Incident Command System and Harrow Court Incident - Case Study Example

INCIDENT COMMAND Introduction : In this assignment I am going to discuss about the various aspects of Incident Command System. The report will be based on the high rise flats, Harrow court incident, Stevenage, Hertfordshire. The beginning of the report deals about the history of the Incident Command System, it’s levels of command, line of command, sectorisation, span of control, etc. After this description the analysis goes on about instigating the Incident Command System, associating it with high rise flats, specifically for the Harrow court incident. Later I am going to deal about the awareness of the Dynamic Risk Assessment Principles and the inter-agency liaison for a particular incident. I. Incident Command System : History : An Incident Command System is an on scene disaster management system. The U.S. National Response Team’s(NRT) Technical Assistance Document says that the Incident Command System(ICS) was developed in 1970’s to manage the rapidly spreading wildfire in California and it’s impact on the urban population in that area. The purpose of the Incident Command System is to manage a response team involving multi – jurisdictional disciplines. The ICS is best described as the system to have perfect co–ordination in carrying out effective response. It is committed to address the following issues during response / rescue operations like lack of perfect information about the incident, lack of proper planning in executing the rescue operation, no effective tools for communication, etc. The ICS is in practice in the UK and the US. Levels of Command : The levels of command for the ICS was framed by UK Metropolitan police after the 1985 riots in north London. The structure is called as the Gold – Silver – Bronze command structure. Gold Level : This level involves the strategic planners of the Incident Command. They will not be present in the operation site but will be at a distance to delegate commands. If the operation involves various agencies, then the Gold commanders of various levels will work together to plan out the rescue operation. Silver Level : These commanders frame the action plan to be carried out according to the guidelines of the Gold commander. They set out the different tactics of carrying out the response / rescue. They are not present in the scene but they are close to the bronze commanders who actually carry out the operation. Bronze Level : The bronze commander is present in the scene with the staff working. These commanders take in charge of the management of Incident Command’s resources, they manage the cordon definitions and they take care of the survivors. Structure, Sectorisation and Line of Command : The structure of Incident Command System is such that the Incident Commander commands four sections namely operations section, planning section, logistics section and the finance / admin section. Apart from these four separate sectors there is a group called command staff who assist the incident commander directly. Examples of sectors can be BA servicing, casualty caring section, water section, etc. Sectorisation is done to tackle the different operations at the incident ground. Sector control points are set to keep the identification of different sectors. Sectorisation must be done if the incident is of large scale and it is better to be done at earlier stages of the rescue operation. Line of command shows the responsibility of each person in the team. The command line will emerge from the crew commander through the sector commanders up towards the incident commander who is the chief person responsible for instigating the command. The line of command is shown in order as follows -Incident Commander supported by command support staff - Operations Commander - Sector commander. The Incident Commander holds important responsibilities like set priorities, stabilize the disaster, frame incident objectives, approve the action plan to be carried out, risk assessment. The operations commander is in charge of the various operations involved in the rescue operation taking span of control into consideration. The sector command looks after the activities of a particular section. The Command Support : The command support staff assist the Incident Commander directly in areas like safety, liaison, public communication. The information officer gives information about the incident to media, other agencies, etc. The safety officer takes care of the safety measures in the incident ground. The liaison officer acts as the coordinating person between various agencies like local government, Investigating agencies, etc. Span of control : It is defined as the manageable limit for any officer. If many crew are reporting to a particular crew commander he may not be able to co-ordinate properly. The span of control varies from three to seven, the ideal condition being five. If more than seven persons are reporting to an officer, then the command structure needs to be expanded. If less than three persons are reporting then that command position may be taken charge by a higher