Reasons and Lessons Learned from the Greatest Fire Incidents - Case Study Example

Name of the university Name of the university department Name of the student Registration number of the student The course number The course title The academic year of study Fire case studies Date of submission Signature of the student Name of the course lecturer or supervisor Declaration i…surname of student..other names of registration number—registration number of the student.. declare that this academic work entitled “fire case studies” is my own original work except as it has been cited in the reference section. This work has never before been published in any academic journal or magazine and has never been submitted for award of any degree or diploma in any university or college of higher learning. This work is not currently in candidature fro award of any certificate in any institution of learning. Signature of the student Academic year Date of submission Table of content Fire case studies 1 Declaration 2 The Methuen fire incident 9 Overview 9 Cause of the fire incident 9 Mechanism of spread of fire 9 Failure of measures to prevent the incident 9 Failure of measures to prevent spread of the fire 10 Lessons learned from the incident 10 References 11 Our lady of the angels school fire incident 11 Overview 11 Cause of the fire incident 11 Mechanism of spread of the fire 12 Failures of measures to prevent incident development 12 Failure of school to manage the incident 12 Lessons learned from the incident 13 Outcomes of the fire incident 13 References 13 Portable battery power supply hydrogen oxygen explosion incident 14 Overview 14 Cause of explosion incident 14 Mechanism of spread of the fire 14 Failure of measures to prevent the incident 14 Lessons learned from the battery power supply explosion 15 Outcomes of the battery power supply explosion 15 References 15 Magnesium dust explosion incident 16 Overview of the incident 16 Cause of the magnesium dust explosion 16 Mechanism of spread 16 Failure of measures to prevent the incident 16 Recommendations of fire investigation 17 Lessons learned from the incident 17 References 17 Hydrogen tube trailer explosion incident 18 Overview 18 Cause of the incident 18 Mechanism of spread 18 Events leading into the disaster 18 Failure of management to prevent disaster 19 Recommendations 19 Lessons learned from the incident 19 References 19 Sago mine disaster incident 20 Overview 20 Cause of the incident 20 Failure of efforts to rescue trapped mine employees 20 Failure of management to prevent the incident 21 Recommendations by incident investigation team 21 Lesson learned from the incident 21 References 22 Organic dust explosion incident 22 Overview 22 Cause of the incident 22 Mechanism of spread of the dust explosion 23 Failure of measures to prevent the disaster 23 Recommendations of the fire investigation report 23 Lesson learned from the incident 24 Reference 24 The Kentucky organic fire explosion incident 24 Overview of incident 24 Cause of the fire incident 25 Mechanism of spread of the fire 25 Failure of management to prevent occurrence of the fire 25 Recommendations to prevent future disaster 26 Lessons learned from the incident 26 References 27 The Albert city BLEVE incident 27 Overview of the incident 27 Cause of the incident 27 Mechanism of spread of the fire 27 Events after the pipeline was hit 28 Failures of measures to prevent the incident 28 Lessons learned from the incident 28 References 29 The Jahn Foundry Corporation phenolic resin dust explosion incident 29 Overview of the phenolic resin dust explosion 29 Cause of the incident 29 Mechanism of spread of phenolic resin dust explosion 29 Failure of measures to prevent the incident 30 Recommendations to prevent future disasters 30 Lessons learned from the incident 31 References 31 Declaration 2 Table of contents 3 The Methuen fire incident 5 Overview 5 Cause of the fire incident 5 Mechanism of spread of fire 5 Failure of measures to prevent the incident 5 Failure of measures to prevent spread of the fire 5 Lessons learned from the incident 5 References 6 Our lady of the angels school fire incident 6 Overview 6 Cause of the fire incident 6 Mechanism of spread of the fire 6 Failures of measures to prevent incident development 6 Failure of school to manage the incident 6 Lessons learned from the incident 6 Outcomes of the fire incident 7 References 7 Portable battery power supply hydrogen oxygen explosion incident 7 Overview 7 Cause of explosion incident 7 Mechanism of spread of the fire 7 Failure of measures to prevent the incident 7 Lessons learned from the battery power supply explosion 8 Outcomes of the battery power supply explosion 8 References 8 Magnesium dust explosion incident 8 Overview of the incident 8 Cause of the magnesium dust explosion 8 Mechanism of spread 8 Failure of measures to prevent the incident 8 Recommendations of fire investigation 9 Lessons learned from the incident 9 References 9 Hydrogen tube trailer explosion incident 9 Overview 9 Cause of the incident 9 Mechanism of spread 9 Events leading into the disaster 9 Failure of management to prevent disaster 10 Recommendations 10 Lessons learned from the incident 10 References 10 Sago mine disaster incident 10 Overview 10 Cause of the incident 10 Failure of efforts to rescue trapped mine employees 10 Failure of