Incident Command and its Implementation in Major Incident - Coursework Example

INCIDENT COMMAND 1. Introduction Investigation report from an incident often cited the lack of an organized and effective fire department command structure. The death of two gallant fire fighters at the high-rise flats incident in Harrow Court substantiated the fact that an impulsive and uncoordinated response can be fatal. Our report will focus on the concept of incident management and the importance of Incident Command System in handling various emergencies. We will discuss the role of different commanders and agencies in incident management. Present the significance of sectorisation and dynamic risk assessment, and analysis and evaluation of the Harrow Court incident. 2. Incident Command and its Implementation in Major Incident 2.1 Brief History of Incident Command The incident command system or ICS was developed exclusively for the fire service as an emergency management structure for fighting forest fires (Beavers 2003, p.580). The ICS provides for coordinated response, a clear chain of command, and safe operations (Gustin 2007, p.302; Brennan 1998, p.36). ICS was developed under the FIRESCOPE organisation in California in the 1970s (Ward 2005, p.294; Cameron 1994, p.62). The concept of an ICS was actually developed in the aftermath of devastating wildfire in California in 1970s. During 13 days in 1970, 16 lives were lost, 700 structures were destroyed, and over one-half million acres burned. Although all of the responding agencies work together to the top of their ability, various problems with communication and coordination weighed down their usefulness (Radvanovsky 2006, p.98; Paton and Flin 1999, p.264). 2.2 Bronze, Silver, and Gold Levels- The Role of the Incident Commander According to Gray et. al. (2004, p.275), the services involved at each level depend on the type of incident. Bronze command or ‘operational bronze’ is entirely concerned with gaining control at the scene and the coordination of life and property saving process. Crew focus on their own role until directed otherwise after the establishment of silver and gold command. Silver command or ‘tactical silver’ comprise of senior public service officers based at the scene of the incident or as close as is safe to be. Their main tasks include determining the resources necessary and planning and coordination when certain tasks will be carried out. The Gold command group is in inclusive strategic command of an incident and deals with matters such as applying recognized policies and plans and providing the media response to an incident. Gold strategic command establishes the precedence of requests from silver command and resolve which request is most essential. The ICS is structured such that there is a sole authority with overall task to administer the incident. This person is recognized as the Incident Commander. He is the man responsible for front-line management of the incident (Gustin 2007, p.303). His job are in general centred at the command post include information, safety, and liaison with other agencies and groups who are responding. With unified command, officers from fire operations, rescue, law enforcement, and officers from other responding agencies join the incident commander at the command post. The IC is in overall command at the scene throughout the duration of the incident until relieved by a senior chief officer or a transfer of command during a long-term event (Pollak and Gupton 2006, p.845). 2.3 Structuring incident through Sectorisation This concept means that an incident scene should be divided into a controllable command division or sectors. Although the sectors are frequently geographical, they may be also functional like emergency medical services, water supply, logistics, etc. Sectorization decreases the responsibilities for the incident commander as sector-level command decisions can be made by the sector officer. Logistics and communications are of the highest significance to meet enormous demands for fuel, oil, tools, and other consumables (Kramer and Bahme 1992, p.216). 2.4 The Line of Command and the Role of various commanders The Incident Command System is designed to dispense functions in a modular fashion, including command post communications, fuel supplies, and other functions (Kramer and Bahme 1992, p.26). The Incident Commander ascertain the objectives and establishes priorities based on the character of the incident, accessible resources and agency policy. The sector commander as a rule works under the incident commander to supervise and synchronize activities in an incident. The operations section under the operations commander implements the Action Plans and objectives issued by the IC. Their tasks include first aid, search and rescue, and Hazmat cleanup (Tucker 2001, p.3). 2.5 Purpose of a Functional Officer The IC organizes resources to meet the varying circumstances of the incident. For the line functions of dealing with the emergency, the IC may allocate one or more officers to serve as sector, division, group officers, to take charge of tactical operations in geographic sector, and to fulfil specific functional assignments (Carter and Rausch 2006, p.81). For instance, the IC may assign functional officers for communications, fuel supplies, medical services, water supply, and other necessities. 