command level. Cordons : The cordons are defined at an earlier stage. Generally the inner cordon is 30m which allows very few personnel to enter. The outer cordon is 100m this prevents public from entering the incident ground. Buckinghamshire fire authorities identify the inner cordon with a red & white tape. The inner cordon is under the control of command support. The outer cordon is under the control of the police. The support vehicles and other appliances are present in the outer cordon. Tactical Modes : There are three types of tactical modes namely offensive, defensive transitional. In the offensive mode the fire fighters fight with the fire internally which threatens the stability of the incident. In the defensive mode the crew work externally to save lives and property from the fire. Transitional mode means change of mode or both the modes are taken into consideration in the rescue process. II. Purpose and Advantages of the Incident Command System : The main purpose of ICS as described by IFTC- UK (Mar 2006) are It should have clear policy to carry out response operations. The ICS should provide proper training, resources, apparatus to communicate, vehicles, etc. It should plan the operations such that the risk is minimum. ICS must give information about the incident to the media. Managing the tactics for rescue and providing triage. Advantages of ICS are The presence of the Incident Command structure leads to single authority and control for a particular person. A crew has to report to only one commander above him, this reduces confusion in reporting and coordinating. The common terminology used in the ICS avoids any misunderstanding in the communication between the working professionals. Particularly when the incident is of large scale and if there are many agencies involved, then each agency may have their own terminology to address some issues. When working in groups this may lead to confusion. In ICS the rescue process is efficient due to management by specific objectives. The objectives are set according to priorities and their working time frame is defined. Objectives are accomplished by framing the strategies and then identifying the proper tactics. The definition of cordons and the prescription of specific colored dress code for the various levels of command help the incident commander to identify the progress of work from a distant place called the Incident Command Post. The resources are managed properly without any misuse or wastage. The integrated method of communication between sectors and media is a prominent advantage of the ICS. The authority for communication being under the control of command support uses effective voice and data communication hardware and networks. From the above mention advantages it is apparent that the presence of the Incident Command System improves the rescue operation in a more efficient and effective manner compared to a situation without ICS. III. Incident Command for High Rise Buildings : The high rise buildings are supposed to follow a strategy for fire safety during construction. Inspite of this there may be fire accidents in these buildings. During such fire accidents, the situation is taken over by the Fire Rescue and Service department. Some of the general precautions taken in high rise buildings are they need to have fire extinguishers in proper places for easy access during a fire situation. Smoke alarms may be fitted to identify smoke due to fire. The doors and windows are taken care to be fire proof. According to Astron ( high rise buildings built to be fire proof ) , there should be a safe room in each flat for easy escape during fire. The residents must have a clear plan of escape and the escape way must be clear and free of obstacles. Posting the Incident Command System at high rise building fire incidents is done by the Fire and Rescue Services department. FRS goes for proper sectorisation. Depending on the fire scenario the sector size may differ. Generally high rise buildings are sectored on different floors. The sector points are defined. Sector identification may vary if the method is consistent and the crew are informed properly. The inner cordon is usually the building area and the outer cordon is the area surrounding the building where the support vehicles like tankers, tenders, ambulances, etc can be located. Triage is initiated to take care of injured people. The crew are instructed to operate in proper tactical modes based on the assessment of risk and the scope of increase in the fire. With the use of communication systems the residents are advised to use the stairs and not to use the lift. They are instructed not to jump from the balcony. There are instructed to close their doors and windows to avoid smoke from neighbouring flats. The entire system is under the control of the Incident Commander. When he feels that the situation is under control, he debriefs the command. IV. The Harrow Court Incident : The Harrow court incident took place on 2nd February, 2005. The fire accident was exactly located at Flat 85, 14th floor, Harrow Court, Silam Road, Stevenage, Hertfordshire. In