Governance Challenges that Poor Countries Face - Yemen Overview - Coursework Example

GLOBAL CHALLENGES IN GOVERNANCE By Name Course Instructor Institution City/State Date Governance Challenges That Poor Countries Face Introduction Governance is defined as processes, rules, and behaviour that have an effect on manner in which powers are exercised through accountability, sincerity, participation unity and effectiveness. Using good governance to tackle corruption is a crucial challenge facing nearly all poor countries. With no reforms capable of dismantling the administrative, political and financial structures perpetuating corruption, poor countries will remain in the cycle of bad governance and cronyism that limits their remarkable potential for social, political and economic development. Issues associated with development as mentioned by Tungodden et al. (2004, p.46) are inextricably related to governance problems. Unless the existing governments execute their entrusted responsibilities efficiently, the poor countries will continue being plagued by diseases, poverty, illiteracy, corruption as well as other challenges troubling the poor countries. In the last few years, policymakers as well as scholars have shifted their focus to governance challenges, which include topics such as electoral systems, corruption control, democratization, judicial systems, and so on. According to Milner (2005, p.835), development can only take place if the country has set up ‘good institutions’, which are either politically intrinsic or have been extended politically. Besides that, developing a strong civil society is not possible without presence of strong government institution, and this can only be achieved by good governance. The research essay provides a critical insight about governance challenges facing Yemen, and how those challenges can be addressed. Yemen Overview Yemen is amongst the poorest countries in the world and the poorest in the Arab world facing a number of socio-economic challenges that ranges from unemployment and poverty, food insecurity and water scarcity to social as well as political conflict and state instability Döring et al. (2013, p.5). Evidently, most parts of Yemen are not controlled by the state and the available institutions for public service are weak, vulnerable to corruption and inefficiency, and are incapable. Politically, the stability and unity of Yemen is almost collapsing because of the enduring conflicts within the country (Diamond & Plattner, 2014, p.287). Normally, tribal clashes lead to in eruptions of violence while the widespread clashes between the Yemeni army as well as Al Qaida on the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) in the South have rendered many people homes. This situation has challenged the state considering that it lack ability to support the growing number of internally misplaced persons. Because of its fragility, Yemen lack capacities for ensuring continuous development. Even though the oil in Yemen is about to run out, water is still its rarest resource. Yemen is suffering from a critical shortage of water and water allocation has become a crucial part in its socio-economic development. Lately, Yemen came into a vital era of political transition, where the presidential power was transferred to another leader for the first time in almost thirty years. For years, the international community has continually supported Yemen in aid activities that result in development as well as stabilization, but poor governance is put the aid measures in danger. Currently, Yemen is pushing for good governance anchored on the firm conviction that the enormous challenges facing the country can be solved if the government allows public participation, and is democratic and accountable (Sharqieh, 2011). Particularly in consideration of the enduring humanitarian crisis as well as political transition, Döring et al. (2013, p.5) suggests that for Yemen to move towards development and stability it needs the international assistance urgently. Political Legitimacy As states by Hill et al. (2013, p.5), the legitimacy pre-eminence as a source of stable authority is a crucial norm of political theory. In essence, legitimacy facilitates the transformation of power into authority; thus, facilitating rule by means that are non-coercive and enabling leaders to endure temporary popularity fluctuations devoid of resorting to violence. In this case, global institutions such as World Bank and the International Labour Organization (ILO understand that when governance and legitimate institutions are strengthened, it becomes easier to break cycles of violence’ and to change the ways of politics towards non-violence, compromise and consent. The notion of political legitimacy is crucial in comprehending the 2011 uprisings in Arab countries, especially Yemen which was not instigated by discrepancy in democratic structures or economic factors. Instead, Yemen uprising was instigated by both political and economic grievances, which consequently resulted in loss of faith in the government. The process of state-building in Yemen started in 1990, when South Yemen (People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen) together with North Yemen (Yemen Arab Republic) united under the leadership of YAR‘s Ali Abdullah Saleh (Boucek & Ottaway, 2010, p.2). Saleh as a republican leader decided to build Yemen under domestic legitimacy and positioned himself to capitalise on the regional republican allies such as late Saddam Hussein the then president of Iraq. Key positions in the army were occupied by Saleh