The Impact of Individual & Group Behaviour on Crisis Management - Coursework Example

The Impact of Individual & Group Behaviour on Crisis Management Abstract Table of Contents 1. Introduction 1 2. Principles of Risk Analysis & Risk Management 1 3. Human Physiology & Anthropometry 2 4. Information Processing & Cognition 3 5. Occupational Stressors 4 6. Change, Leadership & Culture 5 7. Human Error 6 8. Conclusion: Ways to Account for Behavioural Variables in Crises 7 References 9 The Impact of Individual & Group Behaviour on Crisis Management 1. Introduction In the context of the shipping industry, a “crisis” can be defined in a relatively straightforward way as any occurrence that varies from the expected norms of operational performance to cause some kind of loss. That definition, however, comprises many different levels of severity; a crisis could be an unexpected minor problem, such as a mechanical breakdown that causes a delay and extra costs, all the way up to a catastrophic incident which results in the loss of the ship, crew, and cargo. Crisis management is the way in which the organisation – in this case, the ship crew and the DPA – responds to and solves the crisis. There are many factors that contribute to the success or failure of crisis management, beginning with sound risk analysis that can help to prevent crises from occurring in the first place. Risk analysis determines the hazards that exist, and which could potentially cause a crisis; part of the risk analysis process is risk management, which is the reduction of risks as far as possible to prevent adverse effects. Even so, risk management cannot always prevent every risk from creating a crisis. When a crisis does occur, managing it successfully depends on how well the organisation can work together to resolve the problem and minimise the loss. The behaviour of individuals and the group has a significant impact on crisis management; people may react very differently than expected in a crisis so that procedures and measures are carried out in a way that was not foreseen when they were planned. Many factors have an effect on behaviour, including the way people process information, cultural differences among people, styles of leadership, and stress factors. This report attempts to look at factors that affect behaviours in a systematic way, with the objective to discover where human behaviour can and should be accounted for in crisis planning and management. 2. Principles of Risk Analysis & Risk Management “Risk” can be defined as the chance that an adverse occurrence will happen and the severity of the result if it does occur. (North, 1995: 914) Risk management is one of four steps in the complete risk analysis process, which begins with risk identification, then risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication. Risk identification involves determining all possible hazards that could cause some kind of harm. Risk assessment is a judgment of how likely any particular hazard is, with the goal to determine which ones require further consideration. Some hazards have such a low probability that they can be eliminated, depending on the circumstances; for example, sea ice is a hazard, but a ship sailing a route from Manila to Cape Town to New York will almost certainly not encounter any, and so the hazard can be ignored. Risk management is the implementation of procedures and other safeguards to prevent the hazard from having an adverse impact on safety and productivity. (Maritime and Coastguard Agency, 2003) Finally, risk communication is the means by which the risk assessment and risk management information is communicated to decision-makers and the public. (North, 1995: 914) In the context of ship operations, it should also include communication to the crew. Risk management is different from crisis management in that the steps taken to minimise the risk are not necessarily the same as those taken to respond to a crisis a risk has become. But in many respects the same factors that contribute to a risk and must be addressed by risk analysis have to be addressed by a crisis management plan; therefore, if individual and group behaviour is something that needs to be considered in a crisis, it seems only prudent to try to anticipate behaviour as part of a risk analysis. In order to factor behaviour into either risk analysis or crisis management, however, the main factors that influence behaviour among a ship’s crew must be understood. 3. Human Physiology & Anthropometry Human physiology is described by anthropometry, which is the measurement of the dimensions and characteristics of the human body. Anthropometry is important for work environments, because it provides metrics that can be applied when following the seven principles of work space design. These principles are (Wickens, et al., 1998): 1. Frequency of use. How often components are used should be considered, with the ones that are used most located in the most convenient locations. 2. Importance. The most important components should be the easiest to access. 3. Sequence of use. Components should be arranged in a way that reflects the sequence in which they are used. 4. Consistency. Controls and components that have the same or similar functions should be designed the same way and consistently located to avoid confusion. 5. Control-display compatibility. Any display that relates to a control should give information that clearly relates to the way the control functions. For example, if a dial that controls a pump is labelled in litres/second, then the associated display should also show information labelled in litres/second. 