that incident one resident Ms.Natalie Close and two fire fighters Jeff Wornham and Michael Miller were killed. The cause for the fire as stated by HertFordshire Fire and Rescue Service ( Harrow Court Incident Report, Call No. 1693) were tea lights that were lit and placed on a portable television kept on a dining chair near the wardrobe. The tea lights were not extinguished which led to the fire accident. According to Herts24 (The Comet), the death at Harrow court was due to poor training. It also states that the following are the reasons for the incident procedures for High Rise Incidents were totally inadequate and violated the recommendations given to Strathclyde Fire board. There were lapses in the organization of the Incident Command. The standard operating procedures were not developed, monitored or reviewed properly The breathing apparatus procedures did not satisfy the guidelines of Her Majesty’s (HM) Inspectorate. The training provided by Hertfordshire FRS on crew command, breathing apparatus, dynamic risk assessment were insufficient. Unexpected emergency in these type of primises left the firefighters with unfamiliar risks. The smoke alarm at flat 85 was not subjected to prior inspection by the Stevenage Borough Council, this may have led to the non functioning of the equipment . The fire alarm cable securing was done by plastic trunking which was against the standards of BS. Matt Wrack ( Practioner’s Forum of FRS , July 2007) states that the temperature to which the plastic trunking was exposed would have been 200C. So the Automatic Distress Signalling Unit (ADSU), might have been exposed to temperatures above 55C which led to it’s damage. The Recommendations of Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service (Progress Update 14th May 2008) states a clause of 94 recommendations to improve it’s Incident Command System in future. Some of them are Frequent inspection of high rise buildings to know the relevant information available to the crew. The Borough Council (BC) must see to the extending of the riser outlets through the fire resisting portion. The fire alarm system and the evacuation procedures must be appropriate. The inner cordon procedure for such incidents become more complex, so the police should co-ordinate with FRS to arrange for an alternative safety zone. Impart training to all officers about Dynamic Risk Assessment, effective safety and control measures. The use of effective communication and awareness of different radio channels must be emphasized. Review of the safety apparatus and technical awareness about the apparatus. The guidelines of HFRS for High Rise Procedure for the worst case scenarios must be included such as actions to be followed when there is failure of communication, lifts or risers. From the above mentioned mistakes and the method of management of Harrow Court incident it is apparent that mere negligence is the reason for the accident, in the future residents must be given proper training and advice on safety aspects. The Fire Rescue Service must be trained and equipped well to handle any situation. V. Dynamic Risk Assessment( DRA) : The control measures will be successful only when the hazards and risks are regularly assessed. This continuous assessment of risk throughout the incident is called Dynamic Risk Assessment. In Dynamic Risk Assessment the risk situation needs to be revisited regularly. This type of risk assessment is done in three stages namely Initial stage, Developing stage and Closing stage. Initial stage DRA : the situation is first evaluated, then tactical modes are defined, the system of working is adopted, the risk evaluated against benefit. If the risk is more than the benefit then the system of work is re-assessed. If the risk is less then the additional control measures are considered. Developing stage of DRA : when the incident develops the persons at risk must be identified. The DRA must be done to check for new risks and accordingly new actions plans must be adopted. If the risk outweighs the benefit, the action plan must be stopped completely. Closing stage DRA : in the closing stage the tasks, preventive and protective control measures must be reviewed. Finally the incident must be debriefed. The Fire Rescue Services has certain philosophy on risk management. The Operational Refresher course ( 2006) says that the main consideration in an operation is the health and safety of the persons involved in the rescue measure. It adds that the risk philosophy is Some risk must be taken to save saveable lives. Little risk must be taken to save saveable property. No risk must be taken to save lost lives and lost property. We need to have Dynamic Risk Assessment to take proper control measure according to the changes in the incident development. Dynamic risk Assessment is very important in proactive rescue as it avoids further damage of life and property. When Dynamic Risk Assessment deals with risk management at the time of incident , the Generic Risk Assessment deals with some pre-set risk assessment guidelines prescribed by some authority for high rise buildings and fire service