Extending Starbucks Global Reach through Adaptive Standardization - Case Study Example

Extending Starbucks’ Global Reach through Adaptive Standardization Starbucks’ Current Position In a period which is acknowledged to be extremely unfavorable to the food & beverage industry, Starbucks’ cost-cutting measures during 2008 have allowed the company to remain relatively healthy and capable of continuing its objective of global expansion. Despite the company’s overall good condition, the continuing economic recession has reduced consumer spending and forced the global restaurant industry to rely on cost- and price-cutting to maintain viability. (Baertlein, 2009) In addition to this, Starbucks is facing strong competitive threats in both domestic and international markets. While we agree that expansion, as part of a continuing multi-faceted strategy of cost reduction, process improvements, and product diversification (Starbucks, 18 March 2009) is the most effective strategy for growth and profitability, the potential obstacles of current conditions and competition require a careful examination and measured implementation of expansion plans. This report will address three key issues – cultural concerns, standardization and adaptation, and Starbucks’ internationalization model – that must be prioritized in the company’s expansion program. A recommendation about how to best respond to and employ these concepts in the expansion program will be made in the form of a new model for Starbucks’ international expansion, which we call the Adaptive Standardization Model. Table 1 – Summary of Starbucks Financial Position and Market Coverage (through Q2 2009) Consolidated Revenue $2.3 billion Revenue from International Stores $434 million Total Stores 16,862 International Stores 5,416 New International Stores in 2009 (projected net) 380 International Stores added to date 2009 347 (sources: Starbucks, 20091,2,4, Baertlein, 2009, Mitchell, 2009) SWOT Analysis The following SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis of Starbucks is not exhaustive, but focuses on those factors most pertinent to the company’s international expansion objectives. There are several factors that are worthy of particular attention. First, the exceptional brand strength of Starbucks is perhaps the company’s greatest attribute, to the extent that a cup of Starbucks coffee is preferred by knowledgeable, objective customers even when a less-expensive, quality alternative is readily available. (Katsenelson, 2008)The strong brand, however, has also become a focal point for some controversy, which can lead to cultural and political complications in entering new markets. The competitive threat, particularly from low-cost outlets like McDonald’s McCafé, is also a formidable potential obstacle to Starbucks’ growth, particularly in recessionary times. This may be more acute in foreign markets where there is no strong coffee-drinking tradition, such as the consumer attitudes encountered when Starbucks first entered the tea-dependent Japanese and Chinese markets. (Giovetti, 2008) Brand-conscious consumers who are inexperienced with coffee, particularly in lower-income markets, may be attracted to the McDonald’s brand, which is arguably one of the most instantly-recognizable American brands in the world. Table 2 – Starbucks SWOT Analysis STRENGTHS OPPORTUNITIES Extraordinary brand strength. Strong specialized focus on coffee & coffee products. Extensive infrastructure improves sourcing opportunities & supply cost management. Still the largest specialty coffee retailer in the world. (Starbucks, 20091,3,4) Mix of company-owned and licensed/co-op stores spreads risk while maintaining quality standards. VIA instant coffee brand potentially very marketable in areas outside the US. (Mitchell, 2009) International partnership program can be modified for other co-branding opportunities. New board members with strong business technology backgrounds can offer direction to process innovations and efficiency improvements. (Starbucks, 18 March 2009) Large loyal customer base offers opportunities for targeted, relationship-marketing initiatives. WEAKNESSES THREATS Perception of ‘Americanizing’ of local cultures. (Hill, 2005, and Rippen, 2007) Number one position makes the company the target of various critics & pressure groups. Majority of company focus, infrastructure, and revenue generation is still in the US. Heavy reliance on coffee & coffee products may slow product innovation. Starbucks’ premium prices make promoting the brand as a value proposition difficult. (Mitchell, 2009) At risk from exchange rate, tariff, and supply cost fluctuations, particularly in recessionary climate. (Bennett, 1996) Reduced consumer spending, smaller disposable incomes. Customers may prefer cheaper alternatives. Starbucks’ ‘lightning rod’ reputation with globalization protesters and corporate critics may introduce unwanted politics into business ventures, particularly overseas. Very strong competition in the international market, particular from McDonald’s, is receiving favorable reviews. International Markets Competitor Summary The following are brief profiles of the main competitors for Starbucks in markets outside the United States: McCafé (McDonald’s): First launched in Australia in 1993, the McCafé concept was test-marketed in the US in 2005, and as of early 2009, about 70% of McDonald’s outlets offered specialty coffee, either in a McCafé