6. Clutter avoidance. Components, controls, and displays should be arranged in such a way as to avoid confusion and possibly mistaking one control or component for another. 7. Functional grouping. Components with similar functions should be located together. For example, circuit breakers are often gathered together in one location, rather than being individually placed at different locations along the circuit wiring. Using anthropometry to help design safe and efficient workspaces can also be described as ergonomics, which is the designing of work spaces and functions to match the capabilities and needs of the workers. (OSHA, n.d.) Ergonomics can affect human behaviour when workspace design is poor, because the crew may develop bad habits and shortcuts to overcome an inefficient design. For example, an emergency procedure to shut down fuel supply to the engines might require the activation of a couple controls in the proper sequence, but under normal operations these controls can be activated in any order. If the workspace is poorly designed, the crew will work out the best way to activate the controls under normal conditions, and that may be completely different than the required sequence. In an emergency, for example a fire, when the situation is highly stressful, confusing, and maybe made worse by smoke or darkness, the crew will react on instinct and habit, and activate the controls in the way they’ve gotten accustomed to doing – which in this example is the wrong order, which might make the emergency worse. 4. Information Processing & Cognition Cognition, the way in which people perceive and understand information, can be affected in some ways by behaviour, and in turn have an effect on behaviour. Perceptions, or the “sense” that people make of information they receive are combinations of the inputs of their five physical senses and their memories, knowledge, and experience. (Wickens, et al., 1998) The inputs of the physical senses are much the same for everyone, but the experience and knowledge can vary as a result of individual behaviours. Different learning styles, for example can lead to different assessments of the same information. Two engineers, one of whom has a studious nature and learns best from taking classes, and reading and another who learns more by “hands-on” training and listening to more experienced people, may both hear exactly the same odd knocking noise in an engine, but will make different decisions about how to assess the noise’s importance and what to do about it based on their individual learning experiences. Both may make equally valid decisions to fix the problem, and moreover, both may be personally incapable of handling the problem in a different way. This has implications for crisis management, because prescribed procedures or orders might differ from the way in which a particular person works most effectively, and the expected or desired outcome might not be achieved. 5. Occupational Stressors Occupational stressors have a direct impact on behaviour, because they can affect the information inputs people receive, the way in which people process information, and the way in which they perform as a result. Stressors can come from environmental factors, physiological factors, or psychological factors, and work in various combinations. Understanding the sources of stress and the likely effects they may have on individual and group behaviour helps to predict what those behaviours may be in a crisis situation. Environmental sources of stress come from a person’s surroundings – conditions such as temperature, light, noise, vibration and motion, air movement and quality, pressure, and humidity. Poor conditions, an environment which is not comfortable for the individual, can affect performance, behaviour, and even the person’s long-term health. (Noyes, 2001) One way in which environmental stressors can have an immediate impact on behaviour is by simply distracting the person from the task at hand; a person in an uncomfortable environment is aware that he is uncomfortable. Even if he tells himself to ignore his discomfort and focus on his work, his concentration is attenuated at least that little bit by having to consciously acknowledge his environment. The more uncomfortable and stressful the environment is, the greater the efforts he must exert to maintain his work focus. Physiological sources of stress are familiar to most people, who can relate to not being able to think as clearly or have enough energy for normal activities when they are fatigued, hungry, or ill. Physiological stress can manifest itself in behaviour changes. For example, a person who is tired or hungry may move at a slower pace, be less attentive to detail, and perhaps may even interact differently with others, such as being short-tempered. These are examples of how physiological sources of stress can become psychological stress factors; disturbing the body’s normal routine, besides the direct effect it has on the body’s function, also creates a source of concern and worry for the individual. This diverts some of his concentration in the same way environmental factors can as explained above. Other sources of psychological stress are related to the volume and complexity of the person’s workload. (Wickens, et al., 1998) If the tasks are too great and too complex, the person’s ability to sufficiently focus on all of them can be overwhelmed; if they are too simple, they can be insufficient to engage enough of the person’s focus. These negative effects can also be aggravated by stressful environmental factors and by physiological factors such as fatigue. 