Buncefield Fire Disaster - Case Study Example

Incident Command Name: Course: Tutor: Date: Introduction This report is focuses on aspects of Incident Command by highlighting the events that took place during the infamous Buncefield fire disaster. The Buncefield fire is a stark reminder of the magnitude of damage that can be caused by fire. The incident started early on 11th December 2005. A massive explosion occurred followed by several other explosions at the Buncefield Oil Storage Depot in Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire. The fire caused widespread damage to neighbouring properties. It engulfed 23 large fuel storage tanks and injured 43 people. Luckily, no one was severely injured and there were no fatalities. However, the extent of the damage was realised on both commercial and residential properties near the Buncefield site. Nearly 2000 people had to be evacuated from their homes and sections of the M1 motorway were closed. The fire continued for five days and destroyed most of the site, and in addition emitted a large plume of smoke that spread over southern England and beyond (Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service, 2006). A number of points can be highlighted from the Buncefield fire incident. First is that the fire occurred at dawn, but still caused extensive damage. Second is that 43 people were injured, which can be blamed on delays or confusion within the fire department. Third is that the fire fighters could not control the fire in time, and hence, it caused damage to neighbouring commercial and residential properties and about 2000 people had to be evacuated to safety. The fourth point is that in spite of the efforts to contain the fire, the damage continued for five days. Based on the highlighted background information, this report focuses on the reasons as to why Incident Command System for large scale incidents such as Buncefield needs to be established, and the various levels of command that are needed to deal effectively with large scale incidents. The report also discusses an appropriate dynamic risk assessment tool that would have been implemented at the scene as well as an effective action plan. It also identifies and evaluates the roles and duties of various public bodies that would have been involved at Buncefield. Finally, the report evaluates the need for effective liaison with media and other agencies during major incidents. In view of this, the report highlights how information could have been communicated and managed during the incident and puts forward prudent decisions that could have been made during the incident. Why Incident Command System for large scale incidents needs to be established Fire departments have a duty to respond to countless emergency incidents of dissimilar nature. Large scale fire incidents need a lot of attention from a well organised command system. This should involve assigning particular individuals specific roles through a standard identification. In addition, the incident command system should be strong and direct to monitor events right from the onset of incidents. This means that there has to be an effective organisation that will define the different activities and responsibilities assigned to the staff and other members operating within the command system. An effective command system should provide a system to process information to support the command, planning and decision making activities. In addition, the command will provide a system for orderly transfer of command to subsequent arriving officers (Federal Emergency Management Agency, not dated). Effective management of the various systems will ensure timely response to large incidents such as the Buncefield fire. According to HM Government (2005), the Incident Command is responsible for the completion of a number of tactical priorities. These include location and removal of endangered occupants and treating the injured; stabilizing the incident and providing for life safety; conserving property; and providing for the safety, accountability and welfare of responding personnel. This priority should be considered to be ongoing throughout the incident. Evaluating the Buncefield fire, it is evident that the Incident Command System did not deliver as much as would have been expected. According to the Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service (2006), there was insufficient notification to rally for a national incident of a magnitude such as the Buncefield disaster, and there were issues surrounding the quality of national turnout information. Additionally, there was prolonged use of mobile phones that bypassed communications with hub and control. Such is the nature of many major fire incidents. The incident command system should thus be established to ensure that disasters of magnitude such as the Buncefield fire are dealt with in a timely and efficient manner. This is because the incident command system offers guidance for how to organize assets to respond to incidents of any magnitude and how to manage response through various success stages. Various levels of command needed to deal effectively with large scale incidents The Incident Command system includes the doctrine of the fire and rescue service in the context of operational incident management, leadership and the functional command and control processes that flow from it (HM Government, 2008, p.7). The Command operates within a multiagency of Gold, Silver and Bronze levels. The Command operates under the guidance of the Incident Commander, who exercises authority over fire service resources on the incident ground. In a typical incident such as the Buncefield fire, the Incident Commander has much to consider when dealing with the emergency and the task becomes more complex with increased duration. The Incident Commander must ensure that sufficient resources available and those arrangements have been made to manage them. The Gold, Silver and Bronze levels represent the strategic, tactical and operational categories of the fire and rescue staff (HM Government, 2008). The Silver Command and Bronze Command are located on the incident Bronze Command At the start of an incident