2.6 Span Control The term ‘span of control’ refers to the quantity of subordinates who report directly to a particular manager, supervisor, or lead. An association normally exists between the span of control and the number of layers within an organisation (Radvanovsky 2006, p.116; Cameron 1994, p.65). According to Kramer and Bahme (1992, p.69), the most prominent feature of the ICS is its capacity to develop from a routing incident to a multifaceted multi-agency incident in a coherent sequence and span of control is the foundation for modular expansion of the system. This means that if the incident develops in intricacy, the IC can increase the ICS to meet the requirements created by the incident or diminish the span of control to a sensible level. 2.7 Command Support and the Responsibilities of its Officer With ICS in place, an inclusive organization is available that includes command, operations, planning, logistics, finance, and command support. Command support functions include safety, liaison, staging, and information. The job of the safety officer is to warrant the safety of the personnel, facility, and the environment during disaster operation. The liaison officer is to function as a contact for outside agencies to prevent the IC from becoming overloaded with information and requests (Veenema 2003, p.134). 2.8 Inner and Outer Cordons As soon as adequate police and fire service resources are available, it is vital to set up cordons or barriers. Normally the inner cordon surrounds the incident site itself, and an outer cordon surrounds the assembled emergency vehicles. Members of the public and the media are held outside the outer cordon while personnel allowed to work within the inner cordon are stringently controlled (Greaves et. al. 1997, pp.442-443). 2.9 Tactical Modes Offensive, Defensive and Transitional There are three modes of operation at a fire; offensive, defensive, and transitional. When in the offensive mode, operations are performed in a belligerent interior attack mode, taking the attack to the fire. However, when fire conditions have develop to the point where there is diminutive possibility of saving lives or property, defensive mode of operations are conducted in a safe distance outside of the structure and may centre more on controlling the fire rather than on putting it out it. In transitional mode, operations are shifting from either an offensive to a defensive mode. In other words, this is a point between shifts of operations from one mode to another (Smoke 2005, p.239). 3. Purpose and Advantages of Instigating the Incident Command System at Emergency Incidents While it has been proven very significant to set up an ICS at the earliest possible moment in a response, one can be instituted at any point throughout the response. The lack of the command and control assured by the institution of the ICS was distinguished as a causative factor to the delays in getting relief to the people distressed by the tragedy. The logistical, administrative, and financial management and the planning resources that an Incident Command System offers are indispensable for recovery operations, particularly for long-term incidents (Moats 2007, p.60; Moore et. al. 2003, p.67). Limitations tackled by using an ICS in incident management were frequently due to the lack of accountability including indistinct chains of command and supervision. These difficulties include poor communication due to the incompetent use of existing communication systems, and incompatible codes and terminology. The absence of an orderly, systematic planning process and common flexible pre-designed management framework structure that enable delegation of responsibilities and efficient management of workloads. Lastly, the absence of predefined and efficient methods of integrating interagency requirements into the management framework structure and planning process. The implementation of an ICS provides numerous advantages that include flexible, standardised response management systems that allow for the development of response management proficiency at all ranks within the command structure. More importantly, it offers an augmented level of support of trained personnel during any given accident (Radvanosky 2006, p.99). 4. Incident Command System- Sectorization at High- Rise Buildings As we mentioned earlier in section 2.3 of this report, sectorization reduces the responsibilities for the incident commander as sector-level command decisions can be made by the sector officer. According to Avillo (2002, p.225), the most significant feature of a successful high-rise operation is the institution of a well-organized command organization. The sheer scale of the incident demand that this strong command organization be stretched to suit the incident. As such, the incident commander must be ready to trim down his span of control and spread out the fireground by instituting control points to systematize and coordinate operations in particular sections of the building. In fact, most disastrous high-rise operations are the result of inept, unorganised operations and infringement