Jean Charles De Menezes Incident and the Impact It Has Had on Policing - Case Study Example

Policing Practice Name: Institution: Professor: Course: Date of Submission: Policing Practice A Review of The Jean Charles De Menezes Incident and the Impact It Has Had on Policing Introduction and Background Information In policing practice, the idea of a person’s innocence until proved guilty is important (Bailey, 2008). Ideally, a suspect is only proved guilty after the court of law, having been given a chance to defend themselves and state their side of the story. For one to be pronounced guilty as charged, all the factors and indicators should point to that fact. Everything should be proved beyond any reasonable doubt (Beck, 2002). The suspects also ought to be given fair and just treatment. This is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights within the UN charter that is in turn translated in most countries’ constitutions (Bailey, 2008). However, with the existing threats to security systems in the world, the police operations have changed. In the wake of rampant terrorist attacks, the security systems have adopted ways that may not guarantee the suspects’ right to justice. As such, the policing practice has seen the introduction and/or adoption of such medieval operations like the shoot-to-kill. This has been particularly necessitated by the present day terrorism threats and attacks worldwide (Beck, 2002). With the risk of the attacks, the police and other security systems have taken on measures which in some cases result to disastrous consequences such as killing of the innocent people. This paper reviews the case of Jean Charles de Menezes, a Brazilian citizen who was shot dead on July 22nd by the UK’s London Metropolitan police services. A day afterward, it turned out that the victim had been a mistaken identity (Bailey, 2008). The paper focuses on the incident and the impact it has had on policing. With the subsequent public outcry, the UK government had to move in and take a number of steps to institute changes. The changes were made in the shoot to kill practice also called Operation Kratos (Bailey, 2008). Since its inception, the Operation Kratos aimed at dealing with terrorist risks within the UK. Literature Review On 7th July 2005, there occurred random bombings in the UK, what came to be called the London bombings of 7 July 2005. In the incident, 56 people lost their lives (BBC News, 2007). These terrorist attacks, coupled with the threats of more attacks got the security personnel under tight schedule in trying to chase the suspects, and at the same time prevent any possible attacks as earlier on tipped off. The security teams, including the surveillance team, worked round the clock to bring culprits to book whoever they were. Two weeks after the first bombings, there were fresh threats about possible terrorist attacks. The plans by the attackers failed and the chase began. Approximated four men believed to have been the masterminds behind the failed bombings, were on the run as a result of the intensified police manhunt. The suspects were believed to be residing in the same block that coincidentally Jean Charles de Menezes was staying (BBC News, 2007). The residence was put under surveillance and on the day of Jean Charles de Menezes’ shooting, the cameras captured him leaving the block. The police undercover pursued him to the Stockwell Tube Station on the London Underground. Without much ado, the police reportedly fired eight times into his head, leaving him dead (BBC News, 2007). The incident attracted a lot of attention and controversy. The police reported that one of the suspected bombers had been shot dead. The media reported the incident, but with contradicting information about whether indeed Jean Charles de Menezes was among the suspects that were being sought for by the police. A day later, the police issued regret that the man they took down was a mistaken identity (BBC News, 2007). It sparked intense criticisms with fingers pointing at the security system including the surveillance team, armed debriefing team and the firearms team that were tasked to handle the operation. Aftermath of the Shooting Days after the police shooting, the BBC quoted the Scotland Yard as saying that Jean Charles de Menezes was an innocent man (BBC News, 2007). The Scotland Yard indicated that Jean Charles de Menezes was not in any way linked to the London bombings or the threats. The investigative team apologized for such disastrous incident terming it as a “tragedy”. This marked protests by his family and public in Brazil. It forced The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) to set up inquiries into the case. The two inquiries were dubbed the Stockwell 1 and the Stockwell 2 (BBC News, 2007). It was unfortunate from the reports by the two inquiries that the police officers implicated in the murder would not be held responsible for their actions (Bennetto, Milmo & Sengupta, 2005). However, the stock well 2 came out strongly to condemn the way the police was structured as well as its communication systems. Days later, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Ian Blair stepped aside. In November 1st 2007, the police service was found guilty in the case and was heavily fined in compensation of the Menezes death (Bennetto, Milmo & Sengupta, 2005). The case dragged on for months and later years. Every step revealed more and more about the innocence of the victim and the negligence by the police in their failed attempt to curb terrorism and at the same time assure suspects of their right to justice (Fresco, 2007). The Menezes incident became of interest to the media, Muslim Council of Britain and the human rights activists as it regards the policing practice. A number of issues came out clear about the blunders that the police service was involved in while handling the suspects (Fresco, 2007). It was apparent from the review of the Jean Charles de Menezes incident, that his was a case of extra-judicial killing (Fresco, 2007). The London Metropolitan Police Service was faulted for merely applying the Operation Kratos, to shoot down an innocent man. It was discovered that Jean Charles de Menezes was merely mistaken because of his looks (Fresco, 