for which there is no forewarning, such as the Buncefield incident, the Bronze or operational level will be activated first. The incident command will attend the scene, charged with a number of responsibilities. First is to assess the extent of the incident, the magnitude or resource, and the hazards and risks. Second, the team will consider the appropriate level of command and prioritise objectives. The Command also develops and implements a plan by taking into consideration Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and Dynamic Risk Assessment (DRA). Since incidents of the enormous magnitude such as the Buncefield disaster call for concerted effort, the Bronze command also communicates and controls the plan that is drafted and evaluates its effectiveness. Silver Command The task of the Silver Commander is to control the general incident, determine priorities. Allocate resources, and obtain additional resources as required. It is essential that the commander plans and coordinates tasks to be undertaken and liaises with other agencies wherever necessary to coordinate efforts to facilitate this. A Silver Commander at the incident might also evaluate if there is need for a Gold level of command if one is not already at the site, and if need be, communicate the same upwards. The main task of the Silver Command is to give early deliberation to the consequence management and recovery phases of the incident. Gold Command Most incidents and the onset stages of major incidents such as the Buncefield disaster may only require the Bronze or Bronze and Silver levels of command. If it is ascertained that the extent of resources or level of decision making required are further than the tactical level of operation, or if there is need to manage more than one incident (as was the case at Buncefield), then the services of the Gold Command are deemed necessary. The Gold level is the most senior and is rarely engaged in pure fire service operations. Nevertheless, it can feature in multiservice operations such as the one at the Buncefield Oil Storage Depot. The Command gives direction regarding the disaster and therefore takes days rather than several hours or minutes, operating from at a distance from the scene of the incident. It basically establishes a policy under which Silver Commanders work, and determines strategic objectives that should be recorded and periodically reviewed. The team is also charged with the responsibility of ensuring that there are clear lines of communication and undertakes appropriate liaison with strategic managers in other agencies. Appropriate dynamic risk assessment and effective action plan A dynamic risk assessment (DRA) must be done in consideration of a safe system of work. The assessment should be proportionate to the magnitude of risk involved; for instance, the Buncefield fire was associated with explosions and there was a risk of more explosions as the fuel storage tanks were consumed by the fire. Thus when conducting a DRA, a number of factors need to be considered, as highlighted below (from H.M. Fire Service Inspectorate, 2006): The alternative ways of working Urgency of actions and duration of activities Competence of personnel in relation to the complexity of the intended activities. As for the Buncefield fire, there were several issues to be handled, including putting out the fire, evacuating neighbouring people and trying to salvage property. Accessibility of suitable resources Prevailing environmental conditions Access and egress Organization of the work area: the three levels of command have to ensure that each Command plays its role in major incidents Safety management systems Emergency procedures Supervision Control measures commensurate with the number of individuals exposed to the hazard. The issues identified in the DRA should be clearly communicated to all personnel involved through a safety briefing before operations begin to facilitate drafting an action plan. Effective action plan Incidents of magnitudes such as the Buncefield fire are complex and require a long duration to deal with. This requires the command of more than one safety officer. Assistant incident officers should be assigned to subdivide responsibilities for different areas at incidents. At the Buncefield incident, most attention would be the fuel storage tanks and the surrounding property. Special rescue operations would ensure that people are evacuated to safety in the shortest time possible. In this case, the Incident Officer should inform the Incident Commander of the need to assemble a safety unit as a component of the incident management organisation. During extended incidents such as the Buncefield fire that lasted five days, relief rotation can be established to guarantee that safety supervision is maintained at all times (International Association of Fire Chiefs & National Fire Protection Association, 2009). The action plan would take a form that includes deciding about the incident and acting on it to ensure that the outcome is a success, as shown in figure 1. Figure 1: Steps in the action plan Source: HM Government (2008), p. 131. Roles and responsibilities of various public agencies that would have been involved at Buncefield A number of public agencies would be involved at Buncefield. These are classified broadly as Category 1 and Category 2 responders. Category 1 responders include local authorities, government agencies, emergency services, and National Health Service (NHS) bodies (City of London, not dated). The duties and responsibilities of Category 1 responders include risk assessment, developing emergency plans and developing business continuity plans. Category 1 responders also have to arrange to ensure that information is available to the public about civil protection matters. For instance, NHS bodies have to offer information about injuries causalities, deaths and so forth. Category 1 responders also have to initiate mechanisms to warn, inform and advise the public during the entire duration of the incident. Category 1 responders are also charged with the responsibility to share information with other local responders to facilitate better co-ordination. Additionally, they