management to prevent the incident 11 Recommendations by incident investigation team 11 Lesson learned from the incident 11 References 11 Organic dust explosion incident 11 Overview 11 Cause of the incident 11 Mechanism of spread of the dust explosion 12 Failure of measures to prevent the disaster 12 Recommendations of the fire investigation report 12 Lesson learned from the incident 12 Reference 12 The Kentucky organic fire explosion incident 12 Overview of incident 12 Cause of the fire incident 12 Mechanism of spread of the fire 13 Failure of management to prevent occurrence of the fire 13 Recommendations to prevent future disaster 13 Lessons learned from the incident 13 References 13 The Albert city BLEVE incident 14 Overview of the incident 14 Cause of the incident 14 Mechanism of spread of the fire 14 Events after the pipeline was hit 14 Failures of measures to prevent the incident 14 Lessons learned from the incident 14 References 14 The Jahn Foundry Corporation phenolic resin dust explosion incident 15 Overview of the phenolic resin dust explosion 15 Cause of the incident 15 Mechanism of spread of phenolic resin dust explosion 15 Failure of measures to prevent the incident 15 Recommendations to prevent future disasters 15 Lessons learned from the incident 15 References 16 The Methuen fire incident Overview The fire incident occurred on 11th December 1995 at 2004 hours and resulted into injuries of 37 persons and destruction of 1,000,000 square feet of manufacturing space, six fire fighter sustained minor injuries, 1700 residents were evacuated from their homes, 27 civilians were injured of whom 12 sustained serious burns (United States Fire Administration staff and Varley Campbell Associates Inc.). Cause of the fire incident The fire incident was caused by an explosion that ignited firer in the processing area of the first floor of Monomac building Mechanism of spread of fire The fire was fanned by wind that was moving at forty miles per hour and presence of easily combustible materials like wood that had been used in the construction. The inter-building distance was very small that paved way for inter-building spread of fire. Failure of measures to prevent the incident Semi-trailers had been parked to act as additional storage facilities that caught fire and also restricted access to building by the fire rescue service. The fire sprinkler system for Monomac, process and Acadia mill buildings were all interconnected meaning collapse of a sprinkler system in one meant all the others were not functional. There were also no fire and rescue service connection to the buildings. The buildings were not fire compartments which could have restricted spread of fire. Failure of measures to prevent spread of the fire The planning of the buildings was not sufficient and didn’t meet modern standards recommended for inter-building distances. The sprinkler system of Monomac building collapsed after explosion. Lessons learned from the incident There is need for preparing fire emergency plans for buildings that could be used for safe exit from the building. The buildings should be fire protected subject to presence of active fire protection and passive fire protection. Enough fire fighting resources are required to suppress fire from developing in its early stages of development. The building should have fire management plans that allow for escalation of incident from a minor incident to a major incident. There is need for development of new strategies to address fire protection of a building in the event the sprinkler system fails. These measures and strategies should factor fire as a structural load in the building. Fire departments are supposed to have active role in preventing occurrence of fire incidents and enforcing compliance with fire safety codes and regulations. References United States Fire Administration Staff and Varley Campbell and Associates, Inc (n.d.) Manufacturing mills fire, Methuen, Massachusetts: Industrial complex in Methuen, Massachusetts. Retrieved on 7th May 2009 from http://www.interfire.org/res_file/pdf/Tr-110.pdf Our lady of the angels school fire incident Overview The fire incident occurred on 1st December 1958 at 1400 hours at the base of a stairway in our lady of the angels school that located between 909 north Avers Avenue (Kuenster, J. 2008) and Humboldt Park on the western side of Chicago(Cowan & Kuenster 1996).. The fire incident claimed lives of 932 pupils, 3 nuns and injured many pupils (McBride, M. 1979). Cause of the fire incident The fire incident resulted from an arson attack by one of the students of our lady of the angels school (McBride, M. 1979; Kuenster, J. 2008). Mechanism of spread of the fire The spread of the fire was propagated by presence of combustible materials like cardboards and the floor had been coated with flammable petroleum base paints. The pupils had hanged their coats on the hookers on the stairway that provided combustible materials(McBride, M. 1979. Failures of measures to prevent incident development The floor had been painted with petroleum based paints that fanned spread of fire. The building didn’t’ have cavity barriers that could have stopped movement of flames and smoke into other rooms (Kuenster, J. 2008). The building was not equipped with active fire protection like smoke detectors and heat detectors. The fire