2007). The police paid too much attention to Menezes face and his actions. According to the police understanding, as per the shoot-to-kill-to-protect approach, anybody who looks or behaves in a way to imply that they are guilty or anxious and therefore potential risk, will be shot and killed. According to the last surveillance message, the “suspect” looked tensed and guilty (Fresco, 2007). In this case, the police are said to have focused more on the impending risk or potential of a suicide bomb attack, to wrongly judge, shoot and kill Jean Charles de Menezes. However, according to the statuettes of the law and the correct policing practice, “a man is innocent until proved guilty beyond any reasonable doubt in a court of law” (Beck, 2002). It was obvious that the victim was never accorded an opportunity to defend himself against the allegations that he was a terrorist. Additionally, never was he offered a chance to say who he was and his mission at Stockwell Tube Terminal. The matter therefore arose about the fairness in the Operation Kratos. As per the law, even the guilty deserve a fair and just trial. Should Menezes surrender himself as a terrorist, he still deserved a better treatment as a suspect or victim. The Operation Kratos Operation Kratos is a term used to refer to an array of approaches used by the police service all over the UK to deal with the present day terrorist attacks (Aradau & Van Munster, 2007). Since its inception after the September 11 terrorist attacks in America, the policy has seen sharp criticisms as well as applause. According to the police services, including the Metropolitan Police Service, this method will help in shielding the public from possible mass killings as a result of terrorist attacks. The operation Kratos will therefore avert any attacks from a suicide bomber either as a pedestrian or on board in the trains or buses (Aradau & Van Munster, 2007). In essence then, according to the police system, the policy does not in any way involve shoot-to-kill, as claimed by many. According to the police, there is need for swift action, because the suspects are usually ready to detonate the bombs that would result to mass destruction and deaths. The policy argues that the high risk of the suspect detonating on sensing the police presence nearby is what could be a likely motivation for them to shoot on seeing (Aradau & Van Munster, 2007). However, according to the procedures, this action is rare. The officers in operation will be held accountable of the actions they undertake, as per the law. The operation should be in accordance to the Criminal Law Act, 1967 (part III). The policy should not in any way be used based on prejudice or racial profiling. Weaknesses in the Operation Kratos A review of the Jean Charles de Menezes incident reveals a number of weaknesses in the processes and procedures in the implementation of the Operation Kratos. For the police to act there should have been public reports of a suspicious person which in this case did not happen. The firearms squad acted on the scanty information provided by the surveillance crew. Up to the time of the murder, the police were literally vague about the surveillance report images and hence the identity of Menezes (Aradau & Van Munster, 2007). Another thorny issue became why the officers did not face criminal charges even when they were supposed to. Operation Kratos allows for officers to take responsibility and be held accountable of their actions during its execution. Both the two query teams did not find the officers guilty of any offence. Again, according to eye witnesses, the police service was accused of deviating from the norm (Aradau & Van Munster, 2007). There were arguments that such drastic measures, as witnessed in the firearms squad, must have been as a result of orders to kill from top authorities. Owing to these accusations and the storm surrounding Menezes killing, the operation Kratos was put under review. In 2007, the policy’s soubriquet "Operation Kratos" was annulled marking a significant change in the policing practice. (Aradau & Van Munster, 2007). Stockwell 1 and Stockwell 2 Findings Findings from Stockwell 1 and Stockwell 2 as reported by The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) revealed disturbing scenario about the weaknesses in the policing practice (Glendinning, 2008). Issues raised included the concern as to whether the officers in control on the day of the shooting, effectively performed their roles as it was required. It was also of interest to the inquiries, to establish if the communication channels and the command structures were adequate for the officers to act in response to the case appropriately (Glendinning, 2008). In addition, there was concern as to whether the officers in the various units in the operation, particularly the firearms units, were aware of their mission. Again, whether the desirable teamwork was optimum was another issue of worry to the commission (Glendinning, 2008). Results from the Stockwell 1 and Stockwell 2 as done by The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) highlighted a staggering 19 key areas with weaknesses in the policing practice within the UK. This was particularly in regard to fighting of terrorism. The commission then made recommendations to Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC). The HMIC would then carry out frequent assessment about the progress realized by the stated agencies of policing. The main issue of great concern was the Command and Control as well as the concern about inter-operability. The two issues were prioritized because according to the reports of the two inquiries, they contributed most to the tragedy that resulted to the shooting of the Jean Charles de Menezes. They were therefore matters of national interest. They directly touched on public trust related issues with the Metropolitan Police Service. The Command and Control as well as inter-operability of the units on the ground at the time of the shooting were highly criticized. It was argued that the firearms officers could not certainly carry out the operation since the surveillance team could not at that moment give a definite identity of the man being pursued. As a result, there have been suggested changes