store or as part of the regular restaurant menu. (Glover, 2008 & 2009) Most of the competitive comparison between the McCafé concept and Starbucks has been based on product price, which is overall much lower at McCafé. Causes for concern for Starbucks are the reactions of the media to McCafé, which have generally been positive, and the extensive global reach of McDonald’s, which at year-end 2008 operated 31,967 restaurants in 118 countries. (McDonald’s, 2009) Gloria Jean’s Coffee: Founded in Chicago in 1979, Gloria Jean’s began expansion into international markets in 1995 with the opening of a store in Australia. The international branding and roasting rights to all areas outside the US were sold in 2004 to the original Australian franchisees, and in the past four years the chain has expanded rapidly. At present, there are 935 Gloria Jean’s stores in 38 countries; recent expansion has included entry into the markets in China and the Czech Republic. (Gloria Jean’s Coffee, 2009) Spinelli Coffee Company: Founded in San Francisco in 1983, Spinelli entered into a licensing agreement with Equinox, a joint Hong Kong-Singapore concern, in 1995 to pursue expansion in the Asian market. The first overseas Spinelli store opened in Singapore in 1996. The company opened a roasting plant in Asia in December 1998. Currently, there are a total of 27 Spinelli stores in operation in Asia: 22 in Singapore, 4 in Beijing, and 1 in Jakarta. An additional store in Beijing is scheduled to open during 2009. (Spinelli Coffee Co., 2008) Figaro Coffee Company: Figaro was founded in 1993 in Manila, and currently operates 59 stores throughout the Philippines, plus two which have opened in quick succession in Shanghai, China. Further expansion in China is possible. One unique feature of Figaro’s business model is that coffee beans are exclusively sourced through Philippine growers; this may limit the company’s growth potential, but is a strong brand advantage in their home market. (Figaro Coffee Company, 2009) Dôme Café: The Australian-based Dôme brand was licensed to Suntec F & B Holdings of Singapore in 1996 for franchises in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Suntec is also the owner of Olio restaurants and cafés in Singapore. Although the company has extensive expansion plans, at present there are only nine Dôme locations (two opened in 2008), all in Singapore. (Olio Restaurants & Cafés, 2009) Coffee Club: Another Singapore-based chain, in operation since 1991. There are currently 23 outlets in operation around Singapore. Coffee Club is differentiated from most other competitors by offering an extensive food menu as well as coffee. The chain is presently limited to the Singapore area, but offers franchise opportunities which do not preclude its expansion into other areas of Asia. (Coffee Club, 2009) Cultural Issues Starbucks has over a decade of experience in growth in international markets, and certainly cannot be criticized as a culturally-insensitive company. There are, however, several cultural aspects of Starbucks’ international expansion that have been obstacles to Starbucks’ being fully-embraced in some international communities. These issues are related in some ways to the challenges of standardization and adaptation discussed in the next section, and the biggest challenge they represent overall is to the ability of Starbucks to maintain its core brand image and ‘personality’ in culturally-diverse areas. The perception of Starbucks as an ‘Americanizing’ force which overwhelms local businesses is not a new concept. The average ownership stake of the company throughout the 57 international markets is 45.4%, and among the 37 licensee markets, 19.6%. (Starbucks, 20093) This is a formidable economic presence, and when put together with the very public face of the Starbucks brand, can indeed give an ‘invasive’ impression. At least one researcher, in fact, has drawn compelling parallels between Starbucks pattern of expansion and historical colonization on the scale of the Spanish Conquests. (Rippen, 2007) Among Chinese society, for example, the resistance to colonizing foreign economic forces has been deeply ingrained in the culture since the 18th century, despite the country’s rabid appetite for foreign brands. (Giovetti, 2008) These kinds of attitudes will most likely only be intensified in the current recession, as countries and societies adopt a more protectionist stance. Another cultural issue that Starbucks faces is the public taste for coffee and coffee houses among foreign populations. Ironically, Starbucks’ introduction has seemed to be most successful among countries where coffee-drinking is not part of the culture, countries such as Japan and the UK. (Katsenelson, 2008) Part of this phenomenon may be attributable to fashion, such as in brand-conscious China where Starbucks has proven popular with customers but where tea still is the overwhelming staple drink. (Harrison, et al., 2005) In countries with a strong coffee history, the task seems more difficult; in Austria, for example, where coffeehouses have been a part of the social fabric for 300 years, the idea of drinking coffee in public or in a paper cup – or both – verges on taboo. (Katsenelson, 2008) In addition, in areas where Starbucks has already established a presence, the ubiquity of the brand has eroded some of its exclusivity; some customers seek alternatives simply because ‘everybody else’ goes to