6. Change, Leadership & Culture Both Balkin (1998) and Hofstede (2001) refer to culture as a kind of ‘programming’ in individuals within different groups, a set of basic dimensions that determine the attitudes and behaviours of different people. According to Hofstede (2001), there are four of these “cultural dimensions”: 1. Power-Distance: This determines how people see the relationship between leaders and followers, and how they see themselves in relation to different social classes. 2. Uncertainty Avoidance: This is a measure of how certain groups perceive risk and changes, how willing they are to accept uncertainty versus tradition and familiarity. 3. Individuality: This describes to what degree the individual takes precedence or is subordinate to the group. 4. Masculinity-Femininity: This determines how the group views power and roles of individuals within the cultural group. In Hofstede’s studies he determined that women’s values differed much less than men’s values from one culture to another, and that men’s values in any particular culture could be described in terms of being somewhere along a scale from very dominant, assertive, and competitive (very male, in other words) to very modest, caring, and nurturing (very female). (Hofstede, 2001) These four dimensions have very clear effects on how people behave. In a ship crew, the power-distance dimension affects how crew members respond to officers, and in turn, partly determines the way in which officers and supervisors manage crewmen. The degree of cultural uncertainty avoidance affects the way crew members react to changes in routine or unexpected events. Individuality describes how much crew members are inclined to and are capable of pursuing independent initiatives and actions versus relying on detailed orders; in leaders, individuality dimensions of their culture determine how much they might expect their subordinates to exercise independence. A manager or crew leader from a culture in which individuality is highly prized, such as Australia, would likely be less of a ‘micro-manager’ and give less specific, detailed orders than someone who is from a more collective-oriented culture, such as China. The masculinity-femininity dimension in a ship crew might describe whether individuals view their roles more in terms of having strong authority over their areas of responsibility – regardless of the scope of those responsibilities – or whether they are more team-work oriented. Leadership in a crisis requires two fundamental skills: situation assessment (“What is the problem?”) and decision making (“What shall I do about it?”). (Barnett, et al., 2002) The dimensions of culture shape the approach the leader takes to managing the crisis; for example, one who is from a culture with a relatively low measure of uncertainty avoidance may be calmer in an emergency. On the other side of that, however, a calmer leader may not make decisions as quickly or be as emphatic in issuing orders, and not react fast enough to prevent a situation from getting out of control. 7. Human Error In any sort of endeavour, errors are the manifestations of threats capable of producing them. Any condition that has the chance of negatively impacting on what is considered the “normal” situation is a potentially error-causing threat. When some action or inaction of people leads to a condition that is different than what is expected, that is a human error. (Helmreich, et al., 1999) In that context, all of the factors that can affect human behaviour described in the preceding sections are threats which can produce errors. Poor workspace design, environmental stresses, physical or psychological stresses, misinterpretations of information, and cultural cues that make people perceive and respond to situations in ways that may not be the most effective all can result in errors being made. If the error is significant enough and is not corrected, it can in turn result in a crisis. The connection between human behaviour and human error is illustrated by three case studies summarised by Barnett (2005). In the first, the MV Royal Majesty, a passenger liner, ran aground off Nantucket Island en route from Bermuda to Boston, due to an incorrect automatic setting of its GPS-driven autopilot that resulted in the ship being 17 miles off course. In the second, a small cargo vessel the Green Lily ran aground and broke up in heavy weather in the Shetland Islands after an engine failure following a break in a seawater feed pipe. In the third case, two ferries, the Diamant and the Northern Merchant, collided in the English Channel at high speed after incorrectly making course changes to avoid one another. (Barnett, 2005: 138-141) In the case of the Royal Majesty, the human error was the bridge crew’s failure to recognise the incorrect course setting and failure to cross-check the ship’s position and heading with other instruments. In the case of the Green Lily, the crew incorrectly assumed the engine failure was related to the seawater pipe break and subsequent flooding, and therefore took the wrong steps to try to re-start the engine. In the case of the ferry collision, both crews deviated from prescribed procedures – such as failing to reduce speed – and made incorrect assumptions about the intentions of the other ship’s crews. The reason these three cases serve as good examples of behaviour effects on crises is because they were all intentional errors rather than lapses or slips. In the first two cases, the crews made wrong assumptions; in the third, the crews compounded these assumptions by deviating from proper procedures. The working environments all played a part in encouraging these unhelpful behaviours – the Royal Majesty’s autopilot had always worked properly before, so the need to cross-check it was disregarded; the coincidental occurrence of a different failure and stressful weather conditions led the crew of the Green Lily to assume those were connected to the engine failure; and long, uneventful experience in sailing the English Channel had led the crews of the two ferries to take short-cuts in normal procedures. 