Bhopal Disaster Issues - Case Study Example

Bhopal Disaster Case Study Introduction The Bhopal gas tragedy in India ranks among the worst of the industrial accidents that have occurred in the world. Bhopal is a populous city, with its population in 1984 approximately 900.000. During the late night of December 2 and early morning of December 3, 1984 many of the sleeping population of Bhopal city were enveloped by a cloud of deadly gas that had leaked out from the American-owned Union Carbide pesticide, located nearly three miles outside the city of Bhopal. According to Union Carbide later, this toxic gas was methyl isocyanate gas. The consequence was a disaster in terms of human and animal casualties. It is estimated that nearly 3,000 people died from the effects of the toxic gas within a few days. More than fifty thousand required medical attention due to toxic effects of the gas. Later estimates have suggested that in the many years since the gas tragedy, the toxic gas has continued to take it toll, with nearly 20,000 people having died of the delayed effects of the toxic gas. Though the Union Carbide pesticide factory was closed subsequent to the gas leak, the Bhopal gas tragedy and its consequences continue to reverberate around the world (BBC, 2008). Background to the Bhopal Disaster The pesticide factory at Bhopal was the result of Indian objective of increasing the productivity of its farming efforts and becoming self-sufficient in agricultural products, in what can be termed as the Green Revolution the late 1960s and 1970s. This boosted efforts in the agricultural sector meant increased need for pesticides and the Government of India gave sanction to the American based Union Carbide to set up a small plant to formulate pesticides in the state of Madhya Pradesh in 1969. Union Carbide decided to set up this plant to manufacture pesticides at Bhopal, which was the capital of the state of Madhya Pradesh as an Indian subsidiary unit under the name of Union Carbide India Ltd (TED Case Studies). Union Carbide plant was located at hardly any distance from Bhopal city and its railway station. The choice of this site by the management was due to the various factors amenable to its location there, in the form of the nearby railway system for transportation needs, a nearby large lake that could easily meet the water requirements of the plant, adequate electric power supply and the presence of a large labour force to meet their worker requirements. The management however overlooked the pertinent issue of locating a manufacturing facility that employs a very toxic gas in its manufacturing processes in close proximity to a populous city and the slums of the city that were adjacent to the plant. For almost a decade the toxic methyl isocyanate required in the manufacturing processes was imported by Union Carbide India Ltd., and stored. To increase the bottom line of the company, the management in 1979 took the decision to manufacture methyl isocyanate at its Bhopal instead of importing it, compounding safety issues, as the more stringent safety measures had to be put in place as methyl isocyanate would be manufactured instead of stored (TED Case Studies). Methyl isocyanate is a gas that is used as an intermediary in the manufacture of pesticides, which is highly toxic. This means that there is the requirement for taking severe safety precautions in its manufacture and storage. The physical properties of methyl isocyanate of being lighter than water, but heavier than air, causes the gas to remain close to the ground making any leaks of the gas from the manufacturing that much more of a hazard to living beings on the ground. It is an extremely reactive substance that easily reacts with water, acids, and metals that cause it to be a hazard for pipes, tanks and valves that are used to transport raw materials and finished products in manufacturing processes (TED Case Studies). In the Union Carbide plant at Bhopal methyl isocyanate was manufactured through the reaction of monomethylamine and phosgene. The methyl isocyanate thus produced was refined and transferred to a methyl isocyanate storage area that was separate from the production facility. Two horizontally mounted tanks stainless steel tanks of 15,000 gallon capacity were used to store this refined methyl isocyanate. This methyl isocyanate was used in the manufacture of SEVIN brand of carbaryl and other many other carbamate pesticides. Methyl isocyanate required for the manufacture of the SEVIN brand of pesticides was transferred to the SEVIN production units using pressurized nitrogen, on a one tonne basis from the storage tanks. On the fateful night in December1984 there were forty-one metric tonnes of methyl isocyanate in storage tank 610 C. The methyl isocyanate in this tank underwent a chemical reaction due to the seepage of water into the tank. Failure of the safety systems