close relatives while the northern tribes were recruited into the military. According to Hill et al. (2013, p.8), Saleh’s presidency served only the the interests of the elite, especially the northern elite where he came from. This in consequence, resulted in a fundamental legitimacy in crisis in the country’s parliamentary system. Houthi rebels who took part in the Yemeni Revolution shifted to violence while most young Yemenis started losing faith Saleh’s government especially due to the alienation that south Yemen was experiencing from the formal state institutions. For this reason, the southern separatists together with Houthis became identity-based groups with a goal for legitimacy as well as good governance. Significantly, their grievances were attributed to their exclusion from Saleh’s patronage system considering that resources were lessening and discriminations and social injustices were becoming wider. The actual territorial power fragmentation outside Sana’a (Yemen’s largest city) in the last years of Saleh’s rule accelerated during the Arab uprising in 2011. Poor governance had catalysed a revolution movement, where young Yemenis were empowered to challenge the traditional practices and structures of politics as well as power (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2011). The Uneven Liberalization Benefits Neoliberalism has turned out to be more and prominent as a system of governance in many nations across the globe. Neoliberalism directly results in the country’s economic liberalization, the state sectors restructuring as well as the welfare state dismantling. Prior to the 2011 uprising, Salisbury (2011, p.9) posits that Yemen’s economy was controlled by a few elite individuals; for instance, approximately ten families were controlling over 80% of the telecommunications, manufacturing, imports, banking, processing as well as transport . Saleh had promised Yemenis that the economy will be liberalised, but most of the promises were never unimplemented and those that were implemented were used to support the power of tribal and political elites (Al-Dawsari, 2012, p.12). Saleh government in 1995 had talks with ILO and the World Bank over numerous financial support programmes, and was offered grants and loans by both institution on the condition that the country will implement liberal economic reforms, which includes trade liberalization, subsidy cuts as well as state enterprises’ privatisations. In this case, Sana’a technocrats implemented a number of these reforms towards 21st century, which included banking sector liberalization as well as subsidies cut on food and cement imports, but the fuel was not subsidised; thus, turning out to be the main basis for patronage and corruption. Even though Western countries were pushing for foreign investment in Yemen with the intention of facilitating economy diversification far from oil dependence, but Saleh government made no effort to make it achievable. Theoretically, policies for economic liberalization like those promoted by the World Bank and IMF are designed to generate markets, which offer an even ground competition and in so doing, driving the market prices down. In consequence, this promotes economic growth and improves people’s living standards. Still, Saleh regime made sure that they controlled the dissemination of new economic opportunities so as to strengthen the key leaders’ political position and improve the livelihood of their families. Legal and illegal economic opportunities, which include ability to access the subsidized fuel as well as awarding of lucrative contract to tribal leaders and politicians’ family members, were utilized as a motivation for supporting Saleh regime. Besides that, prominent tribal military and political players gained from the process of liberalization by partnering with emerging as well as established trading families. Without tribal or military leverage, cooperating with Yemen’s capitalist elite was only option for the established businesses. The majority of the members in the Yemen’s capitalist elite had lengthy histories of trading in the black markets, especially in smuggling gun. Besides that, military as well as tribal crony industrialists participated in importing state-of-the-art machinery, commodities as well as other technology; thus, gaining massive profits. Corruption As pointed out by Rose-Ackerman (2004, p.1), high corruption levels result in inequality, especially in income distribution. In Yemen, corrupt practices were prevalent in the oil sector, particularly in the service contracts allocation as well as in import/export deals. Saleh was the most corrupt since he allocated fuel products that had been subsidised to his political allies as well as relatives, who consequently charged high prices to the domestic buyers, or sold the products overseas. Regrettably, the corruption culture in Yemen has infested every facet of private and public activity; thus, the government face a great challenge in confronting this issue bearing in mind that Transparency International’s ranked Yemen 14th on 2014 Corruption Index. Besides that, Yemen is currently the most corrupt nation in the Arabian Gulf region, and as a result, has turned out to be unfavourable environment for investment. Poor governance has worsened the country’s security conditions and has created an ideal environment for corruption where illegal conditions are imposed by influential people on investors (Dbwan, 2014). In order to succeed in Yemen, investors must pay a lot of money for protection as well as facilitation. Such practices