The Windsor Tower Fire - Assignment Example

Fire Incident (Course Name and Code) (Institution Name) (Departments Name) (Students Name) (Students Number) (Instructors Name) October 30, 2008 There have been incidents of fires every time a hazard occurs. When terrorist attack and when there is a road accident there is a likely chance that fire occurs. Fire incidents are disastrous causing loss of property and may cause deaths and bring in grieving. Policies, regulations, codes and laws have been put into place to ensure that such scenarios are completely removed. Therefore, the paper analysis four fires that occurred in a closed setting (buildings) from different countries. In these cases engineering regulations that were floated are been analyzed in relations to there contributions to the fire incident. Additionally, the lessons that were learned from these incidents are analyzed with recommendations on prevention of such fires been brought forward. These four fire incidents includes Windsor Tower fire in Madrid Spain, First Interstate Bank, Los Angeles, n United States, Dongdu Commercial Building in Luoyang, China and the King’s Cross Fire, London in United Kingdom. The Windsor Tower Fire This is a fire incident that occurred in Madrid Spain in February 12, 2005. It occurred in a storey building that had 32 storey concrete floors with reinforced concrete central core. At the time of construction of the building and according to code of building in Spain the internal steel beams and the perimeter walls were unprotected. It contained two heavily reinforced technical floors in the 2nd and 3rd floors and between the 16th and 17th floors (Osborne 2005, p. 70). Before, the fire broke out the building was under renovation in which fire protection was been developed for the perimeter steel columns by the use of boarding system. On the other hand, the internal steel beams were been protected with the help of spray protection. Additionally, the sprinkler system was been installed and a new aluminum cladding system was on the process of installation (Howard 2006, p. 120). At the time when the fire broke out the fire protection had reached the 17th floor with some portions in the 9th and 15th floors that were not complete. However, not all the gaps that are between the floor slabs and cladding had been sealed with the fireproof insulation material. Additionally, installation of fire stopping on the voids and the vertical shafts on the fire doors were not operational. This is because at the time when the building was been constructed there were no rules that required installation of fire protection to the steelwork or the requirement of sprinkler fire protection. Hence, the steelwork was not protected and there was no sprinkler that was installed. Moreover, the floor slabs and cladding had a gap that was not fire stopped. The building adopted the ‘open plan’ floor concept which ensured that the floor compartment could be floor-by-floor. This means that each floor spanned over a large space (Osborne 2005 p. 72). It is reported that the wire started at the 21st floor which is believed to have been started by short-circuit. Within an hour all the floors that were above the 21st Floor were on fire. After more hours passed the fire spread upwards to the 3rd floor which was the technical floor. The fire lasted approximately 19 hours. The building was completely gutted by the fire in which floors above 17th floor collapsed. The technical floor in the 17th floor ensured that the building did not completely collapse. The building was beyond repair in which it was later demolished (Howard 2006, p. 122). In this scenario, it was found that the lack of effective fire fighting capabilities e.g. the sprinklers was missing, and if they were there, the fire could have been controlled. Furthermore, the floor was open e.g. a floor of area 1000 meters square which contributed to spreading of the fire easily. Vertical compartments also played a role when the building collapsed due to failure in withstanding the fire. The recommendations for such scenarios include improving firefighting measures. Installation of fire sprinklers, installation of perimeter steel columns fire protection, aluminum cladding and internal fire beams protection with the help of a spray protection. This will ensure that the fatality that was caused in this building will not occur in another building. First Interstate Bank, Los Angeles This is a building a 262 m tall with a story of 62 office floor. The fire occurred on May 4th, 1988 in which the fire started in the 12th Floor and it spread upwards in the other four floors. The fire lasted for approximately three and half hours. The building structure is steel with lightweight concrete slabs which are on a profiled steel deck. The floor area of the building is an area of 1,626 meters square with central service. The central service supported the lifts and the staircase shaft. On the other hand, the external cladding is made of aluminum and glass (Kleane 2007 p. 13). The alarms detectors delayed to go off and delayed the calling of the fire fighting and the fire brigade. The fire spread upwards leaving alone the