of the principle of span of control. High-rise fire fighting is exceptional as many inconvenience such as accessibility, ventilation of smoke, and heat retention is not an issue in low-rise buildings (Fox 2003, p.3). Due to the intricacy and stress that a fire in a high-rise building can generate, the fire department must sort out, reference, and assign duties and responsibilities to its members in order to provide an professional, successful, and safe operation. The incident commander must obtain control and operation of the lobby area, and the building’s fire command centre. He must also acquire control of the building’s systems such as HVAC and Mechanical Equipment Room since it could impact fire and smoke conditions, as well as fire department operations. Due to the pressure that these buildings will present, the incident commander must assign logistic officers, safety officers, street vent coordinator, and a planning officer. He must entrust responsibilities to this individual to help with tracking and assigning of resources, maintaining and displaying of situation status, reviewing, evaluation, and revision of the action plan (Terpak 2002, p.351). 5. The Harrow Court Incident On the night of February 2, 2005, the Fire and Rescue Service responded to a fire at Harrow Court, an 18 storey residential tower at Silam Road, Stevenage. At around 03.00 hrs, T/LFf Antrobus, Ff Miller and Ff Wornham established that there was indeed fire on the 14th floor. The T/LFf Antrobus laid out a hose line to the flat and was attempting to open the riser outlet to charge the hose but she failed. The remaining fire fighters quickly went in to flat 85 to rescue the occupants but where without water to carry out any fire fighting or to protect themselves from any fire development. After successfully rescuing one of the occupants, they re-entered the flat to look for the second occupant but a major fire was already developed inside the room. Ff Wornham manage top escape but became entangled in cables that had fallen down across the open front door of the flat when the plastic trunking holding the cables melted from the heat of the fire (Fire and Rescue Service 2005, p.6; Fire Fighter 2005, p,8). When the reinforcing crews arrived, they found Wornham still tangled in the cables and Miller and the second occupant in the bedroom where the fire started. According to the report of the Fire and Rescue Service (2005, p.6), a major fire escalation occurred resulting from either a flashover or backdraught situation, which produced indefensible conditions for anybody within or in close proximity to the room. The two fire fighters had entered the flat without the standard protective hose lines and the supporting control measures required were not established when the first crew went aloft so early into the incident. The absence of established command organization and supporting control measures at the time of the incident contributed to the uncoordinated and problematic fire and rescue operation leading to the death of two fire fighters and an occupant. The fact the Ff Wornham and Ff Miller went it to flat 85 ill-equipped (bolt cutters etc.) and unprotected for fire fighting is an evidence that they went aloft too early in the incident and no risk assessment were made. More importantly, there were inadequate fire fighters to control the fire safely and no one had explicit and realistic training in fighting fire in high-rise buildings. The Hertfordshire fire authority failed to establish an apposite procedures, did not have reasonable training and did not send out enough number of fire fighters in the initial response to manage the fire safely. Investigations regarding the incident reveal organizational weak points in the development, monitoring and review of Standard Operating Procedures. Above all the Incident Command procedures were insufficient and excluded many provisions contained in the national guidance issued by her Majesty’s Inspectorate. A review of the standard operating procedures and further training in incident management particularly in high-rise buildings is recommended. More importantly, the entire fire service and government must learn from the incident and put an end to the relentless pressure to cut frontline crews and cut corners with training and other safety critical activities. 6. Dynamic Risk Assessment Dynamic Risk Assessment is defined as the constant assessment and control of risk in the hastily shifting conditions of an operational incident (Hope and Oliver 2005, p.179). In the Harrow Court incident, dynamic risk assessment could have save lives since it take into account the initial stage of an incident as the most critical stage. It involves the appraisal of the incident, the risks that are at hand and how these might be reduced. Decisions made at this phase are frequently irrevocable and are made immediately. Unfortunately, the risk assessment if any and decisions made at the initial stage of Harrow Court incident is illogical. At the initial risk assessment, the incident commander is supposed to select and apply safe systems of work but this did not happen in Harrow Court because the authorities failed to establish suitable procedures, no training, and