have to co-operate with other local responders to augment co-ordination and efficiency. Another role of Category 1 responders, which applies specifically to local authorities, is to offer advice and support to business and voluntary organizations involved in the incident (Moore & Lakha, 2006). Category 2 responders include utilities, transport companies, and government units (such as Health and Safety Executive). Such organizations have lesser obligations, and their primary role is to co-operate and share relevant information with Category 1 responders. They have to be involved in consultations where they can add value. For instance, transport companies can be involved in quick transportation of evacuees in case there is a scarcity of ambulances. Other utility companies can offer services such as food aid and additional medical support. The most important point is that Category 2 responders should be in a position to respond to reasonable requests (Moore & Lakha, 2006). Need for effective liaison with media and other agencies during major incidents The media plays an important role in reinforcing a driving interoperability at an incident scene. In most cases they hold responders responsible for inept services at the scene since they are usually among the first to arrive and cover the event to the public (NPIA, 2009). Disasters of major magnitude such as the Buncefield fire need to be handled with utmost consideration for safety of the public. In such a case it is important to ensure that the media does not release reports that cause mayhem and panic among the public, but which are reassuring. During major incidents, an officer in charge of media liaison has to be appointed. Media representatives need to be given facilities that are reasonable to suit the conditions of the incident, but they must not be allowed to hinder operations. Preferably, the liaison officer should have background knowledge in media relations to collaborate with other agencies at the incident (Commonwealth of Australia, 1998). Lack of an elaborate plan would only lead to worsening of the crisis due to miscommunication between responders, the media and other agencies. On the other hand, a well-laid out plan would make the media to communicate appropriate information to the concerned agencies and the public as required. How information would have been communicated and managed during the incident, and prudent decisions that would have been made for the duration of the incident Incident communication should be well co-ordinated. This in essence means establishing a clear structure of areas such as: Who reports to whom? Who is in charge of specific tasks? How do people or teams work together? Shift timings Briefings on time and location How the responders are to communicate (that is frequencies or phone numbers) (Commonwealth of Australia, 1998) Based on the information that is passed across, the incident command would be prepared for any eventuality having determined the magnitude of the incident. As noted earlier, communication failure was a major drawback to efforts to control the Buncefield fire. This means that it would eventually take a long time to come up with a comprehensive plan to contain the fire. This is one reason why the fire could not be controlled and burned for five days. If it is clearly known who reports to whom, it is possible to manage the three levels of command and end up with a good outcome. For instance, a decision would have been made to control the fire in time and hence avoid the other aftermaths such as need for evacuation of neighbouring people and the extensive damage to property. Conclusion In conclusion, fire incidents require attention but large incidents are more involving. Catastrophic incidents such as the Buncefield fire need well organised incident command systems to aid in containing the fire, evacuating the scene and salvaging property. All the three levels of command- Bronze, Silver and Gold must be involved in major incidents since all manner of response is required. The paper has discussed how various responders would be involved in major incidents. Of essence is the media, which plays a crucial role in disseminating information to the public and other agencies. Its role should be appropriately defined to avoid reports that cause panic. The paper has as well discussed the significance of managing information at the incident. When information is conveyed appropriately, a lot of time is saved and this enhances the responders’ capacity to contain the incident. References City of London (not dated), Civil emergencies - the Civil Contingencies Act, available from http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/Corporation/LGNL_Services/Advice_and_benefits/Emergencies/Civil+emergencies+-+the+Civil+Contingencies+Act.htm (5th July 2010). Commonwealth of Australia (1998) Guide 1: Multi-Agency Incident Management. Emergency Management Australia, Emergency Management Australia, Melbourne. Federal Emergency Management Agency (not dated) Incident Command System for Structural Collapse Incidents; ICSSCI-Student Manual, FEMA, New York. H.M. Fire Service Inspectorate (2006) Fire and Rescue Service Manual, Volume 2, The Stationery Office, London. Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service (2006) Buncefield: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service's Review of the Fire Response, The Stationery Office, London. HM Government (2005) Emergency response and recovery: Non statutory guidance to complement Emergency Preparedness, Library and information Centre, Easingwold. HM Government (2008) Fire and Rescue Manual Volume 2, Incident Command, TSO, London. International Association of Fire Chiefs & National Fire Protection Association (2009) Fire Officer: Principles and Practice (2nd edition), Jones & Bartlett Learning, London. Moore, T. A & Lakha, R. (2006) Tolley's Handbook of Disaster and Emergency Management (3rd edition), Butterworth-Heinemann, London. NPIA (National Policing Improvement Agency) (2009) Guidance on multi-agency interoperability, National Policing Improvement Agency and the Association of Chief Police Officers, Bedfordshire. Read More