Essays on The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System Coursework

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The paper "The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System" is an engrossing example of coursework on management.   The investigator's role in any investigated incident is to evidence collection, evidence analyses, to draw conclusions founded on evidence, and develop recommendations from those conclusions. Regarding the investigation role, it can be developed to eliminate the chances of the same accidents from happening or allocate blame or liability. The majority of marine equipment does have management systems that are electronically capable of recording information resulting in growing and large availability of evidence sources.

According to Senders and Moray, there exist various models of accident process such as Heinrich’ s original domino theory and model of Swiss-cheese (87). The description of cheese holes was done by utilization of the original framework referred to as the Taxonomy of unsafe operations created using more than 300 accidents of naval aviation acquired from the US Naval safety center. The initial taxonomy from that time has been refined utilizing data and input from various military and organization of civilians. According to Douglas, this led to the emerging of Human Factors Analysis and Classification Systems (HFACS) (3).

There have been various accident investigations carried out and one example is the accident that involved an Italian tanker, Attilio levels. On 3 June 2004, the double-hulled chemical tanker Attilio level grounded on Lymington Banks in the west of Solent. The tanker loaded with styrene and toluene experienced indentation of the bottom plate but no hull penetration. There was no pollution or injuries reported from the accident. Vessel Specifications and Accident Scenario The chemical/oil tanker Attilio Levoli built-in 1995 was registered under the ownership of Italian company, Marnavi S. p.a (Marine Accident Investigation Branch 2).

The company was under the management of Marnavi and the port of registry of the vessel was Naples. Attilio Levoli was constructed in Ancona and its type is a chemical tanker, IMO type II. Its classification society was Registro Italiano Navale and Bureau Veritas (dual classification). Its overall length was 11.5m with a loaded draft of 6.5m aft. The gross tonnage was 4450 with an oil engine geared drive to a single screw. Its service speed was 14 knots with controllable pitch propeller and bow thruster. In 1445, the pilot boarded the vessel and shared the voyage with the master.

The pilot knew that vessel was to depart through the east Solent but the master instructed him to change plan and use the shorter route, west of Solent in order to proceed to Barcelona. Attilio Levoli was cleared of the berth at 1500. The master, chief engineer, the pilot, and cadet were inside the bridge. The master sat on the chair of the starboard at the combined conning console. The radar of port was unavailable to be used by a team of the bridge since the chief engineer sat at the port conning console.

This required bending cross the master to get in touch with the radar controls. Before disembarking, it was noted that the flag was flying within the vicinity of the radar scanner and the master instructed the second officer to displace the flag. The pilot disembarked the vessel at the boarding point to the west. The second officer went back to the bridge and put the position of 1600 on the chart.

The cadet stood next to the steering section after returning to the bridge while evaluating autopilot. The second officer put another point on the chart to 1610 because the tanker was abeam of the West Lepe buoy. He told the master that the tanker was heading north of the required route and got out of the bridge to bring the pilot flag down. However, the report never got the attention of the master. Also, another position was plotted by the cadet at 1610 in order to put the vessel on the tract.

When the second officer returned, he checked the chart and said to the cadet that he contemplated the 1610 location was wrong. 1618 position was plotted on the chart to put the vessel on track. The master reported his Southampton VTS position after passing Yarmouth at 1631. Marine Accident Investigation Branch reported that moment later, the vessel began vibrating and its engine started to toil(6). The master changed the autopilot to manual although it had no impact since the tanker was already aground on the Lymington Banks.

A yacht passing Lymington at 1635 informed Southampton VTS that Attilio Levoli was aground but an attempt by coastguards to reach vessel via VHF radio was not fruitful until 1720. At this moment, the vessel staff informed the coast guard that the integrality of the hull was intact. At 1805, Attilio Levilo refloated and sailed clear without aid and anchored at 1920 between Yarmouth and Hampstead Ledge to wait for an inspection of underwater.

References

Douglas, Wiegmann. “The human factors analysis and classification system–HFACS.” Final

Report 1.7 (2000): 1-15.

Douglas, Wiegmann, and Scott, Shappell. Applying the Human Factors Analysis and

Classification System (HFACS) to the Analysis of Commercial Aviation Accident Data (2001): 1-6.

Laura, Mussulman, and Deborah, White. “The human factors analysis and classification system,”

Business Services Industry. July-Aug. 2004. 17 Aug. 2010.

< http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0FKE/is_4_49/ai_n6363911/ >.

Marine Accident Investigation Branch. Report on the Investigation of the Grounding of the

Italian Registered Chemical Tanker Attilio Ievoli on Lymington Banks in the West Solent, South Coast of England 3 June 2004 (2005): 1-35.

Reason J. Human error. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Senders, J, and Moray, N. Human Error: Cause, Prediction and Reduction. Hillsdale, NJ:

Earlbaum, 1991.

Wiegmann, D, and Shappell, S. “Human factors analysis of post-accident data: Applying

theoretical taxonomies of human error,” The International Journal of Aviation Psychology 7.5 (1997): 67-81.

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