Heinrich Domino Theory of Accident Causation - Article Example

IDЕNT САUSАTIОN MОDЕLS Name Institution Tutor Subject Date Introduction Basically accident causation implies to the elements that are the key reasons underlying accidents. For professionals within the fields of occupational health and safety, identification of the factors of causation within the workplace accident or injury is vital. Coming to understand what brought about the occurrence of a situation considered unsafe is significant in the implementation approaches to assist in prevention of a reoccurrence (Manuele, 2013). According to Leveson (2011), accidents within construction places are considered to be occurrences which are not planned and involve movement of materials, persons and objects which may which ultimately lead to losses of finances, damage of properties or even loss of people’s lives. A huge number of accidents takes place because of conditions as well as acts which are not safe. For the reason that it is not always possible to recognize and eliminate potential accidents before they come to pass, effective programs in regard to accident investigation are important for gathering crucial information and data. Prevention of construction accidents can be undertaken through identification of the root causes to accidents. This is a possibility through accident investigation approaches like the models of accident causation. Theories such as the Swiss cheese model of system accidents and the Heinrich Domino theory of accident causation provides the comprehensive explanations as to why accidents happen. These models were initially developed so as to help individuals with the investigation of occupational accidents. These models enhanced effective investigation of accidents. Coming to learn how accidents takes place is subsequently useful in proactive sense so as to determine what kind of errors or failures generally cause accidents. Therefore action can implemented to address such errors before they come to happen. The Swiss cheese model of system accidents When it comes to indulgence of accidents and incidents, the Swiss cheese model has turned to be the de facto outline. It occupies an inquisitive position research of accidents (Manuele, 2013). In the system approach, defenses, safeguards and barriers take a key position. Superior technologies possess numerous defensive layers. A number of them are engineered such as automatic shutdowns, physical barriers and alarms. Some of them are dependent on people such as control room operators, pilots, anesthetists and surgeons. Nevertheless others are reliant on administrative controls and procedures. Their role is to safeguard assets as well as potential victims from local hazards. In most cases they perform this in an effective way, however weaknesses always exist. Leveson (2011) postulates that within a perfect environment all the defensive layer would be intact. However in the real world, they exist more like slices of Swiss chesses, possessing several holes. But distinct from cheese, these holes are progressively shifting their location as they also constantly open and shut. The existence of holes within any given slice does not usually bring about an undesired result. Normally, this can take place suppose the holes within several layers transitorily line up to allow for a trajectory chance of accident thus bringing about hazards to damage contact with victims. The holes within the defenses emerge as a result of two reasons which include latent conditions as well as active failures. Almost all adversative occurrences involve a blend of such two set of factors. Active failures These refers to acts which are not safe and are committed with individuals who directly have contacts with systems or patients. Active failures take a range of forms: procedural violations, mistakes, fumbles, lapses and slips. Active failures normally possess direct but short lived impacts on the defense integrity. For instance, at Chernobyl the operators erroneously violated the procedures of the plant and therefore switching off sequential safety systems. This consequently created the instantaneous trigger for the shattering explosion within the core. Proponents of the person approach normally search no further for the causative agents of adverse occurrence once they have recognized such proximal acts which are unsafe. However as conversed below, almost all these acts possess an unpremeditated account that ranges back in time and up through the stages of the system. Latent conditions It is always said that latent conditions are resident pathogens that are unavoidable in the system. They emerge from judgments created by designers, top level management, procedure writers and builders. Such judgments may be erroneous, however they need not to be. All such tactical resolutions have the capacity to introduce pathogens within the systems. Latent conditions are related to two types of adverse effects. First is that they can lead to errors triggering disorders in the local work environment (For instance inexperience, fatigue, inadequate equipment, understaffing, time pressure) and they can bring about long lasting weaknesses or holes within the defenses (deficiencies in design and construction, procedures that are unworkable, untrustworthy indicators and alarms etc.). As the term asserts, latent conditions may lie inactive in the system for several years before they blend local triggers and active failures to bring about an opportunity for accidents. Contrary to active failures, whose particular types are normally difficult to forecast, latent