passenger lift lobby which is in the central core. The fire spread up through the gaps that were between the floors and the external cladding up to the 16th floor. Two floors were adversely affected at each single time when the fire gutted the floors (Craighead 2003 p. 56). Additionally, heat and smoke seeped vertically through the openings of the floor, pressurized stairwell and even the lift shafts. On the 27th floor, a minor fire occurred which was ignited by the fire products which escaped from the HVAC shaft. Luckily, this was easily self-extinguished because of the deficiency of oxygen in that floor. The main structural members were not damaged because of strategic application of the spayed fire protection that was installed in the steelwork. However, there were minimal damage to one of the secondary beam and a number of the floor decks. On the other hand, the non-structural damage that occurred included the external cladding that is between the 12th and 16th floors, horse pipe values collapsed causing water leaks which caused damages on floors that were below the 12th floor (Craighead 2003, p. 60). In this building poor fire management considerations were not put in place. Therefore, some recommendations that are suitable in this case includes improving the fire fighting measures e.g. the use of automotive sprinklers. Ensuring that the alarms are functioning and chances of causing delays are completely eliminated. Moreover, vertical compartment measures should be put in place. Additionally, the open floor span should be changed or cladding placed between the offices. Dongdu Commercial Building in Luoyang, China This is a four storey building that is located at Luoyang which is the capital city of the Henan in central province in China. It occurred in the Christmas period of 2000. The building is located at the commercial centre of Luoyang’s. The Dongdu building housed a supermarket complex, offices and specialty retailer’s shops. On the top floor was a discothèque which was unlicensed and was popular for the local populations. At the time of the incident the discotheque was hoisting a special disco to celebrate the Christmas (Chang 2001, p. 89). The incident killed a total of 309 people whom included mostly the refurbishing workers and teenagers who were in the discotheque. Additionally, the refurbishing of the building was illegal. The construction workers caused the fire to begin at the basement because of the dropping molten metal on the flannel rags and wooden furniture. The workers, after they saw the fire escaped without raising alarm (Lee 2000, p. 60). The workers who were situated in the 2nd and the 3rd floors plus the guests who were in the 4th floor were overcome by the smoke which traveled up stairwells. Whatever the causative of the fire, the fatality of the incident was pointed at poor safety standards. There were no sprinkler system, fire alarms and smoke detectors. Furthermore, there were no emergency exit; the exits for the disco were hidden while the other emergence exit was blocked by smoke. The fire fighters were not able to arrive at the location at the right time because of hindrance of stalls in the streets. The extents of the fire blaze prevented the firefighters from entering the basement. Moreover, the ladders that the firefighters came with were short and were not able to reach the upper floors. This made the firefighters to use cranes to rescue the people who were in the upper floors (Chang 2001, p. 92). The windows were small and it did not form an emergency exit for the people. The emergency door that was in the roof of the discotheque was locked. The elevators broke down because of failure of power. Moreover, the other roots and exits mostly in the 2nd and 3rd floors were blocked by construction merchandise and materials. In this scenario, the lessons that were learned included corruption apart from other breakage of laws that controlled construction. There was laxity in following the rules and developers using short cuts through corruptions to maneuver some rules. The escape route on the roof of the discothèque was locked and in real sense should be open. Furthermore, the right steps were not followed before repair works were carried out (Lee 2000, p. 61). In these cases there are various recommendations that are proposed. The government should eliminate laxity including corruption in the building industry. The laws, regulations and codes that manage construction should be followed and frequent checks should be commissioned. Fire prevention mechanisms like sprinklers and cladding materials should be development and encoded in the rules that supports structural engineering. Furthermore, building occupancy should be managed, for example the discotheque should have be put at a safer place rather than at the high building. King’s Cross Fire This is a fatal underground fire that occurred in London in November 18, 1987 which killed 31 people. It occurred in the King’s Cross St. Pancras which is a major interchange that is stationed in the London Underground. The station extended in two parts Metropolitan Lines and substation on the Circle and deep level tube station