alarm was not able to automatically call the fire brigade (McBride, M. 1979. The windows were not fire resistant and increased ventilation that helped in spread of fire and toxic fumes. Failure of school to manage the incident The school had only one fire escape. The school building was not equipped with rate of fire heat detectors (Cowan & Kuenster 1996). The school didn’t have a direct alarm to the fire and rescue service. Lessons learned from the incident The building should have rate of rise heat detectors that should be able to automatically call the fire department (Cowan & Kuenster 1996). The floor of building should not be painted with petroleum based paints. Every public utility should have more than one emergency exit points (McBride, M. 1979) and building should have many fire emergency exits. Outcomes of the fire incident The incident stimulated changes in school fire safety regulation that was enacted countrywide (Cowan & Kuenster 1996).16500 schools older schools in the USA were brought to comply with the new legislation within one year of the incident. The incident stimulated a mandatory requirement for installation of a fire alarm box in front of the schools (Cowan & Kuenster 1996). References Cowan, D. & Kuenster, J (1996) To sleep with the angels: the story of the fire Chicago, Ivan R. Dee Kuenster, J. (2008) Remembrances of the angels: 50th anniversary reminiscences of the fire no one can forget, Chicago, Ivan R. Dee. McBride, M. (1979) The fire that will not die. Palm springs, CA, ETC publications march 2009. Retrieved on 7th may 2009 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/our_lady_of_the_angels_school_fire Portable battery power supply hydrogen oxygen explosion incident Overview The fire incident occurred in a government facility and claimed life of one person and injured the second (H2incidents 2007). Cause of explosion incident The hydrogen-oxygen incident was caused by arcing of the switch that triggered explosion (H2incidents 2007). Mechanism of spread of the fire The hydrogen-oxygen explosion was instant after arcing ignition (H2incidents 2007). Failure of measures to prevent the incident The technicians lacked training on battery safety charging procedures. The design and fabrication of the battery power supply was not safe and didn’t factor battery safety charging regulations. The battery lacked automatic venting ability and battery’s inert gas purging was not accounted for into the battery box. The battery switches with arcing contacts had been built into the box (H2incidents 2007). Lessons learned from the battery power supply explosion When a battery is undergoing charging, electrolysis occurs and produces hydrogen and oxygen gases in stoichiometric ratios of 2:1 for hydrogen and oxygen respectively. Lack of venting system leads into accumulation of the gas mixture whose pressure increases as electrolysis continues. The battery box had polarized power sockets and switches were operable from outside but were sealed from the interior of the box which meant that putting on would have triggered a spark that could have resulted into hydrogen-oxygen explosion. There is need to eliminate sparking devices that could bring about arcing that can set up hydrogen-oxygen explosion. The charging operations of a battery should be ventilated and there should be provision for inerting gas as battery pressurization methods (H2incidents 2007). Outcomes of the battery power supply explosion The incident stimulated revision of battery safety manuals so that information may be included for safe battery handling and foster safe battery operation practices (H2incidents 2007). References H2incidents (2007) incident report: Portable battery power supply explosion. Retrieved on 7th may 2009 from http://www.h2incidents.org/incident.asp?icn=136 Magnesium dust explosion incident Overview of the incident The magnesium dust explosion incident occurred on 1st august 2001 at 1701 hours in Ohira, Miyagi, Japan at an electronic parts factory. The explosion originated in a steel pipe that linked collection dust mould and inert dust collector. Flames of fire emerged from the pipe hole and magnesium dust ignited resulting into explosion subject to dispersion of the magnesium alloy dust. Cause of the magnesium dust explosion The incident was caused by static electric charge ignition that resulted into hydrogen oxygen explosion. Mechanism of spread The spread of the incident was propagated by dispersion of magnesium alloy dust. Failure of measures to prevent the incident There was failure to adhere with safety procedures for handling magnesium alloy powder which was evident by presence of moisture. Magnesium reacts exothermically with moisture to produce hydrogen gas which can explode when exposed to oxygen and source of ignition like poor measures to prevent static electric discharge. It is clear that hazards related to magnesium reaction with water, water vapor or moisture were not understood. The management did not ensure sufficient cleaning of hidden sections where magnesium dust could have accumulated. There were also poor hazard prevention communications in the organization subject to lack of training on chemical properties of reactive metals with water, water vapor or moisture. Recommendations of fire investigation Magnesium alloy dust should not be exposed to