have led to unemployment because of the investor worries, especially the Yemeni businessmen overseas willing to invest back home. Solution to Governance Challenges The government must ensure there is equitable access to resources like health, education and water and also ensure that the development benefits are shared equitably. In order to meet their commitment towards the population, the Yemeni state institutions have to pursue a vision, put a consistent and coherent social policy into practice that intends to secure the rights of Yemenis, particularly the groups that are marginalised. By pursuing the principle of ownership, the Yemen government should develop national policies suitable for the needs of the people, and consider the country’s traditional, historical as well as cultural heritage. Besides that, people impacted by the country’s politics will require state institutions to be open, operating in a consensus-oriented way. The Yemeni people must be given a political voice in making country’s decisions, the right to join groups such as civil society as well as freedom to exercise their social, economic and political rights. The emerging youth activists as well as political leaders in Yemen must be allowed to take part in the international policy debate concerning national issues. These individuals hold comprehensive informal relationships mind-maps underpinnings the political economy, the elite structure and networks and also have imperative reviews for making long-lasting elite patronage networks. Besides that, the start should introduce effective complaint mechanisms and make sure people occupying public offices are trained appropriately so as to reduce incompetency and corruption at state built a nongovernmental oversight that oversees the state enterprises privatization process on case-by-case basis. Conclusion In conclusion, the essay has provided a critical insight about governance challenges facing Yemen, and how those challenges can be addressed. In view of the highlighted challenges, it is undeniably that the Yemen’s future poverty alleviation as well as socio-economic development depends on the government ability to protect the people’s imperilled means of living. Scores of Yemeni have no faith in the country’s state institutions, which they consider as weak and inefficient. Defenceless groups, like children, women, the poor and refugees are suffering a lot since they cannot access basic services that they need urgently. The only option for Yemen’s to regain legitimacy and trust is by promoting good governance as well as shaping the sustainable development efficiently. Yemen is plagued with corruption which is thriving thanks to the fragmented elite structure as well as weak state institutions. Without strong state institutions, corruption has become rampant, where government allies are offered state contracts and access to subsidised fuel products while opponents are labelled as terrorists. State patronage is sourced from Yemen’s latest oil wealth, and the fact that Yemen’s oil is almost running out has left the present corruption structure of unsustainable. The country economic growth has remained stagnant due to corruption and political instability may be on the horizon. References Al-Dawsari, N., 2012. Tribal Governance and Stability in Yemen. Working Paper. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2011. The Yemeni Revolution: replacing Ali Abdullah Saleh, or replacing obsolete institutions? [Online] Available at: HYPERLINK "http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/a81c810b-9b30-4cbc-bede-c03b5bf69eac" http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/a81c810b-9b30-4cbc-bede-c03b5bf69eac [Accessed 11 May 2015]. Boucek, C. & Ottaway, M., 2010. Yemen on the Brink. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment. Dbwan, A., 2014. Fighting the Culture of Corruption in Yemen. [Online] Available at: HYPERLINK "http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/fighting-culture-corruption-yemen" http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/fighting-culture-corruption-yemen [Accessed 11 October 2015]. Diamond, L. & Plattner, M.F., 2014. Democratization and Authoritarianism in the Arab World. Baltimore, MD: JHU Press. Döring, M., Constanze & Jebens, B.D., 2013. Promoting Good Governance in Yemen through the Yemeni-German Water Sector Program (WSP). Research Paper. Bonn, Germany: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH. Hill, G., Salisbury, P., Northedge, L. & Kinninmont, J., 2013. Yemen: Corruption, Capital Flight and Global Drivers of Conflict. A Chatham House Report. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Milner, H.V., 2005. Globalization, Development, and International Institutions: Normative and Positive Perspectives. Perspectives on Politics, 3(4), pp.833-54. Rose-Ackerman, S., 2004. The Challenge of Poor Governance and Corruption. Research Paper. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press Yale University. Salisbury, P., 2011. Yemen’s Economy: Oil, Imports and Elites. Middle East and North Africa Programme Paper. London: Chatham House. Sharqieh, I., 2011. Only Good Governance Can Defeat Al Qaeda in Yemen. [Online] Available at: HYPERLINK "http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/01/28-yemen-sharqieh" http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/01/28-yemen-sharqieh [Accessed 11 October 2015]. Tungodden, B., Stern, N.H., Stern, N. & Kolstad, I., 2004. Toward Pro-poor Policies: Aid, Institutions, and Globalization. Washington Dc: World Bank Publications. Read More