The paper "Anglo Corporations Should Have Only One Focus That Is Shareholders" is an outstanding example of a business literature review. Effective corporate governance is a major contributor to economic growth because it has the ability to enhance company performance. Organizations have the obligation of adopting effective and efficient corporate governance structures as a way of facilitating growth. In an organization, shareholders engage in the election of directors, who recruit the management who, in turn, is charged with the responsibility of running the organizations. The need to ensure the existence of an administration whose behaviour will likely be apprehensive with its well-being, and with the board of directors, which may be obliged to specific groups, including the executive form the essence of shareholder supremacy in Anglo-American countries.
The question of whether shareholder primacy should be the focus of corporate boards in Anglo companies is based on the understanding that other stakeholders such as the workforce, supplying agents, the government and the surrounding community play an equally essential role in corporate governance. Introduction The conflict between individual freedom and organizational authority power has been continuing overtime.
Initially, the focus was on the relationship between an individual and the church; more recently, it was on the constitution and individual in relation to the civil state. In contemporary society, the dispute concerns making corporate authority attuned to the desires of a dynamic society. The contemporary organization has not only been involved in the creation of untold wealth and provided the society with the chance of expressing and developing their capacities but also has enforced expenditures on personalities and society. The process of encouraging the freedom of individual energy at limited costs on different stakeholders, therefore, emerges as a major impediment. Corporate governance is central to this challenge.
This is because handles systems, procedures, and methodologies by which organizational activities are controlled. There are explanations that emphasize the connections between the management, the board, and its shareholders.
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