conditions can be foreseen and corrected before an adverse occurrence come into effect. Coming to understand this results to proactive management of risk rather than a reactive one (Leveson, 2011). Heinrich Domino theory of accident causation Heinrich is an important pioneer in the models of accident causation. He defined the theory of accident causation, relationship between machine and man, severity and frequency relation, the impact of safety on efficiency, cost of accidents, the role of management in prevention of accidents, and reasons for unsafe acts. Consistent with the statistics on accident reports, he inferred that 10 % of accidents are because of unsafe conditions, 2% are associated with natural disasters i.e. acts of God and that 88% of all the accidents are as a result of workers unsafe acts. According to the evaluation by Heinrich, the definition of accident is “an unintended and unrestrained occurrence where by the reaction or action of a person, radiation, substance or object leads to individual injury or losses. He defined the model of accident causation, the impacts of safety on efficiency, cost of accidents, role of management in prevention of accidents, relationship between severity and frequency, relationship between machine and man and eventually reasons for unsafe practices (Manuele, 2013). He subsequently came up with the Domino model which is centered on 5 sequential factors that follows: Social environment and ancestry Social environment and ancestry refers to the procedures of obtaining knowledge skills and knowledge of customs within the work environment. Inadequacy of knowledge and skills of undertaking tasks, unsuitable environmental and social conditions will result to fault of person (Leveson, 2011). Carelessness- Fault of Person Carelessness or fault of person refers to the negative characteristics of an individual’s personality although such undesired features may be acquired. Unsafe conditions or acts are the outcomes of this carelessness. Unsafe act What are unsafe acts and conditions according to Heinrich? The domino model asserts that every incident is directly related to unsafe acts and conditions, which he describes as “a person’s unsafe practice, like horseplay, standing under suspended loads and safeguards removal. Subsequently they are physical or mechanical hazards like insufficient light and unguarded gears. Unsafe acts or conditions comprises of technical failures and errors which bring about accidents. Accident These are caused by conditions or acts considered unsafe and consequently result to injuries. Injuries Injuries refers to the consequences of accidents. The model of Heinrich asserts that accidents emerge from a series of sequential events, symbolically like a line of falling dominoes. Suppose a single domino falls over, it prompts the next domino too to fall, and the next and the next. However it is important to note that eradicating a major factor, i.e. unsafe act or unsafe condition, averts the commencement of the chain reaction. It is important to note that a good number of accidents can be avoided suppose the safety management system exhibits both intrinsic threats as well as natural degradation. The first step in creating such a system is to prepare a model that reflects the collaboration between the organizational activities and chance of accident in the presence of these specific exposures (Manuele, 2013). Conclusion For the reason that construction activities comprises of complex procedures as well as the most demanding administrative atmosphere, the occurrence of accidents come in form of diverse circumstance and diverse causations. A good number of the construction accidents emerge from operation sources like facilities and equipment in processes of work and human errors. Generally, most of these accidents result to loss of properties, loss of life and even injuries. As discussed, Heinrich Domino theory of accident causation and the Swiss cheese model of system accidents as structural maps, have been the most appreciated and extensively acceptable among the accidents theories. The authorities uses such to control the element bringing about unwanted events and to avert the potential blunders before they come to happen. Furthermore, the discussed models imply the unsuitable view that accidents in workplaces can be avoided suppose human mistakes are eradicated. As much as these approaches have some considerable of effectiveness, there is need to revise these approaches in order to manage risk commendably and efficiently (Leveson, 2011). References Manuele, F. A. (2013). On the practice of safety. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley. International Conference on Electrical and Information Technologies for Rail Transportation, & In Jia, L. (2014). Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference on Electrical and Information Technologies for Rail Transportation (EITRT2013): Volume I. Li, R. Y. M., & Poon, S. W. (2013). Construction Safety. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg. Griffin, T. G. C., Young, M. S., & Stanton, N. A. (2015). Human factors models for aviation accident analysis and prevention. Gertler, J. B., National Research Council (U.S.)., Transit Cooperative Research Program., United States., & Transit Development Corporation. (2011). Improving safety-related rules compliance in the public transportation industry. Washington, D.C: Transportation Research Board. Leveson, N. (2011). Engineering a safer world: Systems thinking applied to safety. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Read More