moisture and there should be measures to clean all hidden locations. Sufficient earthing of static charges should be done. Lessons learned from the incident Magnesium reacts exothermically with moisture and there is need to inject large quantities of water as this has effect of preventing dispersion of magnesium alloy powder. There should be measures to ensure earthing of every portion where static charges may accumulate. Adequate cleaning of all portions where dust may accumulate should be carried out. There should be relevant safety awareness to mitigate risks of chemical explosions. References Ritcu, D. (n.d.) Explosion and fire of magnesium dust at an exterior frame production plant for mobile telephones. Retrieved from http://shippai.jst.go.jp/en/detail?fn=0&id=cc1200085& Hydrogen tube trailer explosion incident Overview The hydrogen tube trailer explosion following unauthorized fabrication and installation of an adapter that was meant to connect a hydrogen tube trailer manifold to an oxygen tube trailer in a facility for filling compressed gas cylinders for various gases that included hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen and helium (H2incidents 2007). Cause of the incident The incident was cause by ignition that occurred in the manifold piping system (H2incidents 2007). Mechanism of spread After primary ignition, a combustion front moved into the hydrogen tube where deflagration transitioned into a detonation that resulted into the rupture of the tube (H2incidents 2007). Events leading into the disaster A technician performed faulty modification of the multi gas piping manifold that made it possible for hydrogen gas and oxygen gas to mix paving way forward for storage tube explosion. The technician’s improper purging procedures resulted into flow of oxygen gas into a partially filled hydrogen tube (H2incidents 2007). Failure of management to prevent disaster The management failed to institute procedures for carrying out any fabrication on the equipment and that was indicator of poor management practices with regard to safety compliance. The management didn’t ensure sufficient supervision of all activities in the facility (H2incidents 2007). Recommendations The management should have ensured that the employees had adequate safety knowledge to carry out any modifications. There should be liaison between employees and their supervisors and supervisors should be aware of any procedural activities that are going on in the facility (H2incidents 2007). Lessons learned from the incident Employees should have safety training and be properly supervised. The employees should comply with established policies and procedures of carrying out any fabrication and modifications of the piping systems (H2incidents 2007). References H2incidents (2007): Hydrogen tube trailer explosion. Retrieved on 7th may 2009 from http://www.h2incidents.org/incident.asp?inc=135 Sago mine disaster incident Overview The Sago mine explosion incident occurred in a coal mine on 2nd January 2006 in Sago, West Virginia in USA. The incident was brought about by explosion of mixture of methane gas and carbon monoxide which are all oxidizable. The explosion occurred at 0630 hours and led into death of 12 mine employees (wikipedia). Cause of the incident The incident was caused by ignition of methane and carbon monoxide mixture in the coal mine (wikipedia). Failure of efforts to rescue trapped mine employees The coal mine company didn’t make efforts to call rescue teams until it was past 0804 hours which was one and half hour after incident had occurred. This was indicator of laxity to safe lives and poor management practices towards ensuring health and safety. The coal mine rescue team wasted time testing carbon monoxide and methane levels before proceeding into the mine and testing hazards like water seeps, explosive gas concentrations, unsafe roofing conditions that resulted into very slow progression into the mine that was recorded at 1000 feet per hour (wikipedia). Failure of management to prevent the incident The management didn’t ensure the roof supporting system complied with required standards. The mine employees had observed gas pockets in the mine and their gas detectors confirmed the gas pockets to have had high concentrations of methane. The management didn’t make efforts to address the situations. The management didn’t carry routine inspection of oxygen pack for the employee to ensure they were functional. The coal mine violated regulations on mine safety and health administration (MSHA) by failing to act on 208 recommendations to improve its safety status. The management failed to act towards controlling concentration of methane gas in the mine as well as demonstrate efforts to ensure shafts had no possibility of collapsing (wikipedia). Recommendations by incident investigation team The management should have provided for emergency planning by providing means for emergency escape from the mine. The management should have ensured compliance with recommended roof control and mine ventilation (wikipedia). Lesson learned from the incident The management should act on any reports of gas pockets that could affect health and safety of its employees. It is duty of the management to provide emergency escape from mines in the event of incidents. The roof support systems of coal mines