Starbucks. (Mirhaydari, 2008) This may lead to diminishing returns in expansion, unless ways are found to maintain the ‘freshness’ of the brand and the superiority of the Starbucks experience. Standardization & Adaptation Starbucks’ first objective has always been to provide the highest-quality coffee in what Chairman and CEO Howard Schultz describes as a comforting ‘third place’ between home and work for customers. The service, much of the menu, the appearance, and ambience of the store is the same whether one is in Tokyo or Topeka, and is what makes up the hard-to-describe and impossible-to-copy Starbucks Experience. (Karolefski, 2002, Dutta & Subhadra, 2006, Giovetti, 2008, Mitchell, 2008) It is precisely because of Starbucks’ rigorous adherence to a standardized program of store design, operation, and staff training that the quality experience has remained remarkably consistent throughout the world. Standardization also has practical benefits. Rapid growth is more easily accommodated if conducted according to patterns which offer a limited number of variations. (Jackson, 2008) Supply chain and operational management efficiencies are better supported by widespread standardization. Performance measures are applied more objectively and yield superior comparative data in a standardized system. The success of Starbucks is a powerful argument for standardization-in-detail and the company has been loath to stray from that path, only making significant alterations when necessary, such as, for example, the addition of segregated seating areas for women in Middle East stores. (Dutta & Subhadra, 2006) Starbucks considers itself an intimate brand, and strives to provide customers with a comfortable, personalized experience, but as Starbucks’ then-president of international operations Peter Maslen pointed out in 2002, it is “intimacy on a mass scale.” (Karolefski, 2002) Maslen wryly noted the apparent contradiction then; some of the arguments that can now be made against standardization challenge the sustainability of that paradox as Starbucks looks toward the future. One of the biggest problems Starbucks faces with its standardized image is ironically of the company’s own making, something The Washington Post (Mitchell, 2009) describes as an “existential crisis.” For years, the ambience of Starbucks was supported very strongly by unsurpassed product quality, quality that would-be competitors strove very hard to match. Many of them succeeded, or at least made quantum improvements in quality as a result of Starbucks’ setting the standard, to the extent that Starbucks’ quality is no longer considered a competitive advantage (Mirhaydari, 2008); or, as The Washington Post’s Dan Mitchell observed, “…these days, you can get a good cup of coffee at a Chevron station.” That leaves only the “Starbucks Experience” for the company to offer its customers, and there are disturbing signs that some international customers, or potential ones, are finding the experience less appealing than they once did. This trend is largely due to the cultural issues discussed in the previous section. Customers in some European countries, for example, have been put off by Starbucks’ strict no-smoking policy. (Giovetti, 2008, and Katsenelson, 2008) Same-store and market sales declined in Japan in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s – by a shocking 17% in 2002 – because customers reportedly were unhappy with the taste of Starbucks’ coffee, a sure sign that the “Starbucks Experience” was not enough to keep them coming back. (Dutta & Subhadra, 2006) Chinese customers, who have been generally supportive of Starbucks in their country, were offended by the opening of a store in the Forbidden City. (Giovetti, 2008) By contrast, Starbucks’ competitors – with the significant exception of McDonald’s – are decidedly non-standardized and adaptable by comparison. Most of Starbucks’ competition throughout Europe consists of small, local coffeehouses and cafés, and the conventional wisdom among analysts is that many customers will return to them once the novelty of Starbucks wears off. (Ibid.) In Asia, where there are more larger-scale chain competitors, standardization is kept to a minimum to take advantage of available locations. A cursory look at the websites of competitors such as the Philippines-based Figaro, or Gloria Jean’s, whose international operations are based in Australia, reveals stores that apart from recognizably consistent signage are as different as snowflakes. In terms of standardization, for these and similar competitors it only extends as far as identifiable branding and (presumably) product consistency. Otherwise, the “Figaro Experience” or the “Gloria Jean’s Experience” is unique to each location. The ambience of any given store will not, of course, appeal to every customer, whereas any Starbucks anywhere will appeal to every loyal Starbucks customer. That is in some ways a strong advantage, but if it were enough, then there would not really be any reason to expand. What is needed is a new solution – not strict standardization, not unlimited adaptation, but the best of both concepts. Internationalization Process Theory, and why it Matters to Starbucks Beginning in the mid-1970’s researchers, originally at Uppsala University in Sweden, began to develop models of the activity of companies in moving from domestic to international business. Besides the Uppsala Internationalization Model, there are