at the Piccadilly. The fire took place after it caught the escalator shaft which usually serves the Piccadilly Line. The fire burnt the entrances and the ticket hall of the station (deep-level tube). The escalator is traced back to the World War II and since then it has not been replaced. Moreover, the sides and steps of the escalator were built of wood which caused the quick and easy burning. Smoking was banned in this region and it is believed that the fire started because of disposal of a matchstick which fell on the running truck. The running track was covered by fibrous detritus and grease because it was not cleaned for some time. The fire flames were invisible and it was something like a false sense alarm because such problems had repeatedly occurred. At that time the fire was like a camp fire while other people who were in the station saw that the fire was small and it did not amount to hazardous extent. At the incident people assumed that fire cannot burn downwards which is contrary to the facts that radiation heat moves in any direction, embers dropping and the issue of ventilation that contributed in the rate of burning. The fire which began at the elevator flashed over and the room was filled by smoke and flames. Investigations that were carried later showed that there were charred wood on the sides when the passengers stood. This may be attributed to the chance that the passengers light and smoked cigarettes. Moreover, there were particles of papers; sweet wrappings, tickets and both human and rat hair, which are believed to have contributed to the fire incident. In this case the lessons that were learned included maintaining of the structures and ensuring that the rules that are legislated are followed to the later. There was slip in following the rules since smoking on the tunnels were banned two years before the fire incident. Cleaning and maintaining of the runway and even the escalators. In this scenario, some recommendations are that the runways and other paths of the building should be thoroughly cleaned and broken parts repaired. The wooden parts of the steps and side ways should be replaced with fire resistant materials and the ticket station should be fire proof. Furthermore, there should be no laxity in accomplishing the rules that are developed by the legislation bodies such as banning of smoking in specified locations. Conclusion There have been different fire scenarios. These fires have resulted into deaths and lose of lives and have affected socio-economic complications. The Windsor Tower Fire in Spain caused a lot of damage leading to completely demolition of the building. The building had two strong points the 12th and 17th floor which formed the technical floors. Refurbishment was going on and most of the floors that were covered by the refurbishment process was not affected that much. This fire is attributed to previous policies that guided the construction of buildings (Kirkley 1999, p. 347). The First Interstate Bank, Los Angeles was caused by an electrical problem that caused the 12th to 16th floor to burn. Large floor space, poor fire prevention measures and delay response from the fire bridge made the fire to spread fast. If there was presence of fire prevention measures and other means that could have retarded the fire, the damage could have been minimal. Dongdu Commercial Building in Luoyang is an example of a building that was brought down because of corruption and poor safety standards. It resulted in many people dying and property worthy millions of dollars been destroyed. Regulations were not followed while most of the activities that took place in this building were illegal. Closing of emergency exits was one of the contributing factors that lead to the death of many people and resulted in complexities during the firefighting intervention (Kirkley 1999, p. 346). The King’s Cross Fire in London was caused because of negligence of the rules and standards that are in building codes and local authority codes. Smoking is banned within the tunnels, maintenance and repairs has never been done on the runway tunnel. Following the regulations and laws that are in place ensures that such types of fires will be eliminated in the future. Bibliography Craighead, G., 2003. High Rise Security and Fire Life Safety. New York Publishers, New York. Chang, G., 2001. The Coming Collapse of China. Random House Publishers, Beijing. Howard, L. 2006. The Windsor Tower Fire Analysis. Structural Engineering Journal, 40(6), pp. 120 – 125. Hahn, M. 2003. Investigations on King’s Cross Fire. Fire Safety Journal, 39(12), pp. 90 – 93. Lee, J., 2000. The Consequences of Laxity Riles: Dongdu Commercial Building Fire. Chinese Journal, 78(16), pp. 56 – 64 Kleane, B., 2007. Structural Fire Fighting: Strategies and Tactics. Prentice Hall Publishers, New York. Kirkley, L., 1999. King’s Cross Fire Analysis. Journal of Structural Engineering, 13(6), pp. 345 – 361. Kumar, S. and Chitty, R. 1989. Fire Modeling and the King’s Cross fire investigation. Fire Safety Journal, 15(1), pp. 103-106. Osborne, M. 2005. Investigations on the Windsor Tower Fire Incident. Prentice Hall of Jakarta, Jakarta. Read More