature of the Western Balkans. Weak law enforcement, poor border security, established smuggling routes, and corrupt public officials will continue to facilitate emergence of hybrid terrorist groups (Kornfein, 2013: p37). Bosnia’s security situation is also burdened heavily by problems manifested through religious and nationalist-driven acts of provocation, intolerance, and violence. According to Carmichael (2013: p131), Bosnia represents one of the most significant epicentres of political Islam in Europe, especially noting that these Islamic political parties have become the target for the so-called ‘White Al-Qaeda’, which launders money from Islamic countries through humanitarian organisations. These funds are expected to continue funding the religious education of young Muslims in Bosnia, particularly in Wahhabi Islam that is the main staple of Al-Qaeda. Indeed, there is increasing evidence that these classes are also used by Al-Qaeda to teach young Bosnian Muslims how to make explosives, marksmanship, and martial arts. In this context, it is only a matter of time before these initiates begin to proliferate into Europe. Therefore, Bosnia’s role as a base for terrorism will only increase over the next five years, especially given the increasing tolerance for Wahhabi Islam in the country. Martins and Ferreira-Pereira (2012: p544) argue that the slow recovery in Europe from the global financial crisis will only accelerate the membership drive for the ‘white Al-Qaeda’ movement in Bosnia, especially with stubborn unemployment and the flow of illegal immigrants from the MENA region. Furthermore, Domm (2011: p64) notes that persistence of the effects of this crisis may increase the content and scope of terrorism in Bosnia and the Western Balkans, especially as social and economic dissatisfaction with the current government grows, resulting in politically-motivated displays of religious intolerance towards other politico-religious groups. Growing Islamic extremism in Bosnia, especially with the return of fighters from Iraq and Syria, provides dangerous conditions for violent terrorist activities in a country that is slowly recovering from years of raw hostilities. As such, the in-flow of Islamic extremists linked to both ISIS and Al-Qaeda may translate into increased instability for Bosnia as Orthodox Christians, Catholics, and Muslims progress hesitantly towards local and regional reconciliation. The presence of religious extremists in Bosnia’s political parties, disillusioned with the slow pace of economic and social changes, threatens to make Bosnia a safe haven for terrorists in the future and a base for attacks on Europe. As the hope of peaceful co-existence fade in Bosnia with increased political-religious tensions, as evidenced by vandalism of religious buildings belonging to both Muslims and Christians, there is every chance that terrorist groups will take it upon themselves to ‘protect’ Muslims (Domm, 2011: p64). This environment of religious intolerance, yet again, may act as a magnet for foreign Islamic fighters into Bosnia, ostensibly to protect Islam and Muslims. While there is minimal evidence of terrorism being prepared against or within Bosnia, McCarthy et al. (2013: p54) state that the increasing presences of immigrants from Africa and Asia who in Bosnia who continue to maintain contacts with international terrorists create a possibility for them to reactivate these connections. This statement will be especially salient when taken in the context of worsening economic and social conditions for the immigrants. More importantly, however, Bosnia and the Western Balkans still have massive amounts of weapons and ammunition from NATO’s intervention during the war and it might be only a matter of time before these weapons are in the hands of committed terrorists (Gibas-Krzak, 2013: p214). Coupled with the convergence of terrorist groups and organised crime groups, the next five years may provide a pointer of how terrorism will seek to utilise these weapons in terrorist acts Bosnia, the Western Balkans, and in Europe. Conclusion Finally, although the threat of terrorism in Bosnia, just as in other Balkan countries, is increasing, it is important to note that these threats are still nascent given the fact that Bosnia’s political establishment is still largely western-aspiring and secular in nature. Therefore, while it is critical to reassess potential risks of terrorism in Bosnia and the region, it is equally important to separate real terrorism from politics. The threat of terrorism in Bosnia in the next five years may not be as dire as in Africa or the Middle East, but with the convergence of terrorism and organised crime, as well as mainstream political parties and religious extremists, the country remains a serious threat to the security of Europe in terms of its position as a transit point for terrorists. References Bossong, R. (2013). The Fight against Terrorism: A Key Global Objective for the EU? Global Power Europe, 2(1), 19-35 Baker, C. (2014). Innocence and victimhood: gender, nation, and women’s activism in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 14(3), 463-464 Bojarczyk, B. (2014). Radical Islamism–A threat to Bosniak Identity and Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Western Balkans, 4(1), 53 Carmichael, C. (2013). Genocide and the Problem of the State in Bosnia in the Twentieth Century. Genocide, Risk and Resilience: an Interdisciplinary Approach, 2(1), 131 Domm, R. 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