Short Psychological Questions - Assignment Example

Short Essay Questions

1. Gregory Pence believes human reproductive cloning is not inherently immoral. What is the argument for this? (Be sure to explain his presumptive case for the benefits of cloning.) How does he address the two objections that cloning (a) leads to abnormalities and (b) deprives individuals of uniqueness?

Pence believes that human reproductive cloning is not inherently immoral, but it is based on a biblical and outdated perspective of living, one which is largely fatalistic (Eggleston). He argues that medicine has already moved away from the teachings of Old Testament morality (Eggleston; Roylance). In relation to the possibility of these clones serving as slaves or organ reservoirs, Pence opposes such possibility (Eggleston; Roylance). Instead, he says that this would not happen because these clones would be fully functioning individuals as other people, and they would not be treated as such (Eggleston; Roylance). Pence also points out the numerous benefits of human reproductive cloning which he expects are sufficient to cancel out other arguments against cloning (Roylance). He highlights that cloning is a way for people to improve their genes, to produce individuals with better genes, or less defective ones (Eggleston; Roylance).

In relation to abnormalities, Pence does not believe such contention and instead argues that cloning would help provide better genes for future generations (Eggleston). Where before, this was not possible, now, through cloning, it has become possible (Roylance). In terms of depriving people of their uniqueness, cloning actually does not make copies of person because there are environmental differences which would eventually make each clone unique (Eggleston). While it is possible to clone oneself, one cannot make a copy of oneself which is the same in all respects and aspects because the totality of the human being is not simply genetically predetermined (Eggleston; Roylance). It is determined by one’s environment and personal development.

2. Judy Thomson argues that abortion isn’t always immoral by rejecting a standard argument for abortion. What is that argument exactly? (Be sure to mention the premise she surprisingly grants for the sake of argument.) How does she object to this argument using her Violinist thought experiment? How does this example relate to her analysis of the right to life?

Judy Thomson highlights that granting, for the sake of argument that the fetus does have the right to life, this right to life does not overcome the woman’s right to control her body and its functions to support the fetus’s life. Based on this context, induced abortion is in effect not morally impermissible. In Thomson’s “A Defense of Abortion,” she presents the thought experiment of an individual kidnapped, waking up next to an unconscious violinist suffering from fatal kidney disease. The individual is to stay plugged to the violinist for nine months until he is able to be unplugged because he would now be able to survive the disease on his own (Thomson)

Thomson argues that the individual can rightfully unplug himself from the violinist because the latter does not have the right to use the individual’s body to stay alive. Unplugging oneself from the violinist would not violate the latter’s right to life; instead, one is only depriving the violinist of the use of the individual’s body to which the violinist has no right (Thomson). In the same context, Thomson argues that “unplugging” or terminating the pregnancy would not be tantamount to a violation of the fetus’s right to life, but it is a deprivation of the fetus non-consensual use of the woman’s body and life support functions, to which the fetus has also no right. Thomson’s analysis of the right to life is very much based on the woman’s choice and right to her body, and that if she does not desire for her body to support a fetus, she should not be deprived her right to make the choice not to give life support to the fetus.

3. Mary Anne Warren argues that abortion is rarely immoral. First, how does she think the standard argument against abortion equivocates? (Be sure to explain what equivocation is.) Second, how does she argue that the fetus is not a person? (Be sure to explain, don’t just list, her “criteria.”)

Warren argues that abortion is rarely immoral and she claims that the likelihood of the premises is based on an equivocation on the term human being. Equivocation here refers to the application of ambiguous terms to hide the truth or to avoid making a commitment to the terms or the situation (California State of Sacramento). Warren points out that the equivocation here is based on the fact that the term human being has numerous meanings (California State of Sacramento). In one sense, it translates to the genetic meaning – homo sapien which should include children as well as adults, as well as fetuses, and those individuals in irreversible comas living without functioning brains (California State of Sacramento). In the moral respect however, human beings are those who are full members of the moral community and the moral community is the community which has members with individual rights (California State of Sacramento). It is a community made up of individual persons (California State of Sacramento).

She points out that a fetus is not a person in the moral sense because the fetus has no consciousness, more specifically, the fetus is not conscious of the events within and outside her being; the fetus also does not possess reasoning (California State of Sacramento). This reasoning is based on the capacity to manage new and complicated issues (California State of Sacramento). The fetus does not also have the capacity for self-motivated activity, or activities which would not be dependent on genetic, direct, or external control (California State of Sacramento). The fetus, according to Warren does not also have the capacity to communicate messages with numerous subjects or topics (California State of Sacramento). Finally, the fetus is also not a person because it has no self-concepts nor does it have self-awareness (California State of Sacramento). In effect, without such qualities, the entity cannot be considered a human being in the moral sense, and since the fetus does not at any stage possess any of the above qualities, it cannot be considered a human being (California State of Sacramento). A potential as a human being, is not enough basis to gain a right to life because the rights of the actual person is still much more significant than the right of one who is only considered a potential person (California State of Sacramento).