two others, the Transaction Cost Analysis Model and the Network Model, which are summarized in Table 3. These models express the most common modes of companies’ internationalization, and they can be predictors of future outcomes in internationalization activities. (Snuif, 2000) Uppsala Internationalization Model Transaction Cost Analysis Model Network Model Basis for analysis Incremental decision-making of the company. The effects of transaction costs on a company’s assessment of a new market and their entry into it. Focuses on the exchange brought about by relationships among organizations and individuals. Assumptions about company’s behavior Learning process – as company gains experience in foreign markets, internationalization occurs in a sequence of well-defined steps, from simply exporting products up to manufacturing. The knowledge and experience gained from previous steps are prerequisites to making decisions and committing greater resources to subsequent steps. Internationalization decisions are based on analyzing the costs of transactions, with a view to reducing them as much as possible. Transaction costs can be divided into 3 categories: costs of research about markets; negotiation costs; and monitoring costs. Social relationships – which can involve either individuals or organizations, and be based on different connections (including personal ties) – influence market activity. According to the network model, a relationship determines the control of resources, the activities to utilize them, or the links between resources and activities. No firm or individual acts alone in the market, but in relation to all others in the market. Possible Variables in the Process Companies with greater resources can take larger internationalization steps with less risk. The time required for companies to gain knowledge and experience to move on in the process is dependent on the complexity of the market. If the market is stable and homogeneous, the time is shortened considerably. Ideal transactions are rare; transactions are modified by behaviors of the parties, the degree of specificity of the assets, internal and external uncertainties, and the frequency of the transactions. The degree of internationalization is a function of the network, thus a high degree of internationalization is possible for a company without a large number of assets in a foreign market. Normal M.O. for International Businesses Market entry should be done in small incremental steps. New markets have small psychological distance from existing ones, and methods carry least possible marginal risk. Companies should expand internally until the cost of making an external transaction is less than making an internal one. Connections should be found in domestic relationship networks to join foreign relationship networks. Table 3 – Summary of Internalization Process Models (sources: Snuif, 2000, Osarenkhoe, op. cit., 2008) The Uppsala Model and the Transaction Cost Analysis Model have been criticized in recent years because these so-called “stage” models do not seem to have theoretical validity; new technologies and market conditions have removed the necessity of following a prescribed, standardized path to internationalization. (Hadjikhani, 1997, Snuif, 2000, Sapienza, et. al, 2005, and Osarenkhoe, 2008) Business today is not what it was in the 1970’s and many companies – Starbucks more significantly than most – do not completely fit any one model. Yet if definitions of some of the key concepts of the models are broadened, ideas such as market knowledge and experience, the characteristics of transactions, and the nature of personal and organizational networks, the models can provide clues as to the potential outcomes of particular events and the most effective responses to them. (Hadjikhani, 1997) By understanding to which aspects of the traditional models the unique “Starbucks Model” of internationalization corresponds, the company will be better able to anticipate outcomes and modify the approach accordingly. OUR SOLUTION Adaptive Standardization As has been detailed in this report, the carefully-designed and deployed look, ambience, operational paradigm, and product which constitute the “Starbucks Experience” is responsible for the unmatched power of the brand, but is in some cases not the perfect fit. We propose that a new model – “Adaptive Standardization” – be adopted by Starbucks to preserve the core values of the brand yet more efficiently meet the demands of local markets, take advantage of viable locations that would be overlooked by the current Starbucks standardized model, and reduce costs not only for the company, but for potential international business partners as well. The model essentially reduces the existing Starbucks program to a relatively few core value components that would be rigidly applied, while other aspects of store location, design, menu offerings, and operation could be modified on a site-specific basis. The key features of this model are as follows: Table 4 – Components of Adaptive Standardization Key Feature Standard Rationale Approach to Market Entry In a defined market area, one ‘flagship’ store to support some number of smaller outlets ranging from small kiosk-sized locations up to full-sized stores as appropriate. *One full-scale store can serve as an operational base for training and supply management for smaller outlets. *Smaller outlying location flexibility reduces location