should meet recommended structural regulations and should not be prone to collapse (wikipedia). References Wikipedia (n.d.) mine safety and health information. Retrieved on 7th may 2009 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/mine_safety_and_health_administration Organic dust explosion incident Overview The organic dust explosion occurred in North Carolina pharmaceutical plant on January 2003 and claimed lives of six including two fire fighters and injured 38 persons. The polyethylene dust explosion damaged the pharmaceutical plant, nearby business premises, a nearby home and school (Directorate of standards and guidance, office of safety systems, US department of labor and occupational safety health administration 2005). Cause of the incident The incident was caused by thermostatic ignition of combustible polyethylene dust (Directorate of standards and guidance, office of safety systems, US department of labor and occupational safety health administration 2005). Mechanism of spread of the dust explosion The dust explosion was spread by presence of suspended and dispersed polyethylene finely divided dust Failure of measures to prevent the disaster There was poor hazard risk assessment with respect to managing dispersion of polyethylene finely divided dust. There was laxity to ensure cleanliness of the facility was optimum including hidden sections that polyethylene dust had accumulated (Directorate of standards and guidance, office of safety systems, US department of labor and occupational safety health administration 2005). Recommendations of the fire investigation report The US Chemical safety and hazard investigation board recommended provision in national fire protection association standard NFPA 654 “standard for the prevention of fire and dust explosion from the manufacturing, processing and handling of combustible particulate solids and recommended formal adoption of the NFPA standard by the state of North Carolina (Directorate of standards and guidance, office of safety systems, US department of labor and occupational safety health administration 2005). Lesson learned from the incident Accumulation of combustible polyethylene dust has potential to trigger dust explosion. The management should ensure all measures are in place to prevent occurrence of dust explosion by complying with NFPA 654 regulation (Directorate of standards and guidance, office of safety systems, US department of labor and occupational safety health administration 2005). Reference Directorate of standards and guidance, office of safety systems, US department of labor and occupational safety health administration (2005) Combustible dust in industry: preventing and mitigating the effects of fire and explosion. Safety and health bulletin; Retrieved on 7th may 2009 from http://www.osha.gov/dts/shib/shib073105.html The Kentucky organic fire explosion incident Overview of incident The fire incident occurred in Kentucky acoustics insulation manufacturing plant on February 2003 and led into deaths of 7 persons and injured over 37 (Chemical safety and hazard investigation board (CSB) (2004, September). Cause of the fire incident It was caused by a small fire that was left unattended in an oven that inginted a organic dust cloud that had been created by a close line cleaning exercise that was going on (Chemical safety and hazard investigation board (CSB) (2004, September). Mechanism of spread of the fire The primary explosion triggered a secondary explosion of dispersed dust cloud of finely divided organic dust throughout the acoustic insulation manufacturing plant (CashDolar, K.L. 2000; Chemical safety and hazard investigation board (CSB) (2004, September). Failure of management to prevent occurrence of the fire The management didn’t ensure there was sufficient organic dust hazard risk assessment in the Kentucky plant. There was laxity in communicating organic dust hazards to the employees who could have implemented fire safety standards in the plant (CashDolar, K.L. 2000; Chemical safety and hazard investigation board (CSB) (2004, September). The maintenance practices in the plant were not sufficient to prevent occurrence of the dust explosion incident (Chemical safety and hazard investigation board (CSB) (2004, September). Recommendations to prevent future disaster The plant should have a dust collection system and filters and the plant should not have surfaces that can lead into accumulation of dust particles that are important elements for combustion to be initiated (CashDolar, K.L. 2000). The plant should use cleaning methods that do not lead into dispersion of dust particles and if vacuum cleaners are used, they should be approved vacuum cleaners for dust collection (Chemical safety and hazard investigation board (CSB) (2004, September). Lessons learned from the incident There should be measures to control elements that trigger primary dust explosion like removing safely combustible dust which acts as fuel during dust explosion (Chemical safety and hazard investigation board (CSB) (2004, September). The ignition source for dust explosion should be identified as a risk hazard and measures put in place to prevent prevalence of the observed risk. There should be measures in place to manage dispersion of dust particles and to lower dust concentration which is vital component for secondary