4. Carl Cohen argues that experimenting on (non-human) animals is morally permissible. How does he arrive at this conclusion based on an analysis of rights? (Be sure to explain his Kantian argument.) How does his account accord animals “indirect” moral status? And how does he think a famous argument for animal rights, by Tom Regan, commits the fallacy of equivocation?

Carl Cohen arrives at the conclusion that experimenting on animals is morally permissible based on his analysis of rights. A right is considered a potential claim which one may use over another (University of Maryland). To understand genuine rights, it is important to know who actually holds such right and against whom it is held and to what the right is (University of Maryland). Rights in effect are potential claims in the setting of moral agents and they come about only where it is being claimed over another (University of Maryland). Cohen further points out that only species that have capacity C would have rights and non-humans do not have such capacity C, and therefore animal species do not possess rights (University of Maryland). He further emphasizes that only species that have the capacity for moral claims possess rights and having such claims require autonomy (University of Maryland). Non-human species are not autonomous and therefore would not have rights (University of Maryland). This also relates to Kant’s discussion on humans and their willingness and this willingness being a quality only attributed to humans (Wilson). Animals do not have will and are therefore not considered autonomous and as such would not have intrinsic value (Wilson). Experimenting on non-humans is therefore considered morally permissible.

Cohen also highlights that Regan’s contention includes two different points which have inherent value. The point in favor of animal rights which is based on animal’s inherent value is considered fallacious, or what is considered fallacy of equivocation, where two or more meanings from the term are confused in the argument (Traer). Regan’s fallacy is noted in his statement of inherent value of humans and of animals being the same, and in effect protected by equal rights (Traer). Regan’s argument would therefore contradict itself as it gives equal value to two rightly competing rights (Traer).

5. Peter Singer argues that treating animals as inherently less valuable than humans is “speciesist.” What does he mean by this exactly? Does he think all animal interests count the same as all human interests? How does this square with his principle of the Equal Consideration of Interests? Finally, why does he think alternative views run into the “problem of mental defectives”?

Peter Singer’s statement on the treatment of animals as less valuable than humans as being extremely speciesist translates to the principle of equal consideration of interests, where equality should exist for all humans even with the differences which exist between them. This principle is not limited to humans, but it should be a principle which can be used as moral basis for human’s relations with non-human species (Singer). Where this principle is not applied to other species, then humans are being severely speciesist, and the principle of equal consideration is being applied only to humans of similar species (Singer). From this attitude and belief system, other issues relating to the unfair treatment of other people, the blacks or other races can sometimes be at risk also, with often unfair considerations given to others who have different skin colors (Singer). For speciesists, there is a belief that the interests of one or some specie/s is/are superior to others. For human speciesists, the thinking is often based on the belief that pain is not as bad when felt by animals or other species (Singer).

In relation to the problem of mentally defective humans, these are said to have less of claim to autonomy (Singer). In using such qualities (autonomy) to differentiate humans and other animals, mentally defective humans may already be considered of the same moral status as animals (Singer). This is a forceful argument as it is considered a horrifying conclusion. However, some argue that these would be the consequences which would be faced if self-consciousness and autonomy would be used as qualities to differentiate animals from humans (Singer).

6. Amy Gutmann argues that justice requires universal healthcare coverage for all citizens. What is her Rawlsian argument for this? (Be sure to explain the Rawlsian ideas of equal opportunity via the procedure of the veil of ignorance.) How exactly does this only establish equality of access, not results? And why does this only establish mere universal coverage, like Obamacare, not a single-payer system? (Be sure to explain the basic differences between the two.)

Amy Gutmann’s Rawlsian argument is based on John Rawl’s theory of justice as fairness where he insists on the presence of a social contract among free and equal citizens (Rid, 577). His ideas are founded on three principles – of the protection of equal basic liberties, of guaranteeing fair equality of opportunity, and of limiting inequalities for those which benefit the worst off (Rid, 577). Healthcare is very much important as it supports opportunities and where there is an obligation to ensure individual opportunity, promoting health is an element of such obligations (Rid, 577). Rawl’s also believes that health inequalities are not just where there is unequal access to healthcare. Gutmann, is very much in favor of equal access to healthcare. She declares that there is no philosophical argument which can justify unequal access to health or the extension of life.

Rawl’s principle supports justice as fairness where there is the optimal pursuit of individual liberty, and limits on such only proper if it contradicts the ability of others to secure similar goals (Gutmann, 542). It is also based on the veil of ignorance where equalization is promoted based on neither party knowing their actual position in society (Graham, 539). In this case, the equal access would only be available, but whether or not people would actually use such rights accorded to them is another matter (Graham, 539). The results would not necessarily be the same for the poor or the rich members of society who are actually both allowed access. This situation only allows for universal coverage not a single payer system. Universal healthcare coverage refers to the system where all individuals have health coverage or health insurance, and single payer systems are situations where there is one payer, in most cases, the government for healthcare claims (Montgomery). Gutmann’s universal healthcare is based on health coverage for all, not the single payer system. This means that people would still seek insurance, possibly private or possibly from the government to ensure their health coverage. This would mean that people would still eventually pay for their health insurance or seek out health insurance to pay for their healthcare needs.