in place led to the release of methyl isocyanate into the air environment. The consequence of this release of methyl isocyanate into the air environment of the plant and its spread to the populated areas of Bhopal city was the Bhopal gas tragedy (Kalelkar, 1998). Events of the Bhopal Tragedy The immediate cause of the leakage of gas from tank 610 C into the atmosphere can be put down to the seepage of water into the tank triggering an exothermic reaction, which caused a build up of pressure in the tank. Thus the trigger event was the water contamination of the storage tank 610C. Any manufacturing plant involving the use of gases, where pressure might build up for various reasons are expected to anticipate this and have built in safety systems to handle such contingencies that could lead to disasters. However, in the case of the Union Carbide plant at Bhopal several of the attendant and required safety systems were non-functional or inoperable and the required safety procedures disregarded at the time of the trigger event (Puri, 2008). The save way to store the toxic methyl isocyanate is in the liquid form. However, at the time of the incident, the refrigeration unit meant for cooling the gas to keep it in liquid form was shut down as a measure to cut costs. Instead water was being circulated around the rank to keep it cool. This use of water as a cooling agent around rank 610C was potentially hazardous as water and methyl isocyanate react with each other chemically in an exothermic manner. Any leakage of the circulating water into the tank would result in this chemical reaction and that is exactly what happened (Puri, 2008). When water leaked into tank 610C and caused the exothermic reaction with methyl isocyanate, the management in an effort to contain the heat generated by the exothermic reaction increased the water circulation to cool the tank. This compounded the problem with more water leaking into the tank. No attempt was made to start the refrigeration system that was put off for economic reasons. The result was that the reaction in the tank reached proportions that could not be controlled by the safety measures in place. The management was left with two options allow the build up of gas in the tank till the storage tank 610C exploded or release the gas into the atmosphere to reduce the pressure in the tank. The second option was the less dangerous and so the management decided on releasing the methyl isocyanate into the atmosphere (Puri, 2008). Such release of gas was a contingency measure that was foreseen as a safety precaution in case of the pressure went up in the storage tanks. Hence safety measures to contain the released gas were present. The planning of the containment measures were however inadequate and as a result the containment measures were overwhelmed by the surge of escaping methyl isocyanate gas. Methyl isocyanate can be neutralized through the action of caustic soda and hence a caustic soda scrubber was in place to neutralize the gas that was released from the tank. However, the caustic acid scrubber was not designed to neutralize the large amount of gas that was released from the tank and it was overwhelmed by the gas and failed in its function to neutralize the methyl isocyanate before it escaped into the atmosphere (Puri, 2008). A second means to neutralize the escape methyl isocyanate gas was planned and created for the purpose of containing escape of methyl isocyanate gas. Methyl isocyanate can also be neutralized by burning the gas and the second safety system for the containment of the gas involved a flare system to incinerate the gas. On the night of the event the pilot flare flame was inoperable and the attempts to burn the gas before escaping into the atmosphere were futile. The gas escaped from the 33m tall flare tower (Puri, 2008). A third safety system to contain the escape of methyl isocyanate to manageable levels were also in place and consisted of water cannons to bring down the escaping toxic gas to ground level and thereby contain the spread. Here again the design of the water cannon system was inadequate. It was not designed to reach the up to the 33m, which was the height at which the gas was escaping from the flare tower and so this safety system also failed to restrict the escaping gas (Puri, 2008). The failure of the three safety systems caused the management to panic and give up any further attempts to contain the escaping gas. The escaping gas being heavier than air tends to settle down and get dispersed by winds. The rate and direction of dispersal are dependent on wind conditions. On that fateful night the geography of the area and the direction of winds combined to send this cloud of toxic gas over the heavily populated areas of Bhopal city. It was December and the cold wintry nights meant that the population in these areas were indoors. The initial reaction of the