8. Conclusion: Ways to Account for Behavioural Variables in Crises As it relates to the crew, the task of the DPA if a crisis occurs on board ship is to offer guidance and direction in accordance with established procedures and policies, and to help co-ordinate external assistance if necessary. Once a crisis occurs it is too late to prevent the effects of unexpected behaviour from aggravating it; therefore, the DPA must work with the officers and crew to anticipate reactions to various crises, and correct potential problems before they occur. Identify and eliminate workspace and environmental sources of stress: Assuming that the ship is already properly designed to provide a safe and comfortable working environment, the DPA should ascertain whether or not anything has changed en route, and what, if any, changes in the normal work pattern the crew has made to compensate. Even minor issues may have an impact on emergency procedures, so if any changes have been made, these should be assessed against established procedures to see if any conflict will arise, and corrected if it appears likely to do so. Understand the different cultures represented among the crew: There is a danger of over-generalising in this, and so the DPA should familiarise himself as much as possible with the particular crewmen on board as individuals. Nevertheless, knowing a little about different cultures can help fill in the gaps of information the DPA may not get from the men themselves. For example, it is a common habit of most Filipinos to laugh or smile when nervous or faced with a question or information they do not clearly understand. A Filipino crewman reacting in that way may just be a happy person, or he may be having some difficulty; asking a few more questions to find out which is the case can prevent miscommunication and errors later on. Make certain established normal procedures are being followed: As Barnett pointed out in the case of the ferry collision (2005: 141), the failure of the shore-side organisation to enforce procedures helped encourage a cultural of laxity aboard the ships. Both captains were experienced and fully-aware of the regulations and guidelines, and their experience allowed them to find small ways to reduce their own workloads. Since their managers never addressed the deviations from procedure, those deviations became habits – harmless under normal circumstances, but disastrous when a crisis arose. In conclusion, one must consider that the DPA is obliged by circumstances to make the assumption that the situation on board is proceeding according to normal guidelines and procedures, which are developed with business requirements, the requirements and capabilities of the ship and equipment, and the relevant regulations in mind but not the variables of individual behaviour, or the behaviour of individuals in a group as part of the equation. By examining the factors that can influence the behaviour of his assigned ship and crew, the DPA can better anticipate their response in an emergency situation – a response that, as the history of maritime incidents has shown time and again, quite often varies from expected actions. Knowing more and being able to develop more accurate expectations could make the difference between a crisis and a tragedy. References Balkin, J.M. (1998) Cultural Software. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. Barnett, M. (2005) “Searching for the Root Causes of Maritime Casualties – Individual Competence or Organisational Culture?” WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs, 4(2): 131-145. Barnett, M., Gatfield, D., Habberley, J. (2002) “Shipboard Crisis Management: A Case Study”. Southampton Solent University, 2002. Available from . Helmreich, R.L., Klinect, J.R., & Wilhelm, J.A. (1999) “Models of Threat, Error and CRM in Flight Operations”. In: R. S. Jensen (Ed.), Proceedings of the Tenth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University: 677-682. Hofstede, Geert. (2001) Cultural Consequences, 2nd Edition. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications. Maritime and Coastguard Agency. (2003) Merchant Shipping Notices, Marine Guidance Notes and Marine Information Notes Consolidated to July 2003, Vol. III. Norwich, UK: TSO. North, D.W. (1995) “Limitations, definitions, principles and methods of risk analysis”. Scientific and Technical Review of the Office International des Epizooties (OIE), 14(4): 913-923. Available from . Noyes, J. (2001) Designing for Humans, 1st Edition. East Sussex, UK: Psychology Press Ltd. Occupational Safety & Health Administration [OSHA]. (n.d.) “Safety and Health Topics: Ergonomics”. U.S. Department of Labor [Internet]. Available from . Wickens, C.D., Gordon, S.E., and Liu, Y. (1998) An Introduction to Human Factors Engineering. New York: Addison Wesley Longman. Read More