explosions of finely divided dust particles (Chemical safety and hazard investigation board (CSB) (2004, September). The management should ensure there are measures to control escape of dust particles from the equipment or ventilation system. Routine dust accumulation should be done to remove combustible dust particles (CashDolar, K.L. 2000) References Chemical safety and hazard investigation board (CSB) (2004, September) investigation report: CTAAcoustics, Inc, combustible dust fire explosions CSB Washington DC. CashDolar, K.L. (2000) Overview of dust explosibility characteristics. Journal of loss prevention in the process industry, V. 13, pp 183-199 The Albert city BLEVE incident Overview of the incident The boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) occurred in Albert city, Iowa on 9th April 1998 at 2310 hours in a turkey farm. The incident led into deaths of two fire fighters and seven other persons were injured (NFPA fire investigation n.d) Cause of the incident The incident was caused by ignition of propane vapor that was leaking after it was hit by two teenagers riding an all terrain vehicle (NFPA fire investigation n.d) Mechanism of spread of the fire The nearby buildings had wooden construction that was combustible. Secondary explosion resulted following explosion of the LP tank that broke LP tank into pieces. The broken pieces flew in all directions (NFPA fire investigation n.d) Events after the pipeline was hit The incident was caused by two teenagers riding an all terrain vehicle that hit a pipeline that transported liquid propane from an 180000 gallon tank. There was propane gas leak that resulted into a propane could that exploded after ignition (NFPA fire investigation n.d) Failures of measures to prevent the incident There was no protection of the piping system of propane which could have prevented strike of the piping system. There was impingement on the tank that made the LP tank shell to weaken and eventually fail. There was also direct exposure to flame of the LP tank that was responsible for the secondary explosion that broke the LP tank into pieces (NFPA fire investigation n.d) Lessons learned from the incident The piping system of propane should be protected from any incident that could break them. There should be enough water supply to help in cooling the LP tank and reduce chances of the LP tank weakening that could result into secondary explosion (NFPA fire investigation n.d) References NFPA fire investigation (n.d.) BLEVE (Boiling liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion) retrieved on 7th may 2009 from Http://ncsp.tamu.edu/reports/NFPA/vapor_explosion.htm The Jahn Foundry Corporation phenolic resin dust explosion incident Overview of the phenolic resin dust explosion The incident took place at 1504 hours on 25th February 1999 at Jahn Foundry Coporations in Springfield, MA. The incident resulted into 3 person suffering fatal injuries and 9 others suffering minor injuries (Exponent engineering and scientific consulting, n.d). Cause of the incident The incident was caused by ignition of phenolic resin dust that had been dislodged from the overheat exhaust duct (Exponent engineering and scientific consulting, n.d). Mechanism of spread of phenolic resin dust explosion Deflagration and phenolic dust explosion was augmented by availability of resin rich deposits of phenolic dust that was present in the exhaust duct. The secondary phenolic resin dust explosion was triggered by phenolic dust deposits on the horizontal surface of the upper level of shell mold building (Exponent engineering and scientific consulting, n.d). Failure of measures to prevent the incident The management didn’t ensure sufficient cleaning of hidden sections where exposable dust was accumulating. There were no efforts to indicate communication of hazards related to phenolic resin dust explosion subject to measures to ensure phenolic resin dust explosion risk assessment. The management didn’t train its staff on safety procedures to prevent occurrence of phenolic resin dust explosion. There was lack of awareness of phenolic resin dust explosion among the employees of Jahn Foundry company. The management didn’t comply with NFPA 654 regulation (Exponent engineering and scientific consulting, n.d) Recommendations to prevent future disasters There should be cleaning of all surfaces where there is likelihood of phenolic resin dust accumulation. The exhaust duct should be cleaned and kept free of any phenolic resin dust accumulation. The management should ensure employees are properly supervised to ensure there is no dispersion of phenolic resin dust during cleaning which can be a predisposing factor for secondary phenolic resin dust explosion (Exponent engineering and scientific consulting, n.d). Lessons learned from the incident The manufacturing and processing companies should comply with NFPA 654 regulation on ‘standards for the prevention of fire and dust explosion from the manufacturing, processing and handling of combustible particulate solids. Relevant training on dust safety should be provided to employees (Exponent engineering and scientific consulting, n.d) References Exponent engineering and scientific consulting (n.d.) phenolic resin dust ecxplosion. Retrieved on 7th may 2009 from http://www.exponent.com/phenolic-resin-dust-explosion/ Read More