insufficient number of fire fighters. The organization is weak and more importantly, initiated an ineffective incident command procedures. If done properly, dynamic risk assessment could have made the situation easier as sufficient procedural knowledge and SOP will be invoked to assess the chosen system of work against the risk involved. Consequently, the incident commander can constantly monitor the situation and review the effectiveness of existing control measures to ensure that new hazards are identified and controlled. More importantly, he will be aware and make sure that the operational activities themselves do not produce risks to people or the environment. It is clear that with dynamic risk assessment, there will be enormous pressure on incident commanders to assess risk properly and to be impulsive in their thinking and operation as the incident develops. 7. Role of other Agencies at a Major Incident The government guidelines in the Home Office publication “Dealing with Disaster” according to Gray et. al. (2004a, p.271) clearly states that despite of any explicit responsibilities that the emergency services, armed services or other public services might have they must all work collectively in realising the common joint objectives of saving lives, thwarting intensification of disaster, alleviate anguish, guard the environment, and more. The fire service she added along with other public services is also responsible for assisting paramedics in the treatment and removal of fatalities. Although the police have primary coordination responsibilities, the actual disaster site itself is the territory of the fire service. One of the main roles of the fire service at the scene of the disaster is to direct and carry out the rescue and recovery operations. The ambulance service on the other hand has primary responsibility for the medication and transport of fatalities at the scene of a major incident. The principal role of the local authority where a major incident arises is to assist the emergency services in the operations of their duties. This must be balanced against maintaining local authority services to the wider community such as healthcare, education and utilities. In the aftermath of a disaster or major incident when the first rescue response is complete, the role of the local authority becomes much more important as they take the lead role in the revitalization and restoration phase of the incident. A further major role, which many local authorities may embark on, is the formation and implementation of the disaster plan, which will include actions on how to deal with a major incident should it arise. In addition to numerous public services which may be implicated in a major incident response, there also a number of charitable organisations who can offer assistance and support to the public services and civilian fatalities. The British Red Cross for instance support the ambulance service in stretcher bearing and ambulance transport functions as well as wellbeing and counselling services. They may also be obliged to carry out nursing auxiliary duties at neighbouring hospitals in the event of great numbers of fatalities overwhelming existing hospital facilities. 8. Conclusion The ICS was specifically developed for fires and provide coordinated response and safe operations. At each level of the incident, ICS provides three types of command group. The ‘bronze’ or ‘operational’ command group is for coordination of life and property saving measures. The ‘silver’ or ‘tactical’ command group is for planning and coordination, and allocation of resources required. The ‘gold’ command group is in the overall ‘strategic’ command of an incident and deals with implementing policies and plans. The Incident Command has the overall responsibility of managing the incident from beginning to end. Sectorization is the concept of dividing the incident scene into a manageable command division or sectors. These sectors can be geographical or functional like medical services, water supply, logistics and so forth. Under the IC, the Sector Commander oversee and coordinate activities in an incident while the Operation Commander implements the action plan issued by the IC. The Functional Officers are people assigned by the IC to secure communication, fuel and water supplies, medical services, and other necessities. Depending on the complexity of the incident, the IC can expand or reduce his ‘span of control’ to a reasonable level. ICS can be established at any point during the response but it has been proven that it is important to establish it at the earliest possible. The adoption of ICS provides advantages that include flexible and standardised response management system and increased level of support of trained personnel during any given incident. An efficient command organisation, sectorisation, and dynamic risk assessment can greatly enhance high-rise operations. The Harrow Court incident became problematic because the fire authority failed to establish suitable procedures like the above. Therefore, a thorough review of SOPs and further training in incident management particularly in high-rise buildings is required. 9. 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