department. The high rise properties above eight floors must have compliance with HMFSI Generic Risk Assessment. In the Harrow Court Incident the Dynamic risk Assessment was not done properly. At the initial rescue process the two firefighters Michael Miller and Jeffery Wornham were able to save the life of Mr. Savage but again when they went inside the bedroom to save Ms. Natalie Close, the fire grew rapidly and all three were dead. This clearly shows that Dynamic Risk Assessment was not done properly. VI. Inter- Agency Liaison : In a major incident the Incident command may not have a single authority but it may be an Unified Command ( UC) comprising incident commanders of different departments like police, triage service, local municipal authority, government, environment agencies, etc. The police is the main inter agency liaison in any fire incident. It arrives on spot immediately along with the Fire Rescue Service. Police department mainly acts as the liaison in the Unified Command Structure. It interacts with the first witness and other witnesses to collect information about the incident which is crucial in preparing the Incident Action Plan and Dynamic Risk Assessment. The police takes control of the public and allows restricted entry into the outer cordon. The ambulance is another important liaison which is engaged in triage. It provides temporary, on the spot life supporting systems and provides transportation of casualties who need immediate medical assistance. The Aide Memoir (Nov. 2007) of Humberside Fire and Rescue Services says that the attendance of medical teams and special equipments should be included in the Initial Action plan and Dynamic Risk Assessment The local government may be the municipal authority in that area who provide information about nearest hospitals and other related services. The Fire Department Strategic Plan (2003) of Hickory Fire Department says that the local government specifically has one officer named public safety officer who becomes the first responder in case of any fire incidents in that area. Also there is a Structural Engineer in the local authority who inspects the violations in the constructions. Environmental agencies also become part of the Unified Command when the incident is related to mass contamination and severe fire accidents. They advice the Fire and rescue Service on issues related to wind direction, removal of contaminated waste matter during the rescue process. In the Harrow Court Incident case the police, ambulance, environment agencies were informed and they contributed their response with the FRS team. The local government was not involved. The social services team were not available immediately as the incident took place at around 3 ‘O clock in the night. The local residents could have helped in some way by giving proper information which would have assisted in preparing the initial action plan. Information to FRS was by Mr. Brown who resided in flat 95 just above that of the incident flat 85. The residents of flat 85, must have been more careful in using the tea light candles. Conclusion : In this report I have briefed about the Incident Command System. The structure of the command system, Levels of command and roles of different commanders are explained. The operating tactical plans and the function of command support staff are also explained. In the next section the Harrow Court Incident is discussed in detail and the Dynamic Risk Assessment procedures are analysed and correlated with the particular Harrow Court Incident. The involvement of other agencies are scrutinized in application to the Harrow Court Incident. In essence this report gives an in depth view of the Harrow Court Incident and the functioning of the Incident Command System. The methods to improve the incident command is also discussed. Reference : 1. Astron, B34681 5/04, ‘ High – Rise – Flats Built to be Fireproof ‘, < www.dontgivefireahome.com> . 2. City of Hickory Fire Department – ‘Strategic Plan for Service Delivery’ , Original March 2000, Revised November 2003, < www.2004StrategicPlanningHDF.hickory.gov.> 3. Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service , ‘ FIRE AT HARROW COURT, STEVENAGE - 2 FEBRUARY 2005 –RECOMMENDATIONS’, Progress Update , 14th May 2008, 4. HertFordShire Fire and Rescue Services, ‘Investigation into the Deaths of’ , Call Number 1693. 5. Herts24, ‘ Harrow Court : Union claims poor training contributed to the fire deaths’ ,‘The Comet’, 6. Humberside Fire and Rescue Services, ‘Aide Memoir Mass Decontamination ‘ , Nov. 2007 , < www.yorkshireandhumbersidefire.gov.uk>. 7. International Fire Training Centre, ‘ Incident Command, RFFS Supervisor Initial ‘, Issue 01, March 2006., . 8. Matt Wrack, ‘Automatic Distress Signal Units’ ,’ Our Fire and Rescue Service Practitioners’ Forum’, Item No 07/42, 10th July 2007, < www.pforum.fire.gov.uk > 9. National Response Team, ‘Incident Command System / Unified Command (ICS/UC), Technical Assistance Document ‘, < www.nrt.org> 10. Operational Refresher Course, Student study Pack, Nov. 2006, Copyright- CROWN Copyright-2004. < www.dftdc.org>. Read More