people to the burning sensation caused by the gas was to run outdoors, only to be overwhelmed by the greater concentrations of the toxic gas present in the air, resulting in the large loss of life and tragedy at Bhopal city (Puri, 2008). There is still no clarity as to whether the toxic gas consisted of only methyl isocyanate or whether the reaction and heat in the storage tank 610C led to the production of other lethal gases. The most controversial issue was whether the heat and pressure levels in the tank had led to the production of hydrogen cyanide a lethal gas. However, examination of the medical autopsy and other details fails to provide substantial evidence to support the involvement of only hydrogen cyanide in the death of the victims. Autopsy evidence of the victims suggests that the gas inhaled by the victims consisted of a mix of methyl isocyanate, its trimers and dimers, along with the aqueous and thermal decomposition products of methyl isocyanate that include hydrogen cyanide (Sriramachari, 2004). The management of Union Carbide in India and in the United States tried to evade the corporate failure in ensuring that minimal safety precautions, systems and standards were present at the Bhopal plant in total disregard to the dense population situated nearby, even after they had changed their manufacturing practice from the earlier mere storage of the toxic methyl isocyanate for manufacturing processed to the manufactures of methyl isocyanate at the plant itself. The issue of inadequate safety systems was compounded by the money saving procedures that were put in place in the plant that compounded the design inadequacy of the safety systems in place. In addition the management of the crisis event was poor and the nearby population was not alerted to the looming danger, which would have assisted in reducing the level of the human tragedy experienced in Bhopal. The management instead tied to cover all this up by putting out the sabotage theory of a disgruntled worker leading to the water contamination of tank 610C, which did not stand up to the test of veracity. The company ultimately had to pay a price as compensation to the victims of the Bhopal gas tragedy (Dinham & Sarangi, 2002). The Legal Consequences The Bhopal tragedy fails to go away for the Union Carbide Company. The legal implications of the Bhopal gas tragedy gave rise to one of the biggest lawsuits that moved between Asia and America. A final settlement of $ 470 million was the payment that Union carbide had to make based on the tragedy that occurred at Bhopal to the victims of the Bhopal tragedy. This figure has been found to be inadequate for the trauma and the subsequent health problems of the Bhopal gas tragedy and they have been clamouring for more (TED Case Studies). In recent times the U.S. Court for Appeals of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York has sent back to the Manhattan federal court the law suit pertaining to the Bhopal gas tragedy, ruling that the earlier court had made a mistake in granting the request of Union carbide for a summary judgement. The ghost of the Bhopal tragedy continues to haunt the management of Union Carbide (U.S. court reinstates Bhopal water pollution case). Conclusion Multi-national companies have a tendency to ignore safety systems required in their manufacturing facilities in the developing world, with the value of human life is degraded. Union Carbide and the Bhopal gas tragedy is a reminder of this aspect of neglect in corporate governance. Union Carbide continues to pay the price for this folly in corporate governance. Literary References BBC. 2008, ‘1984: Hundreds die in Bhopal chemical accident’, [Online] Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/3/newsid_2698000/2698709.stm (Accessed on November 25, 2008). Dinham, B. & Sarangi, S. 2002, ‘The Bhopal gas tragedy 1984 to ? The evasion of corporate responsibility’. Environment & Urbanization, vol.14, no.1, p.89-99. Kalelkar, S. A. 1998, ‘Investigation of Large Magnitude Incidents: Bhopal As A Case Study’. Presented at the Institution of Chemical Engineers Conference on Preventing Major Chemical Accidents. London. 1998. [Online] Available at: http://www.bhopal.com/pdfs/casestdy.pdf (Accessed on November 25, 2008). Puri, S. 2008, ‘Face to Face with the Bhopal Gas Tragedy’, [Online] Available at: http://www.swarajpuri.com/facetofacebhopal.htm (Accessed on November 25, 2008). Sriramachari, S. 2004, ‘The Bhopal gas tragedy: An environmental disaster’, Current Science, vol.86, no.7, pp.905-920. TED Case Studies. ‘Bhopal Disaster’ [Online] Available at: http://www.american.edu/ted/bhopal.htm (Accessed on November 25, 2008). ‘U.S. court reinstates Bhopal water pollution case’. 2008, NowPublic [Online] Available at: http://www.nowpublic.com/environment/u-s-court-reinstates-bhopal-water-pollution-case (Accessed on November 25, 2008). Read More