to the police system regarding the two elements. First, the commission investigating the incident suggested for the establishment of a new Counter-Terrorism Control Room. It has been in use for years now, although as per the last review, it was not entirely functional. In addition, there have been efforts in the integration and use of IT support. This way, the police force hopes to reduce chances of misidentification of suspects as it was the case with de Menezes. The misidentification was partly due to the miscommunication on the ground. The commission of inquiry faulted the operation of July 22nd for lack of proper inter-operability among the units. Following the commission’s report, communications within the force has been enhanced. This was made possible through the establishment of the Covert Airwave technique. Alternatively, the commission’s report oversaw the inception of the National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA). The two functions have brought about better communication among the units during operations. The units were accused of ineptitude during the operation that saw Mr. Menezes erroneously shot dead. As a result, the commission recommended that there be retraining procedures within the forces (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008). Consequently, there have been efforts in training of the officers in all fields for new skills. The Metropolitan Police Service has also introduced a new method for Firearms Commanders to replace the initial in-house technique. The commission pointed out that the police units need more skills in: investigation, change organization, joint working, communication, intelligence gathering, IT and threat managing. They also need better skills in inspection, cooperation and practical areas (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008). In April 2009, a special single Surveillance Command came into operation as part of the reform agenda within the police. The commission also recommended the establishment and/or purchase of the photo-imagery structure. Mr. Menezes was shot by mistaken identity because the images that were relayed to the firearms team did not substantively identify the person in pursuit. The new technology in the photo-imagery structure would ensure such mishaps do not occur in future. To further enhance inter-operability between the firearms and the surveillance teams, the commission agitated for Standard Terms. Since then, the two units have come up with a glossary that would be used by both units during operations. This aims at reducing the chances of misunderstanding and avoids possible mistakes as it was the case with Mr. Menezes. Appraisal of the Proposed Changes On the general, there has been effort to institute police reforms and change the policing practice after the Jean Charles de Menezes incident. The government through The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) moved in to investigate likely loopholes within the units after the tragedy. The government acted on the realization that public trust was important for the success of the war on terrorism (Foucault, 2003). Much as the Metropolitan Police Service was tasked with combating terrorism, the public was not sure whether the unit would carry out this duty and at the same time assure them of their safety during such operations (Foucault, 2003). On the whole therefore, the idea of police reforms was a positive one. However, this does not mean everything has been exhaustively done. According to the reviews so far done, some of the proposed changes have stagnated with no definite deadline of completion (Epstein, 2007). This lack of specificity would undermine the momentum and urgency that the changes call for. A good example of such projects is the proposed counter-terrorism room. A challenge is given to the stakeholders to speed up the rate at which these projects are implemented in order to achieve timely results. Should the changes stall, or take too long to be implemented, there is the risk of reoccurrence of the same mistakes as before (Epstein, 2007). With the upcoming Olympic Games, there is particular need for the government to step in and act fast. In order to win the war against terrorism, the government must first win the public trust and assure them of their safety by listening to the suggestions and demands as put forth by the public (Foucault, 2003). Conclusion By law, a person is innocent until proved guilty beyond any reasonable doubt by a court of law. Even after being found guilty, the victim has a right to fair judgment. Similarly, the suspect has the right to defend himself or herself before the court. The suspect has the right to be heard. In the wake of terrorism however, this fundamental ideology in law seems to be poured down the drain. It has been noted that the terrorist attacks are done by individuals who are ready to die and cause mass murder and mass destruction. With the bombs around them, they move while ready to detonate them at any time. After the September 11 attacks in the U.S., the U.K government established the Operation Kratos. This combination of tactics was meant to curb the ever-changing style of terrorist attack, especially by suicide bombers. Under this policy, the units in operation, on sensing possible detonation, and therefore harm to the public, could shoot the suspect without prior identification or questioning. It is in such circumstances, that Jean Charles de Menezes was shot dead on July 22nd 2005. A day after, the Scotland Yard regrets for taking down an innocent man thereby sparking off sharp criticisms from the media and the public. The pressure saw the government launch investigation into the matter. Through The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), the incident was investigated and a report given. The adoption of the report led to a number of changes in how the policing practice is now done, since the Jean Charles de Menezes incident. This paper gave a review of the Jean Charles de Menezes incident and the impact it has had on policing. The paper discussed the outcomes of the Stockwell 1 and Stockwell 2 as suggested by The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). 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