costs, allowing more local partners. *Store opening time reduced. *Helps to head off competition by accessing a greater variety of locations. *Draws on the successful experience of Starbucks’ “saturation” expansion in the US. (Jackson, 2008) Business Partnerships Preference for joint ventures over licensing and franchising, with focus to operate the flagship store. Expansion within the defined market area through additional stores to be achieved through the joint venture as franchisor/licensor. *Reduces the marginal risk of expansion. *Expansion can be handled more efficiently if primary responsibility for it lies with experienced local partners. *Also helps reduce entry costs for interested local partners. *Deflects criticism of “colonization” in international markets by increasing local control. Site Signage and Appearance Standardized signing, color scheme, and other brand markers (such as employee uniforms), but store layout and furnishing to be site-appropriate. *Starbucks’ trademark and other visual brand cues are sufficiently recognizable to establish store identity. Customer comfort and utility better served by placing those cues in the context of their surroundings. Staff & Management Training Starbucks’ current management & employee training regimes to be maintained, but to be administered through local flagship stores by qualified local managers, who can best relate to & ensure training success of local staffs. *Places Starbucks’ effective training program in a better context with regard to local culture and languages. *More effectively co-opts local personnel, which will result in delivering a more personalized experience for customers. Menu Offerings Core menu of espresso coffee drinks and supporting products such as Tazo and Frappucino to be offered at all locations, but the variety and extent of food and other items to be determined according to local preferences. *Allows stores to tailor their menus to best meet customer demand. *Allows stores to better respond to direct competitors. *Helps Starbucks maintain its “innovative velocity” (Joshi, et. al, 2007) by essentially turning the entire store network into a product-testing lab. Store Fixtures & Supplies So long as store fixtures & supplies meet minimum requirements of the site signage and appearance standards, should be locally-sourced and creatively-chosen to reflect the local culture. (This can be applied to non-core menu items as well.) *Increases customer comfort and supports the “third place” philosophy. *Support of local businesses is a strong public-relations advantage. *In most areas, will reduce costs due to comparatively favorable local prices for these items. Conclusion After a careful review of the current circumstances of Starbucks, a comparative analysis of its competition, and a survey of relevant literature and media commentary, we have arrived at a solution we feel presents the best options and solutions for Starbucks’ continued international growth in one package. The Adaptive Standardization Model addresses the concerns facing Starbucks in comprehensive fashion: Cultural and political issues ranging from consumer tastes and preferences to levels of investment and business control are addressed by increasing local involvement in Starbucks’ individual international operations. The core bases of Starbucks brand strength – consistent, high-quality coffee products, essential brand image and identification, and the basic core template of service and management training and deployment – are maintained, but with enough flexibility to allow them to be presented most effectively to local markets. The best key aspects of internationalization process models are employed: transactional cost management through transference of marginal risk to local partners; incremental deployment through the establishment of “base and outpost” store networks within local markets; and establishment of strong relational networks through engagement with local partners and suppliers. The Adaptive Standardization Model improves Starbucks’ competitive advantages by providing unique added depth to the Starbucks Experience, making it more personalized and a more natural part of its customer communities. The advantage of the adaptability of competitors like Gloria Jean’s is countered, because the Adaptive Standardization Model allows Starbucks to compete on – quite literally – the same ground. The advantage of the standardization and vast store infrastructure of competitors like McDonald’s is countered, because the Adaptive Standardization Model allows Starbucks to provide a superior level of consistency in organic settings, something that McDonald’s cannot achieve with their present model. We share Starbucks vision that the best opportunity for growth and profitably lies in increasing the company’s international presence, but in the current economic conditions and with the considerable threats posed by up-and-coming competitors, only a carefully-deployed and flexible plan such as the Adaptive Standardization Model will ensure success. References 2008 Financial Report. (2009) McDonald’s Corporation. Available from: Baertlein, Lisa. (2009) Starbucks Profit Tops View, Focus on Value. [Internet] 30 April 2008. Los Angeles: Reuters. Available from the BNET database: Bennett, R. (1996) International Business. Melbourne: Pitman. Coffee Club. (2009) Coffee Club [Internet]. 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